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                Abstract  
This thesis aims to develop a specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism that 
follows an analysis of ancient scepticism as it began to form in the teachings of Pyrrho of 
Elis, moved into the Academy, and reached its greatest clarity in Sextus Empiricus.  The 
focus of the thesis is to expose an understanding of Pyrrhonism as offering an approach 
to finding a less troubled life by way of habitual alteration of everyday language.    
 The discussion of Pyrrho centers on several key passages that indicate a specific 
attitude towards the human condition, towards the way beliefs are generated, and towards 
the way language can be utilized to refine the generation of beliefs.  Further, comparisons 
are made between Pyrrho and Plato regarding aporia and how central uncertainty and 
wisdom through awareness of ignorance were to both of these thinkers. 
 Turning to the Academic tradition, the thesis strives to underscore the 
unargumentative, ascetic aspect of Pyrrhonian scepticism by showing the fundamental 
differences between the ascetic, language oriented Pyrrhonians, and the eristic, 
argumentative Academics.  Looking at Arcesilaus and then Carneades as examples of the 
Academic tradition, it is shown how the focus on finding the untroubled life as well as 
the language praxis found in Pyrrho’s teaching are diminished and supplanted by 
dialectical argument. 
 The final chapter briefly examines the revival of Pyrrhonism by Aenesidemus, 
showing that he appeared to be aware of the language practice that Pyrrho espoused, as 
well as the tangent that Academic scepticism took from Pyrrho’s original intentions for 
living a less troubled life.  A detailed discussion of Sextus Empiricus is contained in the 
third chapter, which revolves around a treatment of the five tropes of Agrippa, includes 
an explanation of several concepts key to understanding Sextus and an elucidation of the 
sceptical utterances central to the linguistic practice that has once again been reinstated. 
Ultimately Pyrrhonism is found to be a philosophy of revealed experience, such that she 
who wishes to live a more tranquil life needs to practice what Pyrrhonism teaches in 





    Introduction and Overview 
 
 This thesis develops a specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism that 
follows an analysis of ancient scepticism as it began to take form in the teachings of 
Pyrrho of Elis, moved into the Academy, and reached its greatest clarity in Sextus 
Empiricus.  The specific understanding aimed for considers Pyrrhonism as being attentive 
to the habitual use of everyday language by an individual, and how beliefs and 
convictions of individuals become implicitly intertwined with the language used to 
express them.  This is problematic in the eyes of the ancient sceptics and Pyrrhonists in 
particular, as they do not find convictions or beliefs to be found or justified easily.  
Further, though phrased in a way lacking Pyrrhonian finesse, Pyrrhonists do not think 
(feel is perhaps a better word, for reasons that will become clear) that holding strong 
beliefs and convictions allow one to be unperturbed by troubles or to live a happy life – 
goals handed down from the Cynics before them.  Beliefs tend to do the opposite: create 
divisions among opinions and people alike, fabricating notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. What 
is more, beliefs tend to be assumed to be grounded in unimpeachable fact, especially old 
ones, engrained from childhood or from generations past.  The Pyrrhonian worry, in an 
allegorical nutshell, is that a childhood belief can be the seed of an adult prejudice.  A 
single conviction combines with a new one in the future, joining with yet another, 
creating belief - a new ‘us’ and ‘them’, a new line in the sand - from potentially nothing, 
which is yet still assumed to be unimpeachable.  The Pyrrhonian answer to this, and the 
specific understanding that is the aim of this thesis, is to adopt a discrete use of language 
which avoids the production and dissemination of beliefs and convictions, thereby giving 
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way to the revelatory and innately ascetic Pyrrhonian path to the happy life.  Discrete 
language praxis consists of making all of one’s statements and locutions in accord with 
an aporetic attitude; that is, to speak with no inclination to claim what one says is known.  
The specific mode of aporetic language changes slightly with the development of 
scepticism over time, but can generally be understood as the shunning of making absolute 
claims about reality, the true nature of things, or one’s ability to know these things, in 
everyday speech. 
 There is a connection between this approach to using language and some 20th 
century thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Lee Whorl.  
These philosophers and linguists developed a theory that an individual’s language 
determines that individual’s thought.  This theory, called linguistic determinism, is 
deeply connected to this thesis in that aporetic language can be seen to be a forerunner of, 
or even dependent upon, linguistic determinism.  The full scope of the connections 
between aporetic language and linguistic determinism is not clear given that the ancient 
sceptics did not cash out their theory in these contemporary terms.  It is quite clear, 
nevertheless, that aporetic linguistic practice shows an interest on the part of the sceptics 
in language and how our use of language can influence and obscure our beliefs and what 
we believe we know.   
 However, the focus of this thesis is more upon how the Sceptical school of 
thought developed between the third century BCE and the third century CE, and how 
contemporaneous schools of thought influenced the sceptics and vice versa.  The 
investigation into how connected the Sceptical way is to linguistic determinism would be 
a fruitful discussion, and I feel that a good starting point would be to recognize that the 
 7 
relation between language and world is a reciprocal and continual one in that both one’s 
language and one’s world are constantly changing and evolving, sometimes together, 
sometimes not.  Short of this brief foray, linguistic determinism is set aside. 
 It is paramount to note that the Pyrrhonists do not attack those who hold such 
convictions, nor do the Pyrrhonists argue with those who try to justify beliefs.  Rather, 
Pyrrhonists view the problems created by holding beliefs and convictions as essentially 
personal problems; the Pyrrhonist is more concerned with her own affiliation with her 
own beliefs.  This is to say, Pyrrhonism is a deeply personal approach to living happily 
and is not antagonistic or intended for dialectics.  This is accomplished through the 
shedding of beliefs via the habituation of the previously mentioned use of language, 
aimed at oneself and not at an interlocutor.  If indeed this form of language use is ever 
‘directed at’ or used upon another, it is almost certainly carried out in a pedagogical way 
meant to teach the uninformed of the Pyrrhonian way. 
 The discussion of Pyrrho contextualizes the entire thesis and centers on several 
key passages that indicate a specific attitude towards the human condition, towards the 
way beliefs are generated, and towards the way language can be utilized to refine the 
generation of beliefs.  The germ of the specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism 
that will be drawn out is an attitude generated through aporetic language practice.  
Pyrrho’s ascetic, aporetic disposition is developed and maintained within language so as 
to address language use itself, and more importantly, to address the troubling effects that 
language has upon our conscious and unconscious ontological beliefs and opinions.  He 
does this largely through conscious effort, to speak of things as being ‘no more’ this than 
that, having the attitude of this phrase underlie most every statement.  To be clear, the 
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teaching of Pyrrho offers a deeply habituated way of speaking, rooted in a recognition of 
the limits of human experience, to reduce the number and impact of troubling beliefs 
about the true nature of things.  Exposed through select passages on Pyrrho’s teaching as 
well as anecdotal records of his life, the linguistic praxis of maintaining aporia1 for the 
benefit of reducing deceptive beliefs is the foremost concern of the present effort. 
 The first chapter draws comparisons between Pyrrho and several Platonic 
dialogues in which aporia is shown to be a state of mind essential to beginning any 
inquiry.  For example, in the Meno, Socrates espouses utter uncertainty on his part as to 
whether virtue can be taught, and brings Meno to experience aporia himself before trying 
to help him birth his own ideas.  In Theaetetus Socrates casts several theories of 
knowledge into uncertainty, and by never offering a clear argument for what knowledge 
truly is he ends the entire dialogue in aporia.  
 Discussion of the soul is also found to be an area of comparison between Pyrrho 
and Plato, and allows for a quick exposition of how one such as Pyrrho, who ‘determines 
nothing,’ can seem to speak openly about the soul and yet not be inconsistent with his 
avoidance of dogmatism.  Following Democritus, Pyrrho suggests that much of human 
experience and truth is based on custom and conventions.  To speak about something 
such as the soul, Pyrrho is merely following what is customarily understood, so as to 
make sense to those with whom he speaks; he follows customs and appearances, but 
withholds from assenting to them being true as they appear.  Accordingly, the thesis that 
Pyrrho offers an aporetic attitude maintained in language is reinforced, as things such as 
the soul are ‘no more’ real than not real, and are merely spoken of as conventions of 
language. 
                                                
1 See glossary entry on aporia. 
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 Furthermore, the way in which Pyrrho teaches is shown to be a pedagogy of 
revealed experience, as Pyrrho teaches by living and practicing what he preaches.  He 
does not argue for it, nor does his philosophy revolve around argumentation.  All 
evidence of his position is either from him explaining how he feels that one can live a 
happier life, or anecdotal examples of things he did or stated.  Little is given by way of 
direct argument.  Based upon this approach to teaching, a ‘pedagogy of the sage’ or 
teaching through revealed experience, is developed to elucidate further Pyrrho’s modus 
operandi. 
 The second chapter focuses on the development of scepticism as it moved into 
Plato’s Academy under the headship of Arcesilaus.  Through him, and furthered later by 
Carneades, the ascetic, the aporetic disposition central to Pyrrho’s approach to the human 
condition, as well as Pyrrho’s pedagogy, are exchanged for a desire to argue.  The 
Academic sceptics are not concerned with finding the good life, maintaining the 
pedagogy to do so, or with aporetic language use, nearly as much as they wish to engage 
in argumentation.  This is made clear by the misappropriation of Pyrrho’s ‘no more’ 
locution into an eristic2 weapon, such that it is no longer part of a linguistic practice for 
maintaining aporia, but the arrowhead of dialectical arguments aimed at throwing down 
interlocutors.  Not only is the end of Pyrrho’s scepticism substituted for another, but the 
very path he walks is disregarded for another. 
 In addition, Arcesilaus and Carneades further distance themselves from Pyrrho’s 
linguistic praxis by offering criteria for living a good life (by the reasonable and by the 
plausible, respectively) which are only offered when their suspension of judgement is 
charged with inaction.  That is, they offer a way of living only when charged with having 
                                                
2 See glossary entry on eristic. 
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to do so, and even then, it is generally understood that they offer such criteria 
dialectically and do not appear to practice it.  This chapter discusses many similarities 
between the Academics and Pyrrhonians, with particular attention given to the 
Academic’s assault on Stoic kataleptic impressions, but the eristic focus of the 
Academics and the apparent disappearance of the concern for reducing troubling beliefs 
in the end serve as a contrast against which to highlight the features of Pyrrhonism itself. 
 The third chapter begins with Aenesidemus’ revival of Pyrrhonism and criticism 
of the Academic tradition.  Aenesidemus revives the aporetic linguistic praxis that 
originated with Pyrrho and died with the Academics.  He brings the desire for finding a 
happier life as well as the language practice back into focus and adds his own relativizing 
tincture to the locutions available to the sceptic.  Aenesidemus does this by compiling a 
list of tropes3 or ‘ways’ to suspend judgement that are generally understood as 
arguments.  They are not simply arguments, as they are literally ways of speaking to 
maintain aporia and suspended judgement.  If the tropes were simply arguments, then 
Aenesidemus’ criticism of the Academics and self proclaimed revival of Pyrrho’s work 
would be hollow. He is reviving Pyrrho’s aporetic practice and pedagogy, and is 
criticizing the Academics for their focus on argumentation. 
 The tropes of Aenesidemus are discussed in brief and their merit as both 
arguments and locutions like Pyrrho’s ‘no more’ locution are weighed.  Ultimately 
Aenesidemus reinvigorated the language practice of Pyrrho, which aimed at reducing the 
number of troubling beliefs that an individual creates for himself or herself regarding the 
true nature of things. 
                                                
3 See glossary entry on trope. 
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 The final part of the third chapter is dedicated to understanding the position of 
Sextus Empiricus, widely regarded as one of the last bastions of ancient scepticism.  The 
discussion of Sextus focuses on the five tropes of Agrippa, and provides a detailed 
exposition of several key concepts, including phantasiai4, apprehension, epoche5, and 
ataraxia6.  A similar treatment of the tropes is given here as was given in the previous 
chapter in that the use of them as locutions or utterances is underscored by the linguistic 
praxis that Sextus is found to take quite seriously.  Indeed, his writing itself inculcates the 
aporetic disposition in language that Pyrrhonism recommends, as Sextus rarely makes 
determinations about anything beyond phantasiai. 
 Sextus strives to expose the experience of aporia and epoche, which result in 
ataraxia, by reducing the number and impact of beliefs about non-evident things.  Much 
like Pyrrho, he allows for customs and appearances to guide the sceptic through life, but 
he suspends judgement as to whether appearances lead to knowledge in the absolute 
sense.  The tropes are intended to do this, not so much as arguments but as ways to speak 
that suspend judgement and reveal the experience of uncertainty, similar to what Socrates 
aimed to accomplish in the aporetic dialogues.   
 By maintaining the experience of aporia and the suspension of judgement via 
language practice, the Pyrrhonians offer a philosophy that is distinct in that it finds the 
uncertainty of human experience to be a source of tranquility.  They do not say that they 
are utterly devoid of troubles, nor do they in fact outright claim that Pyrrhonism does in 
fact reduce troubles.  They offer a practice or quietude that appears to reveal a happy and 
less stressful way of life that can only be disclosed, if at all, through actual practice of 
                                                
4 See glossary entry on phantasiai. 
5 See glossary entry on epoche. 
6 See glossary entry on ataraxia. 
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aporetic language.  To speak no longer as if you know is the core of Pyrrhonian language 
praxis, and the pleasant result of this is a reduction of dogmatic beliefs which create more 
strife than they create happiness. 
 
             Chapter One 
 
   1. Pyrrho’s Aporetic Linguistic Praxis 
 
 Scepticism has changed a great deal since its genesis in Western philosophy.  
Indeed the contemporary, everyday use of ‘being sceptical’ as doubting or dis-believing 
certain things, while reflecting on some connection to the tradition of philosophical 
scepticism, grasps only a very narrow view of how philosophers have been ‘sceptical’ 
throughout the ages.  Scepticism has even become synonymous with being cynical or 
vitriolic, and this is a travesty that should be corrected if a better understanding of what 
scepticism has to offer is to be achieved.  Scepticism originated as a philosophy 
concerned with the individual living a good or happy life.  It developed out of the sea 
change as the Hellenistic period focused more on the happiness of the individual in the 
world rather than on grand political systems of the previous era.  It is not, as is so often 
misconstrued, a philosophy troubling over determining absolute truth from absolute 
falsehood, or making grand metaphysical claims or refutations about reality.  Early 
scepticism was closer to a mix of asceticism, quietism, and phenomenology, and though 
some branches of scepticism later turned away from these, I would argue that this here-
and-now focus was Pyrrho of Elis’ (3rd – 2nd century BCE) – widely regarded now as the 
earliest bona fide sceptic – entire goal.  Later sceptics who revived his philosophical aims 
carried Pyrrho’s goal forward.  Pyrrho did not care as much for argumentation as many of 
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the schools of his era did, and he appeared genuinely concerned with exploring how one 
could live a happy life.  The here-and-now focus of Pyrrho is evident in the way 
language-use is central to his aporetic way of life.  I argue that his sceptical, aporetic 
disposition is made and maintained within language to address language use itself, and 
more importantly, to address the troubling effects that language has upon our conscious 
and unconscious ontological beliefs and opinions.   
 After this outline of Pyrrho, comparisons and contrasts are drawn between him, 
Socrates, and Plato, specifically about the varying uses of aporia.  Furthermore, I shed 
light on the soul as a common ground that Pyrrho shared with his philosophical 
contemporaries, showcasing not only the common use and presence of the soul in 
Hellenistic thought, but also that Pyrrho’s use is a prime example of his practice of 
following appearances, customs, and conventions so as to make sense despite total 
aporia.  All of this is in effort to highlight my understanding of Pyrrho’s scepticism: a 
phenomenological, almost post-structuralist linguistic approach to maintaining an open, 
undogmatic, unbiased, and ultimately unperturbed disposition towards the human 
condition. 
   To begin however, a more accurate description of ancient scepticism is needed.  
Separating the origins of scepticism from the general modern understanding of it might 
be easier if there were a definitive ‘first sceptic’ in the pantheon of philosophers, but 
when sceptical thought first began is hardly agreed upon as many ancient philosophers 
held skeptical dispositions, including Plato, Aristotle, and many before them.  These 
include, though not exhaustively: Parmenides, who claimed that reality is not entirely as 
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it appears to us, nor as we think about it7; Democritus, who thought that reality was atoms 
moving in void and all else is just a matter of belief and convention8; and Metrodorus of 
Chius, who understood that “none of us knows anything, not even this whether we know 
or do not know.”9 Perhaps the most venerated grandfather of scepticism is Pyrrho of Elis, 
though it seems, as will be discussed, that philosophers before him such as those named 
above, largely influenced his philosophy of doubt, particularly Democritus and his 
statement regarding convention and custom developing ‘truth’. 
 While many of these ancient precursors to Pyrrho contained in their thought many 
seeds of what would become scepticism, we might turn to the origin of the word ‘sceptic’ 
to clarify how the ancient sceptics carried forth their philosophical stance.  The Greek 
‘skepsis’ from which ‘sceptic’ is derived implies an investigation or inquiry into 
something.10  The inquiry of the sceptics might be into any given thing – metaphysical or 
epistemological truths – but it is most certainly conducted in the realm of language, 
language being the medium for making propositions and claims about knowledge and 
justifying beliefs.  A sceptic to the ancient Greeks was someone apt to inquire into things 
and not quickly settle on a given conclusion.11  A doctor and self-proclaimed sceptic by 
the name Sextus Empiricus, who wrote in approximately the late second to early third 
century CE, is the main source regarding the Pyrrhonian variety of scepticism.  He 
provides an excellent comparison of what is his own later skepticism with other 
                                                
7 Parmenides, H. Diels, Die Fragment der Vorsokratiker, ed. W. Kranz, 6th edition, (Hildesheim: 
Weidmann, 1951).  See also Michael Frede, Chapter Eight: The Sceptics in Routledge History of 
Philosophy, vol II, From Aristotle to Augustine,  edited by David Furley,  (London: Routledge, 1999), 257. 
8 Frede, 257. Quoting Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, 325a 23 ff. 
9  Frede, 257 quoting PE XIV, 19, 9, DK B1. Note: Diogenes (9.71-72) outlines several sceptical thinkers 
including Homer, Archilochus, Euripides, Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus. 
10  Frede, 253. 
11 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism in “Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings Second 
Edition,” Translated by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998), 1.12. 
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contemporaneous philosophical views and in doing so offers insight into what it was to 
be a sceptic.  Though Sextus is at the tail end of the sceptical movement of the Hellenes 
(really, the beginning of the Roman period), and his flavour of skepticism is different 
from that of those before him, he offers insight into these previous forms of scepticism as 
well as his own, and his works Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians 
are among the most complete works on ancient skepticism.  As he explains at the outset 
of the Outlines, there are three approaches to inquiry represented by three different 
philosophical camps.  There are the dogmatists, or those who think they have found 
answers to their inquiries; there are the Academic skeptics, or those who think or believe 
that inquiries cannot be resolved; and lastly there are the Pyrrhonian skeptics, who do not 
give up on inquiry.12  
 Dogmatists, insofar as ancient scepticism was concerned, were those who claimed 
to know something with absolute certainty.  To speak or theorize as if the world were 
indubitably made up of water, that everything in the world fits into a precise number of 
categories, or that this world is a mere reflection of a more perfect one, all fall under the 
moniker ‘dogmatic’.  These dogmatic thinkers, by claiming to know something, cease 
their inquiry into that thing by the very fact that they assume it, or understand it, to be 
true and that reality actually is the way they claim it to be.  This may be an 
epistemological claim about how we can know, or a metaphysical claim about the nature 
of the universe – in any case, the important thing here is that the claimant is no longer 
inquiring into the truth of her claim, since it is now assumed or understood to be known.   
 Cynical or negative doubt like that of the Academic sceptics appears to be largely 
how modern everyday thought tends to construe all of scepticism.  That is, scepticism at 
                                                
12  Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.1-4. 
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large is believed to be the denial of a truth claim due to the preconceived conclusion that 
certainty and truth are simply not available or graspable.  This point is a sharp one and 
needs to be understood, as it arises often in ancient sceptical thought, especially in later 
criticism of the Academics.  To claim that X is true or can be known, and to claim that X 
is not true or cannot be known, are both fundamentally claims to a truth about X.  
Academic skeptics varied greatly, as will be discussed, but like the dogmatists, they 
generally ceased their inquiry into many epistemological or metaphysical questions.  
They did not do so because they felt they had resolved their inquiry and beheld a 
‘positive’ truth about reality (i.e. everything is made of water, or X is P) but they felt that 
inquiry and certainty were not humanly available to us ( i.e. X is –P).  Essentially, where 
as a dogmatist claimed to know X, Academics claimed that we cannot know X.  Later 
sceptics, who felt that the claim to know X and the claim to know that X cannot be 
known, both amounted to claiming to know something about X, derisively dubbed the 
former ‘negative dogmatism’.  Academic scepticism developed in Plato’s Academy with 
scholarchs like Arcesilaus (3rd -2nd century BCE) and Carneades (2nd – 1st century BCE), 
who reacted to a great extent against dogmatists who claimed to have ‘resolved their 
inquiry’, which included Stoics, Peripatetics, Platonists, and just about any who did not 
profess a skeptical outlook.  
 The Pyrrhonists, ‘revived’ by Aenesidemus in the 1st century CE, reacted in turn 
against the negative dogmatism of the Academic sceptics, and refused to assent to a 
resolution, or assent to the belief that no resolution is possible.  From this perfunctory and 
very general comparison of dogmatists (anyone who claims to know something), 
Academic sceptics (those who claim nothing can be known), and Pyrrhonian skeptics 
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(those who do not claim to know something for certain), we can grasp the thrust of 
scepticism – it is a recognition of the limitations of human experience and knowledge, 
though not necessarily a negation of the possibility of knowledge or reality.  This, 
combined with the tendency of Hellenistic philosophies to regard as deficient a 
philosophy that cannot be practiced as a path to a good life, demarcates the essential 
difference between ancient scepticism and modern scepticism.  Modernity has pared 
away from the term the focus on improving the life of the individual that the ancient 
sceptics, particularly the Pyrrhonists, held to be their very goal. 
What did the ancient sceptic delimit, however?  Epistemological claims about 
what knowledge is and how justified we are in laying claim to it?  Metaphysical claims 
about reality and what is true or false in it?  Did the ancient sceptics inquire into how and 
what we know, or about the truth of the nature of things?  Once again, different sceptics 
seem to have different aims for their inquiry, and a clear answer to this general line of 
questioning is not available, though we might look to interpretations of Eusebius, a 
Christian scholar in the 3rd century, to show how an either epistemological or 
metaphysical reading of what he records can lend to a better understanding of ancient 
skepticism as a whole.  He writes on the thought of Pyrrho, who is largely held as the 
beginning of a coherent form of scepticism, and a general understanding of the origins of 
scepticism is what we are here looking to gather.  It will become evident that Pyrrho was 
not as keen to prove or disprove metaphysical or epistemological theories as much as he 
wished to illuminate a happy way of life, as his aporetic linguistic practice categorically 
avoids making such claims.  
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In his Preparatio Evangelica, Eusebius discusses what he has read of Aristocles 
regarding the philosophy of Pyrrho of Elis as handed down through Pyrrho’s pupil, 
Timon.  Therein Eusebius reports on three questions that Timon posited as necessary for 
one who is looking for happiness in life: “First, what things are like; second, what our 
disposition ought to be with respect to them; and finally, what will be the result for those 
who are so disposed.”13  Timon states that Pyrrho’s answers to these are that things are 
equally “indifferent and unmeasurable and undecidable,”14 and that following from this 
our senses and opinions niether lie nor tell the truth, and we should not trust them.  
Rather, we should be:  
 
[…] undogmatic and uncommitted and unswayed, saying of each and every thing 
 that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not […] the 
 result for those who are in this disposition will first be speechlessness and then 
 freedom from disturbance.15  
As Harold Thorsrud points out, the ancient sceptics were peculiar not for their aporetic 
stance on inquiry, but for the way they find this disposition in itself to be a path to 
happiness in life, or at least to freedom from disturbance.16  
As he further indicates, Pyrrho’s aim here seems to be to “relieve us of poorly 
founded confidence and the disturbing desires that it produces.”17  That is, we do not 
know things, we cannot say to know a thing absolutely, and we need to recognize that 
                                                
13  Eusebius, Prep. Ev. 14.18, 758d, I used the text in Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings 
Second Edition. Translated by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998). 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Harald Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 25. 
17  Ibid.  
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very fact.  In recognizing the reality that we do not know things as we so often assume 
we do, we can live our lives undisturbed by the troubles that these assumptions generate – 
troubles such as creating further divisions between people, beliefs regarding right and 
wrong, good and evil, all of which are based on belief but assumed to be based on truth.  
The disturbances that Pyrrho avoids are those problems generated by assumptions carried 
forward by their absorption into language usage.  If we consistently remain undogmatic 
about what we actually know about the words we use to make propositions and claims 
about how the world is, then we will avoid many of the disturbances that they cause.  For 
example, it is widely assumed that death is a bad thing to happen to someone.  Many 
arguments and beliefs have been set out throughout history attesting to this; belief 
systems about an afterlife, reincarnation, and still more beliefs about how to live this life 
to prepare for death.  The majority of these beliefs assume knowledge about death, and 
operate their arguments and language with the presumption that the person who holds a 
given belief also holds the underlying knowledge about death, when in fact no one is 
privy to such certainty about death.  Perhaps the beliefs themselves are harmless enough, 
but when conflicting beliefs meet, whether in an individual who is contemplating them or 
between people who uphold conflicting beliefs, then disturbances certainly arise.  
Conflicting beliefs and ideals are the hallmark of every major war and conflict through 
human history; this much is as obvious as is the need to avoid such conflict.  The deeper 
disturbance is that the antecedent beliefs (e.g., about death), only assumed in the 
language necessary to convey them, are not as sturdy a foundation as the consequent 
beliefs (i.e., about the nature of an afterlife) further assume them to be. 
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As already indicated, scholars18 have wrangled with the question of whether 
Pyrrho intended his scepticism as specifically epistemological or metaphysical, with 
particular attention being given to the above passage from Eusebius.  The linguistic focus 
I am taking in interpreting Pyrrho’s intentions mark the metaphysical or epistemological 
difference as less crucial, since either can be assumed in my understanding of Pyrrho.  
His focus is in preventing uncertain knowledge becoming the foundation for beliefs, and 
he wishes to do this via an aporetic practice of language.  Thus, he is aporetic towards 
epistemological claims as much as metaphysical ones, and desires to alter the dogmatic 
dispositions we have towards these by exposing the aporia at the roots of many of our 
beliefs.  
Richard Bett offers insight into interpreting the passage in either direction, 
focusing on the Greek terms adiaphora, astathmeta, and anepikreta in Pyrrho’s answers.  
Interpreting these into English as ‘indifferent, unbalanced, and indeterminate,’ gives them 
a metaphysical orientation according to Bett, while interpreting them as  ‘indifferentiable, 
immeasurable, and indeterminable’ gives them an epistemological reading.19  He goes on 
to say that, while the metaphysical reading – which would have Pyrrho speaking about 
the nature of the external world - may seem to entail the epistemological reading 
concerning the nature of human knowledge, “the two claims are certainly not equivalent; 
the first claim is about things, irrespective of any cognitive relation which we may stand 
to them, and the second is about that very cognitive relation.”20  Bett draws lines of 
                                                
18 Richard Bett, Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism. Translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); Benson Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
19 Bett. 18-19. 
20 Ibid., 19. 
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comparison to Pyrrho’s use of ‘thing’ (pragmata) to both Aristotle’s use of it in 
Metaphysics as well as Plato’s use of it in several Platonic dialogues, notably 
Parmenides, where pragmata are associated with doxa, or the everyday, non-theoretical 
opinions people have.  He states that these terms concern  “those opinions that take the 
familiar world as it appears to us in ordinary experience as fully real, as a source of 
truth.”21  In this light it seems that Pyrrho may indeed be speaking one way or the other, 
either metaphysically or epistemologically, but the ‘undogmatic, uncommitted, 
unswaying’ disposition that he advocates is underscored by a practice concerned with 
how one ought to speak about things, “saying of each and every thing that it no more is or 
is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not.”22  This practiced linguistic 
disposition is one of the strongest and most common threads throughout all forms of 
ancient scepticism.  It is perhaps the most unrecognized aspect of their entire philosophy, 
and does not rest solely or specifically on an epistemic or metaphysical claim.  It is a 
disposition not uncommonly taught in the era, as most every philosophy’s aim was to 
guide a person to the good and happy life.  Pyrrho is offering a way of life, through his 
aporetic disposition and language practice, that avoids the disturbances caused by the 
assumption and subsumption of certainty into language.  No such certainty is available 
for many things, yet everyday language does not differentiate; we talk about what it is ‘to 
know’ that the tree outside is a birch tree in the same way in which we talk about justice 
and virtuous action.  Pyrrho wants to show that by stepping back from certainty and 
altering the dogmatic phrases in everyday language to be more accepting of uncertainty, 
many of our troubling beliefs fade. 
                                                
21 Bett, 24. 
22  Eusebius, 14.18. 
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1.1 Ataraxia in Epictetus and Epicurus 
This avoidance of disturbances and anxiety, or ataraxia, is the focus of several 
schools of thought, including those of Epictetus and Epicurus, for whom philosophy was 
also intended to direct one towards living a good life.  Giving a brief account of their 
utilization of ataraxia will help illuminate the term as it was generally used.   
 Epictetus, a proponent of Stoicism in the 1-2st century CE, advocated ataraxia as 
essential to living the eudiamonic or happy life, along with ‘freedom from passions’ 
(apatheia) and ‘good feelings’ (eupatheia).  Ataraxia was viewed as a mental state of 
tranquility, that was integral to the whole of Epictetus’ path of learning which involved 
being content with the faculties one is given, as well as acting virtuously, which the Stoic 
thought was necessary to realize a eudiamonic life.  
Much earlier, in the 3rd century BCE, Epicurus developed his own philosophy 
largely concerned with regulating pleasure.  Anxiety was viewed as the greatest obstacle 
to attaining pleasure, particularly regarding one’s concerns for the future.  Ataraxia was 
the state of mind achieved by those who were able to banish anxiety and focus on 
reducing the number of their desires to maximize the amount of pleasure they receive 
from fulfilling them.  In essence, ataraxia was an individually achieved revelation, a state 
of mind that was perhaps taught by a teacher, but achieved within one’s self, with the 
intention of reducing anxiety. 
Thus, both the above brief outlines of ataraxia show that it was not a word of 
singular meaning to Greek thought.  Ataraxia is a state of mind primarily, and is a state of 
mind underscored by tranquility, being without troubles, and imperturbability.  It is also 
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seen as a goal that one can aim for and attain, and even as a necessary step towards living 
a eudiamonic life.  Lastly, and perhaps implicitly understood, ataraxia is a customary 
term for the Greeks.  It is a regularly used word to describe that state of mind of being 
without troubles and being unperturbed.  All of these are held in common within Pyrrho’s 
views on scepticism, particularly the last, as it is by customs and conventions that Pyrrho 
feels everything is ‘known’.   
 
1.2 The Role of Epoche and Ataraxia in Pyrrho 
Diogenes Laertius records Pyrrho saying “that nothing was either honourable or 
shameful, just or unjust; similarly for all cases he said that nothing exists in truth but that 
men do everything on the basis of convention and custom; for each thing is no more this 
than that.”23  By this, we get a glimpse into the focus of Pyrrho’s epoche (generally 
understood as ‘suspension of judgement’), and how he found ataraxia.  He seems to 
focus on ethical or moral questions concerning honour, justice, good, and bad, suggesting 
that he felt that what we think we know of these things is in fact (or, at least as likely to 
be) merely customary or conventional ways of thinking and speaking.  This concern feeds 
into his unease for how our beliefs are generated by things that are not known for certain 
but are still assumed to be known. 
What is known of Pyrrho’s stance on ataraxia is obscure, as it is only through 
second, third, and fourth-hand accounts such as the passage from Eusebius (copied from 
Aristocles writing on Timon who was recording Pyrrho’s teachings) where it is stated 
that ataraxia follows for those who adopt epoche and an aporetic disposition.  Pyrrho 
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recommends that epoche be less about epistemological or metaphysical things as such, 
and more about the practice of language for the alteration of language.  He does not aim 
to argue with people over these things; he wishes to express the suspension of judgement 
and suspension of belief in everyday speech, so that the ‘to know’ language of knowing, 
for example, the tree outside is a birch, or that the car is a particular shade of green, does 
not intermingle unconsciously or implicitly with the language used to convey thoughts 
about the nature of justice, goodness, or genuine philosophical claims about the nature of 
reality.  This is so that when a disagreement occurs, we do not become perturbed, or more 
importantly, develop loyalties to and hatreds of  beliefs or opinions that contradict our 
own beliefs or opinions - beliefs and opinions we potentially have held by nothing other 
than custom and convention.   
 This is Pyrrho’s ataraxia, and it follows from having and maintaining an aporetic 
disposition and no longer being vested in the truth  or falsity of ontological underpinnings 
of what we state about the nature of things in language.  Pyrrho is neither a solipsist nor a 
nihilist; he wishes us to say what we perceive, feel, and understand.  He only wishes us to 
“determine nothing dogmatically […] but rather follow appearances.”24  That is, to be 
aware that the truth of all of what we say is not as graspable and fixed as our ability to 
signify it in language makes it out to be.  He wishes us to avoid the troubling effects of 
implicitly adopting beliefs and values in our use of language.  To alter one’s use of 
language to reflect an aporetic stance, ‘saying of each and every thing that it no more is 
than not is, or both is and not is or neither is nor is not,’ is to follow Pyrrho’s 
recommendation of epoche and to be less troubled by the limits of the human condition 
than are those who claim to know.  By ‘those who claim to know’, (i.e. dogmatists) I 
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mean those who implicitly deny or do not recognize the limits of human knowledge by 
utilizing ‘to know’ in an unqualified sense. 
Other philosophies also recommended aporia as a route to a happier or more 
virtuous life.  Plato’s teachings in the dialogues are not only aporetic but also can be seen 
to recommend an aporetic stance to Socrates’ interlocutors.  Scepticism is distinct in that 
it finds the practiced aporetic disposition of maintaining one’s metaphysical and 
epistemological limitations constantly present in one’s everyday speech as that very path 
to a life of flourishing.  The things sceptics wish to avoid are deception, falsehood, and 
beliefs based on either of these things.  The sceptic feels his dogmatic opponents 
succumb to these false beliefs more often than not, and thereby suffer the irritation of 
arguing for their position or even simply hearing a contrary one to their own – things that 
the sceptic avoids by not having a dogmatic position to argue for or from.  Pyrrho is 
recommending a deeply habituated mode of speech rooted in the recognition of the 
limitations of human experience so as to avoid these irritations.  It is no small thing that 
Pyrrho maintained that speechlessness, or aphasia, is the first result of a sceptical 
disposition, and that freedom from disturbance, or ataraxia, follows. Disturbances arise 
from ceasing to inquire into the most basic aspects of our ontological beliefs and 
assuming the answers to have been found; as soon as openness to inquiry ceases, 
falsehood can however innocently, be assumed, believed, and acted upon, and are 
reflected in and amplified by their assumed ‘truth’ in everyday language.  Aristotle’s first 
principles and Plato’s hypotheses serve as examples of what Pyrrho tries to avoid, though 
we must be careful here.  Pyrrho approves of the inquiry, even of taking up hypotheses or 
first principles for the sake of inquiry.  Rather, it is when the language used in the inquiry 
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is no longer of inquiry, but of having found something true and certain and taking that as 
a new starting point, that Pyrrho feels becomes a stumbling block in the road of living a 
happy life.  When the first principle is no longer clearly maintained as a possibility but is 
spoken of as true and real is when Pyrrho becomes uneasy about the beliefs that develop 
from a principle that is assumed to be true.  Someone who is genuinely not sure if the 
world is made up of water will not make a statement that assumes such a premise, nor 
will he go on to make further metaphysical or epistemological claims based upon that 
presumed knowledge about the world.  This person will not do this if they follow 
Pyrrho’s recommended practice because Pyrrho forces one to maintain an aporetic 
disposition in language itself.  Inquiry always stems from this disposition.  As soon as 
language becomes openly dogmatic, saying X is X, rather than X appears to be, or may be 
X, potential falsehoods can be assumed true, or truths assumed to be false.  Language, 
being the medium of making claims, propositions, and assenting to beliefs, becomes 
more resilient to the falls of developing certainties and beliefs out of falsehoods by 
recognizing the limits of human knowledge and justification.  This is a point to be 
developed later; here I only wish to highlight the recommended linguistic praxis of an 
aporetic disposition as the germ of Pyrrho’s path to living a good life.   
This disposition of Pyrrho’s is reportedly unique to him, as Diogenes Laertius 
writes that Pyrrho came to profess it after learning under a certain Bryson son of Stilpo, 
as well as Anaxarchus.  Pyrrho is believed to have be influenced by a journey to India 
where he allegedly spoke with gymnosophists.25  Pyrrho introduced 
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the idea of ungraspability and suspension of judgement […] For he said that 
 nothing was either honourable or shameful, just or unjust; similarly for all cases 
 he said that nothing exists in truth but that men do everything on the basis of 
 convention and custom; for each thing is no more this than that.26  
 
Diogenes further reports that Pyrrho required friends to follow him around to prevent him 
from falling off cliffs or being trampled by wagons, as he allegedly did not believe his 
senses, though he continues to say that Aenesidemus spoke of Pyrrho as only theorizing 
about suspending judgement, and did not live improvidently.  I take the reports of Pyrrho 
being willing to walk off cliffs if not for his friends to be little more than a joke at his 
expense, but find there to be more to Aenesidemus’ report than Diogenes gives credence 
to.  Certainly Pyrrho theorized about his disposition of suspending judgement, and 
perhaps he did not live and act out that suspensive attitude to the extent of walking into 
traffic, but in between theorizing and acting is saying, is language, and that is where the 
praxis of Pyrrho’s attitude of suspending judgement and of saying of things that they are 
‘no more this than that’, makes its mark.  Whether Pyrrho doubted sensation or the reality 
of the external world, or thinks that we should actually have these same doubts seems to 
become secondary to his focus on the practice of maintaining the ramifications of these 
doubts in everyday speech.  Language itself is defined by ‘convention and custom,’ and 
Pyrrho may indeed have been pointing to this connection; that is, that language is 
governed by convention and custom, but that the convention and custom of a person and 
a people are also governed by their use of language.  What is a word if we do not all 
signify the same thing by it?  What is a thing if there is no customary word for it?  There 
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is a schism between the customs and conventions we have for language, and the reality 
we assume them to possess.  Nothing is more honourable than shameful, more just than 
unjust: we have merely taken the words for these from customs and let them be grasped 
as truth in reality, when no such grasping is really occurring.  As mentioned earlier as an 
example, ‘death’ is the root of a great many beliefs concerning how people should live 
and what may occur after death.  What ‘death’ and its entourage of beliefs ‘is’ changes 
with the customs and conventions of different groups of people; one group thinks death is 
bad and believe that you do not actually die but continue in an afterlife; another group 
may think death is not so bad since it believes that you reincarnate every time you die.  
At the root of it all, however, is the assumption of knowledge about death that pertains to 
reality itself – and each group who has a belief to uphold tends to think its belief is 
known.  Thus, disturbances arise whereas following Pyrrho’s aporetic disposition would 
have prevented them.  This is not to say that the Pyrrhonist does not follow customs, but 
that she does so without giving assent to the beliefs behind the custom. 
 The importance of customs is echoed further in another account of Diogenes, 
where a dog attacks Pyrrho and someone reproaches him for panicking.27  Pyrrho replied 
that it is “hard to shed completely one’s humanity, but that one should struggle against 
circumstances, as much as possible in one’s actions, but if not then at least in words.”28  
The reproach for showing emotion or ‘humanity’ here seems opposed to what Pyrrho’s 
recommended aporetic way of life is, as he does not recommend casting off pathos in the 
passage from Eusebius.  However, this passage does address the outcome of ataraxia that 
Pyrrho professed.  The aim is not to divest or neglect oneself of pathe forced upon one by 
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something like a dog attack, but to shed the thought, and the language that follows it, that 
the dog attack, or falling off a cliff, is in reality good or bad.  It seems to me that Pyrrho 
would indeed be struck by the fear of walking off a cliff, but to speak of the ensuing 
death as absolutely bad or good, he would not assent or dissent, but would suspend 
judgement; hence the joke.  In the same section in Diogenes’ account of Pyrrho, he 
speaks of Pyrrho doing things that did not follow custom, such as washing pigs, lending 
to the idea that even within customs he did not regard things as truly good nor bad.  
Pyrrho is willing to draw from custom and convention for direction much like 
Democritus did, though still with a critical eye and always from his aporetic disposition.  
He will follow customs, both in action and in language, in accordance with those customs 
he finds himself a part of so as to be able to function both as a person and as an active 
linguistic agent.  He does not put any belief in these customary actions or words he uses; 
I would say he uses them so as to participate in the world, and make sense of his own 
pathe, but he refuses any dogmatic understanding of them being based on any certain 
knowledge.  It seems that if Pyrrho were born in the Early Middle Ages in Europe, he 
would probably have been Catholic, and if he lived in India, he would probably have 
been Hindu.  In either of these examples, the point is that he would have adopted the 
customs and the beliefs of the world in which he found himself.  Perhaps that is Pyrrho’s 
aim, however: to show that all around the world humanity’s ‘truths’ and beliefs are 
founded on customs and conventions.  The crucial difference is that Pyrrho never wants 
to let go of the fact that the very foundations of those beliefs are nothing more than 
epistemological and metaphysical assumptions, solidified by the operation of language to 
articulate those very assumptions, mixed with customs and beliefs from his background. 
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 Lending to the above, Diogenes tells a story allegedly told by Posidonius, 
speaking of Pyrrho being on a ship caught in a storm at sea, with all passengers aboard 
frightened by the storm.  Pyrrho was calm and pointed to a pig on the ship eating from its 
trough unperturbed by the storm, saying of it, “the wise man ought to repose in such a 
state of freedom from disturbance.”29  The pig in this anecdote is an allegorical example 
of Pyrrho’s wise sage.  The pig is wise because it is free of the conventions of language 
and the assumptions about reality that these conventions develop in those who adopt 
them as true, and is therefore able to be free of any worry about the goodness or badness 
of the outcome of the storm because of the adoption of epoche due to every thing being 
indifferentiable/indifferent, immeasurable/unbalanced, and indeterminable/indeterminate.  
While the pig is also free from the metaphysical, epistemological, and ontological aspects 
of the storm  such as convictions about the dangers of the storm, or wondering why 
storms always strike every ship he sails on, these aspects are not available to his 
sensibilities, or at least not available to the same degree as to a being with language.  One 
may argue that ‘we cannot know for certain that pigs do not think in a language,’ but the 
counter to this criticism is that I maintain this allegorical pig to represent Pyrrho’s wise 
sage, and that Pyrrho’s sage sustains an aporetic disposition within language with regard 
to epistemological and metaphysical certainties.  This shows that the point is not that the 
pig lacks language, but that the sage lacks conviction or belief in the ontological 
certainties that language foists upon its users.  Language develops unintentional and 
unconscious convictions in its users, and Pyrrho wants us to step back from language and 
those convictions, by altering and becoming more aware of the ways we use language. 
                                                
29 Diogenes, 9.68. 
 31 
 Thus far, in developing a general account of the roots of scepticism, I have 
focused on Pyrrho of Elis and several key passages essential to understanding his 
philosophy of finding the happy life through the recognition of the limitations of human 
experience.  The first of these passages contained the three questions and answers from 
Eusebius concerning what things are like, how we should be disposed towards them, and 
what the result of such a disposition would be.  Several approaches have been examined 
with regard to Pyrrho’s answers, and overall I have found the best understanding to be 
that Pyrrho recommends a mode of speech that reflects an underlying, or at least 
perfunctory, doubt regarding both our ability to know things as well as things themselves.  
Pyrrho’s disposition of epoche, or suspension of judgment, is underscored by a deeply 
habituated practice of language reflected in the use of phrases and utterances like ‘no 
more this than that’ which result in freedom from disturbances.  Pyrrho aims to alter the 
tendency of language users to assume the nature of reality as something fundamentally 
known.  Such fundamental knowledge is assumed by the operation of language itself, and 
Pyrrho’s recommended mode of speech, to ‘say of each and every thing that it no more is 
than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not,’ aims to maintain an aporetic 
disposition, or suspended judgement, in everyday speech.  By doing this, the way 
language foists convictions and beliefs on its users is reduced, and the disturbances that 
these assumed beliefs develop – notably the disturbing notion that many of one’s beliefs 
are not founded on anything more solid that convention and custom – are 
correspondingly reduced. 
 Pyrrho’s aim is to alleviate poorly founded beliefs – beliefs about reality 
developed out of nothing but conventions and customs of language, which have become 
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assumed to be reality.  To fall off a cliff and die is assumed to be bad.  In this situation, to 
die is ‘known’ via custom to be bad which in turn is taken up as necessarily true in 
everyday language.  Pyrrho disagrees and would put his aporetic disposition into action to 
show it is no more good than bad, and that falling off the cliff is in itself also neither bad 
nor good.  He brings his philosophical scepticism to bear in his daily life and daily speech 
with the intention of not falling to assumptions that the very use of language implicitly 
demands.  We are accustomed to thinking that being in a storm on a small boat in the 
middle of the ocean is a bad thing because of the antecedent assumption that death is an 
inherently bad thing; Pyrrho undermines the implicit assumption of language and its 
effect of embossing the language user with presumptuously founded knowledge by 
always demanding the user consciously to qualify his or her statements so that aporia and 
not dogma, becomes the disposition of the language speaker. 
 Micheal Frede remarks that Pyrrho is not in fact a sceptic if one takes him as 
saying “that in reality [things] are neither good nor bad, and that it is just in people’s 
belief that they are just or unjust.”30  This criticism extends to his epoche in that it is 
found to be inconsistent or nonexistent because Pyrrho does assent to the inherent 
inapprehensibility of reality.31  Given the Hellenistic stance on philosophy as necessarily 
concerning a path to the good life, and Pyrrho’s concern for reality, how we think about 
reality, and how we operate language as it concerns reality, perhaps he is less the 
grandfather of scepticism than he is of phenomenology or post-structuralism.  He is more 
concerned about individual existence, and living a good life, than with proving a 
metaphysical or epistemological theory wrong or right.  Whether we wish to have Pyrrho 
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in the sceptical camp or the post-structuralist camp, the language-oriented reading of 
Pyrrho developed thus far may be seen to depend on understanding Pyrrho’s doubt as 
Bett assumes here; namely, that Pyrrho does not suspend judgement on a fundamental 
claim about reality, but asserts that reality is inherently inapprehensible and recommends 
suspension of judgement there from. 
 This sort of assertion is what Sextus Empiricus later dubs ‘negative dogmatism’ 
and because the Academic sceptics gave assent to such reasoning, Sextus cast them out of 
what he considered as constituting proper scepticism.32  While some passages on Pyrrho 
seem to suggest that suspending judgement is his most central tenet over and above any 
singularly epistemological metaphysical reading of him, perhaps the strongest example 
against this is in Eusebius, where Pyrrho is said to have expressed that, “It is necessary 
above all to consider the issue of our knowledge.  For if by nature we know nothing, 
there is no need to consider other things.”33  This line appears to cast Pyrrho in a 
particular light.  That is, if Pyrrho is being negatively dogmatic and claiming that we 
know nothing by nature, then the inference that we ought to suspend judgement from this 
initial claim seems to obtain.  That is, if Pyrrho does not think we know, then that doubt 
serves as the reason to suspend judgement.  Essentially, Pyrrho’s assent to the claim that 
nothing can be known is the cause for his recommendation that we maintain a state of 
epoche.  This is problematic, as it appears to be inconsistent; Pyrrho seems to be claiming 
to know that we cannot know, and uses this claim to justify suspending judgement.    
 If we suppose epoche is Pyrrho’s first priority, such that he is already suspending 
judgement on the claim that we know nothing rather than claiming to know that we 
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cannot know, we might wonder as to why he is already suspending judgement.  There 
seems to be no reason given for Pyrrho’s call for a disposition of epoche, as was given in 
the previous approach where suspension of judgement followed the dogmatic claim that 
humans by nature cannot know.  If he suspends judgement first, why does he?  
 As it happens, there is a disagreement on the interpretation of the Eusebius 
passage.  Some scholars34 argue that the line 
 
  […] Pyrrho declares that things are equally indifferent, and unmeasurable and 
 undecidable, and that for this reason neither our senses nor our opinions tell the 
 truth nor lie; and so we ought not to put our trust in them […] 35 
  
should be altered to:  
 
 […] Pyrrho declares that things are equally indifferent, and uunmeasurable and 
 undecidable on account of the fact that neither our senses nor our opinions tell the 
 truth nor lie; and so we ought not to put our trust in them […] 36 
 
This alteration reverses the inference, where a metaphysical claim originally rooted the 
epistemological claim.  That is, “making the assertion about the nature of things now 
becomes a consequence of the assertion about the status of our sensations and opinions, 
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not a reason for it.”37  In the first reading, things themselves are not graspable.  In the 
proposed alteration, it is our senses, or perhaps pathe, that prevent apprehension.  Bett is 
against this alteration, as he maintains that a metaphysical reading does not require the 
alteration and the epistemological reading does not benefit by it.38  
 If Pyrrho were intending to advocate for a specifically metaphysical scepticism, 
claiming that things themselves are ‘indifferent, unbalanced, and indeterminate’ 
(following Bett’s metaphysically oriented interpretation of adiaphora, astathmeta, and 
anepikrita in the Eusebius passage), it is only because of the indeterminate (indeterminate 
is a good stand-in for the cumbersome ‘indifferent, unbalanced, and indeterminate’) 
nature of things themselves that our senses ‘do not lie nor tell the truth’ and hence why 
Pyrrho recommends epoche.  Thus he would be claiming that things are unknowable; that 
our faculties for perceiving things are not to be doubted, but the things they perceive are 
in themselves unknowable, and that ‘for this reason’ we should epoche on our 
judgements about their reality.  Alternatively, but still understanding Pyrrho as being 
specifically metaphysically sceptical about the nature of reality (where things themselves 
are indeterminate,) for him to claim that things are indeterminate ‘on account of the fact’ 
that our senses or opinions do not lie nor tell the truth – thereby reversing the inference, 
as Bett indicated – changes nothing of the metaphysical doubt Pyrrho espouses.  Whether 
it is because our faculties and opinions reflect the indeterminate nature of reality and for 
this reason require our distrust, or because our faculties and opinion themselves give to us 
only indifferent, unbalanced, and indeterminate input about reality and on account of this 
should be distrusted, the end is the same.  That is, Pyrrho says that the result of epoche, 
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rather than some belief or another about the nature of reality, results in freedom from 
disturbances. 
 If Pyrrho were not advocating a metaphysical scepticism but a solely 
epistemological scepticism regarding the indifferentiable, immeasurable, and 
indeterminable nature of human knowledge, he would be claiming that we should not 
trust our faculties and opinions ‘for the reason’ that our faculties and opinions reflect the 
indeterminable nature of our knowledge and therefore do not lie nor tell the truth.  The 
alternative interpretation, still understanding Pyrrho as being specifically epistemological 
in his doubt, has Pyrrho claiming that we should distrust our faculties and opinions 
because human knowledge is indeterminable ‘on account of the fact’ that our senses and 
opinions themselves do not lie nor tell the truth. 
 Ultimately I agree with Bett, as overall the alteration does nothing to further the 
understanding of the passage insofar as either reading is concerned, and especially 
regarding whether Pyrrho was making a fundamental assertion - whether about the nature 
of things or of our ability to know them - rather than suspending judgement.  In essence, 
Pyrrho could be making one of three suppositions: the metaphysical claim that things are 
essentially indeterminate; the epistemological claim that we as humans do not have the 
ability to determine things; and lastly, a combination of the two, claiming that things are 
indeterminate and we cannot even know them anyways.  In any of these cases, Pyrrho is 
laying down a dogmatic claim for the ground for suspending judgement, and the altered 
interpretation of the Eusebius passage serves only to highlight this.  Pyrrho is negatively 
dogmatizing about either position.  However, epoche and an aporetic disposition are far 
more central to Pyrrho’s philosophy, and are what stand out in his legacy above anything 
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else.  He was not nearly as concerned about the specific arguments – whether he was 
targeting metaphysical or epistemological uncertainty – as he was about the linguistic 
practice and maintenance of suspended judgement and an aporetic disposition.  Why 
would he make suspension of judgement so fundamental, yet make a dogmatic claim, 
whether it be a metaphysical or epistemological claim, a reason for not making dogmatic 
claims?  This does not seem to follow with the aporetic language practice that essentially 
shuns the making of such claims, but also simply contradicts itself.  
 One possible way we might conclude that Pyrrho is in fact suspending judgement 
on all claims and not being inconsistent is to think of the novice sceptic developing into 
the sage Pyrrho and so many others of his time recommend that we become.  By this 
pedagogy of revealed experience, Pyrrho teaches by living and practicing what he 
preaches.  In this way, the novice sceptic would begin his or her sceptical way of life with 
the negatively dogmatic metaphysical or epistemological first doubt acting as the impetus 
for suspending judgement.  The negatively dogmatic first doubt (“humans by nature 
cannot know”) being the outright claim that either things themselves are unknowable 
(metaphysical), or that we cannot claim to know that we know them (epistemological). 
Pyrrho can be said to have made this same ‘first doubt’ – the dogmatic claim that reality 
or knowledge is indeterminate or indeterminable – as the reason for maintaining his 
aporetic disposition.  As our sceptic develops and expands her aporetic disposition, she 
will develop this position to include her original first doubt.  She looks to her own 
assumptions and reasoning, and now looking at them from a more undogmatic, 
unswaying, and aporetic disposition, she realizes that her first doubt – to say, believe, or 
opine that reality or knowledge is indeterminate – is a dogmatic statement not in line with 
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her aporetic disposition, and extends the ‘no more’ locution to include it.  The shunning 
of dogmatically phrased statements is the basic function of linguistic praxis; alternatively, 
aporetic language is the embracing of uncertainty and statements phrased around a 
disposition that is comfortable with undecidedness. 
 Developed more fully later in the tradition, scepticism eventually advances the 
idea of itself acting as a medicinal purge, wherein it cleanses one of dogmatic maladies as 
it also purges itself out with them.  Just as the novice sceptic, in becoming the sceptical 
sage, released herself from her foundational first doubt, so Pyrrho’s dogmatic scepticism 
purges itself until all that is left is an aporetic disposition maintained by undogmatic, 
unswaying linguistic praxis.  This line of thought certainly developed from Pyrrho, or at 
least Timon, as Diogenes notes that Timon maintained in the Pytho the utterance ‘no 
more this than that’ meant to determine nothing and to refuse assent.  As Diogenes 
records, both this utterance and the 
 
 utterance of ‘for every argument there is an opposing argument’ also 
 concludes to suspension of judgement, for when facts are disputed, but there is 
 equal force in the [opposing] arguments, ignorance of the truth follows.  Even this 
 argument [i.e., that every argument has an opposing argument] has an opposing 
 argument [namely, there is an argument which has no opposing argument] so that 
 when it has destroyed every other argument it turns on itself and is destroyed by 
 itself, just like purges which first purge the foreign matter and then themselves are 
 purged and destroyed […] 39  
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Applying this purging concept to the aforementioned development of Pyrrho’s sage, we 
can see that in the maturing view of the novice sceptic, first beginning with a negative 
dogmatic claim that instigates the novice’s reasoning for epoche and desire for an 
aporetic disposition, and developing through the practice of stating things as being ‘no 
more this than that,’ the sceptic pares away the initial dogmatic doubt as well as any other 
dogmatic doubt, leaving nothing but a disposition of suspending judgement.  Ergo, via 
Pyrrho’s linguistically maintained aporetic disposition, dogmatic convictions, whether 
positive in sense that they assent to X or negative in that they deny X, are abolished from 
linguistic practice.  Dogmatic doubt may have started the sceptic on the path, but only 
aporia remains. 
 The Pyrrhonian practice of aporetic language finds comfort in statements that are 
apprehensive, or more accurately, that suspend judgement.  Once aporetic language 
becomes habit, and the Pyrrhonist’s disposition becomes one of aporia and epoche, then 
ataraxia fortuitously follows, since the sceptic is no longer vested in beliefs and 
convictions regarding the nature of reality.  He no longer has these beliefs because at 
thelevel of language, he has entered the practice of maintaining aporia and epoche 
regarding reality.  X is no longer stated as being X, it is stated as appearing to be X, with 
the metaphysical and epistemological possibility of it being something other than what it 
is stated to be remaining open. 
 Moreover, through Eusebius, Pyrrho states that aphasia or speechlessness comes 
first then followed by ataraxia.  This is the path recommended by Pyrrho for those who 
wish to be happy.  By adopting an aporetic disposition via the use of language reflecting 
one’s understanding that one may in fact know nothing – ‘saying of each and every thing 
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that it is no more than it is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not’ - the initiate 
first arrives at not being able to say anything, or not wanting to assert anything.  The 
initiate essentially drops out of language as a speaker.  Whether aphasia is a necessary 
step towards achieving ataraxia is not entirely clear in Pyrrho, nor is ataraxia explained 
much beyond ‘freedom from disturbances’.  Perhaps we might view aphasia as the 
turning point for the initiate-come-master, in much the same way we might view the first 
negative dogma of the initiate as his or her first step as a sceptic.  Aphasia strikes the 
initiate down and out of language, the novice no longer making any assertion whatsoever; 
denying language the pleasure or power over his or her ontological views.  Yet, much 
like Plato recommends coming back down the line, reentering the cave, or more 
emphatically, himself ‘descending’ to give voice to the Republic, the initiate returns to 
the active, aporetic disposition maintained prior to becoming struck dumb, but now 
without the original negative dogmatic assertion as a foundation for suspending 
judgement.  Rather than being armed with a foundationalist understanding of reality 
through the Forms, or whatever interpretation one wishes to take on Plato, the full-
fledged sceptic has done the opposite and purged even the foundation of her aporetic 
disposition and is now an ontological, epistemological, and linguistic nomad, unfettered 
by any dogma short of what she may assent to or deny in language – and even that 
remains always open.  If the sceptic maintains his or her aporetic stance in language, 
always reflecting a lack of ontological dogma through the tripartite utterance about the 
nature of each and every thing being ‘no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or 
neither is nor is not,’ then the sceptical sage will remain unopinionated, without 
inclinations, and will not waver about these things, and will come to ataraxia.40   
                                                
40 Note: ‘unopinionated, without inclinations, and without wavering’ are Richard Bett’s (pg 16) alternate 
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 Therefore, we might understand Pyrrho as suggesting a way of life that engages 
language as a practice for an aporetic disposition towards claims about reality or 
knowledge that would otherwise perturb us.  He wishes to use the very medium that 
controls our ability to make meaning and sense, to contain just how much we let language 
speak itself.  I might say that ‘stealing is morally wrong’ as a dogmatic claim regarding 
the nature of things, and Pyrrho’s point is that it is assumed in uttering such a statement 
that either I can and do know something about what is moral and immoral in the world, or 
that the immorality of such an act is apparent in the nature of things.  Someone might say 
that a particular tree’s leaves are green, or that a root canal is painful.  Whether taken 
epistemologically or metaphysically, all these statements are assertions made through 
language about the nature of things, and I believe that Pyrrho opposes the assumption 
made in these utterances in that the way that one would say them, or the fact that one says 
them, implies that the utterance is founded in knowledge rooted in an ontological 
certainty that is assumed to be established by language, or pre-established in order for 
language to make sense.  This is to say that Pyrrho is fighting against the assumptions 
that language has access to some ‘knowledge’ about the nature of reality that does not in 
fact exist, but also that language-use itself furthers this sort of presumptuous use of 
nonexistent knowledge.  In order to make sense, language assumes this sort of sure-
footed knowledge that Pyrrho clearly does not think is available.  He thinks all is ‘just 
custom and convention,’ and that what is only so by convention – whether it is a cultural 
practice, language practice, etc. – is not entitled to be held up as knowledge in the 
absolute sense.  Pyrrho feels that assuming such certainty in the utilization of language 
                                                
translations of Inwood’s ‘undogmatic, uncommitted, unswaying’ in Eusebius. 
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takes away from one’s ability to enjoy life, as one presumption grows from a different 
assumption, and so on and so forth until one is further from the sort of truth assumed to 
be had than if no presumptuous, dogmatic theorizing had occurred at all.  The layers of 
presumptions and assumptions, each one a potential falsehood or deceptively persuasive 
hypothesis, leads one away from a disposition of suspending judgement and closes one 
off from being open to possibilities outside the scope of convictions and utterances 
already held and made.  Where someone like Aristotle, or any given ‘dogmatist’, wishes 
to build up a system of ‘knowns’ or axioms on which to place a virtuous or happy life, 
Pyrrho thinks the better way is to look at what one is already standing upon and to realize 
that so much of that is only convention and custom, and not anything like the absolute 
and stable knowledge that it is customarily assumed to be.  He demands the ontological 
certainty and trust of such utterances and ‘knowns’ be pulled out from under them as 
much as possible and as often as possible, that “one ought not to suppose that that which 
persuades us is true.”41  Truthful opinions and perceptions are as persuasive as untruthful 
ones.  So that when a disagreement occurs whether between people or within one’s own 
soul, we do not become perturbed, react overly emotionally, or develop loyalties to and 
hatreds of beliefs or opinions that contradict what we may have happen to have held 
previously by nothing other than custom and convention.  This is ataraxia, the result of 
having and maintaining an aporetic disposition and no longer being vested in the 
existence or non-existence of the truth of ontological underpinnings of what we state 
about the nature of things in language.  Pyrrho wishes us to say what we see and feel and 
understand, but to be aware that the truth of all of what we say is not as graspable and 
                                                
41 Diogenes, 9.94. 
 43 
fixed as our ability to signify it in language makes it out to be: ‘if not in actions, then at 
least in words.’ 
 
 
1.3 Plato’s Socrates as Pyrrho’s Sage 
 At the outset of presenting the position of Pyrrho of Elis it was mentioned that 
Pyrrho’s sceptical or aporetic approach to a happy life was not unheard of in his time.  
Others, such as Plato, expressed many of these same sentiments in his dialogues through 
Socrates, and Socrates probably espoused them himself in his life.  As Socrates famously 
maintained in the Apology, “this man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, 
understands that his wisdom is worthless.”42  The Platonic dialogues, particularly the 
early ones, quite often express aporetic positions, or even flat out deny the ability of 
humans to possess wisdom much in the same way that Pyrrho expresses his initial 
negative dogmatic doubt about the nature of things.  Plato often attacks hubris through 
Socrates’ conversations, and as Gregory Shaw notes regarding Alcibiades I, “the worst 
kind of evil [is] said to be caused by those who claim to understand the best things: 
goodness, justice, and nobility.”43  It is one thing to argue about the best dancer in the 
room or the stupidest show on television, but to have convictions or beliefs about justice, 
or what is moral, is another thing altogether.  I might think reality TV shows are foolish 
and carry that conviction out into the world, expressing it and spreading it every time it 
comes up in conversation, and the repercussions for me and those with whom I share my 
                                                
42 Plato, Apology 23b, I used the text in Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M.Cooper, translated by 
G.M.A Grube (Indiana: Hackett Publishing 1997). 
43  Gregory Shaw, “After Aporia: Theurgy in Later Platonism,” Journal of Neoplatonic Studies 1, no. 5 
(1996) 3-41, at 12. 
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conviction will be small and limited.  If I do the same thing with a conviction about 
justice – say that capital punishment is good – not only am I reinforcing my own surface 
conviction about capital punishment, I am implicitly and unconsciously engaging and 
reinforcing the underlying convictions (about life and death) as well, all of which may 
‘no more be than not be.’  In bringing together elenchus in conversations to birth the 
ideas of others and his supposition that he knows nothing, Socrates is a reflection of 
Pyrrho’s sage; he does not propound anything other than the thought that he knows 
nothing, and engages in language only to bring out aporia in his interlocutor. 
 In Alcibiades I, Socrates explicates this position well, asking “don’t you realize 
that the errors in our conduct are caused by this kind of ignorance, of thinking that we 
know when we don’t know?”44  As Westerink notes, the explication of aporia is done in 
a systematic fashion throughout many dialogues: Alcibiades I, Gorgias, and Phaedo in 
dealing with virtue; Cratylus and Theaetetus in dealing with epistemology; Sophist and 
Statesman in dealing with the external world; the Symposium and Phaedrus in dealing 
with theology and love; and in Philebus which deals with the Good.45 
 Socrates’ argumentation as characterized by the method of elenchus is not geared 
towards finding an absolute truth.  It is about digging through falsity and finding the most 
acceptable hypothesis regarding the soul and proper living.46  For Plato and perhaps for 
Socrates, aporia is a necessary cleansing step towards understanding ta erotika, which 
was more indispensable than reason in Plato’s greater scheme of things, and is the sole 
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thing Socrates ever claimed to grasp.47  Ta erotica is the art of loving, or the movement 
of the soul toward the good, with the philosopher being for Plato the greatest lover of the 
good.  As Gregory Shaw’s succinct summary of Platonic paideia states it, while “Plato’s 
paideia was intellectually rigorous, it was even more demanding as a discipline of the 
heart, for it required souls to endure the insecurity and inferiority of not knowing.  Yet 
from their conscious aporia, such souls began to follow a more ancient way.”48  The 
consistent ‘shock’ of aporia maintained the purity of the soul allowing for the nurturing 
of eros; without aporia, the soul is unable to focus solely on the good and becomes 
fixated on other things. 
 Turning to several of the Platonic dialogues, I wish to highlight the fundamentally 
aporetic stance Plato often takes.  In the Phaedo, I focus on the arguments for the 
existence of the soul and the ‘second voyage’; in the Meno regarding the paradox of 
knowledge; and in the Theaetetus on perception and knowledge.  The nature of Plato’s 
practice of aporia is such that it is a necessary starting point for the education or paideia 
of the soul.  Thus I am not engaging the texts in full, but showing how key aporia and the 
function of the soul are to Plato’s paideia and how central they are in each of the texts.  
Furthermore, I address the way in which Pyrrho can speak of such a thing as the soul and 
be consistent in his claim to determine nothing.  This serves to situate Pyrrho’s use of 
aporia and offers an avenue of understanding with which to further grasp aporetic 
language practice by showing that Socrates was very similar in his approach and use of 
aporia. 
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1.4 Pyrrho and Plato’s Phaedo 
 In the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates posit the realm of Forms as the route by which 
his second voyage must take – a route by way of words, or logos.49  It is Socrates’ second 
voyage because his first was one attempted within the visible world, and confined to 
mechanical suppositions and opinions regarding the causes of things.  That is, the first 
was an attempt to explain causes by other causes rather than by something that explains 
the cause of things qua cause.  Just before explicating his second voyage Socrates gives 
an account of this as exemplified by Anaxagoras, who claimed that the cause of anything 
was Mind.  However, Socrates found that Anaxagoras did not speak of Mind at all, and 
was “unable to distinguish the essential difference between the real cause of a thing, and 
that without which the cause never could be a cause.”50  The second voyage posits the 
Forms as the ground in which the visible world ‘participates,’ and corresponds to the 
argument for the immortality of the soul.  Being only the ‘second best course’, however, 
the hypothesis definitely underscores the aporetic stance that Plato still fundamentally 
maintains; he is offering the Forms as a hypothesis.  Echoing my interpretation of 
Pyrrho’s wariness of words, Socrates states that  
 
 Accordingly, it occurred to me that I must have recourse to words, and in them 
 carry on the investigation of the true nature of things.  Now perhaps the 
 illustration that I employ to a certain degree does not correspond with the reality: 
 for I do not altogether admit that any one who pursues his researches after things 
 in words regards them in mere reflections any more than one who goes straight to 
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 the real object: but be that as it may, this is the way in which I started; and having 
 laid down any conception which I judge to be most incontestable in each case, I 
 assume as true whatever seems to me to be in accordance with it […] 51  
 
 Thus, the second voyage is a turning away from a materialist, physically or 
doxastically-oriented mode of explanation for the true nature of things and a turning 
toward the intelligible, or beyond-physical explanation of things.  The hypothesis is 
however spoken of without utter conviction or belief.  As remarked a few short lines 
later, 
  
 […] to this one thing I hold simply and artlessly and perhaps foolishly, that it is 
 nothing else that makes it beautiful but that ideal beauty – whether we are to call 
 it presence or communication, or in whatever way or by whatever means the 
 connection is brought about – for on this latter point I can no longer pronounce 
 any strong affirmation, but only to the extent that it is by the absolute beauty that 
 all beautiful things are made beautiful.  For this seems to me the safest answer 
 […]52 
 
The Forms, and the way things are connected to them, are posited from an unsure 
position, which is only given as ‘the best one can do’.  Plato is maintaining Socrates’ 
aporetic stance and putting forth the Forms, as well as participation, only as hypotheses.  
Further, in the previous quotation he is recognizing the realm of words, or logoi, as not 
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necessarily a good reflection of reality or of what one is speaking about.  This is precisely 
Pyrrho’s fear and what he avoids by maintaining his position of suspended judgement in 
the realm of logoi so that he is never letting what may only be a poor reflection of the 
true nature of things become a foundation for further utterances or beliefs.   
 
1.5 Pyrrho, the Meno, and The Soul of The Hellenes 
 In the Meno, the first question Meno asks of Socrates regards whether virtue can 
be taught.  It is answered by Socrates through a definitive underscoring of Socrates’ 
ignorance and aporia regarding the subject.  The soul is assumed to exist however, and is 
spoken of throughout the dialogue as something t customarily o be assumed to be part of 
everyone’s ontological makeup.  In this next section I hope to continue to show the role 
that aporia plays in Socratic dialogue and draw lines of comparison to the aporetic 
disposition espoused by Pyrrho.  Furthermore, I want to show that the conventional 
function that the soul played in practically all philosophy at the time – so much so that 
even one such as Pyrrho, who inquired into everything and demanded everything ‘no 
more’ be than not be, allowed it in his own discussions.  To begin we shall look at several 
passages from the Meno that shows Socrates employing his method, starting with the 
following line that demonstrates Socrates’ outright claim to ignorance. 
 
 MENO: I do not; but, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is?  Are we 
 to report this to the folk back home about you?  
 49 
 SOCRATES: Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have never yet 
 met anyone else who did know.53 
 
Plato, using language not unlike that suggested by Pyrrho, and exceptionally similar to 
that of Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, points to the many difficulties in 
pinning down both what virtue is in itself, and how it is applied in its particularity.  Plato 
employs statements about things being ‘no more this than that’ though perhaps less 
generally than Pyrrho, as found in the following passage. 
 
 SOCRATES: When you speak like that, do you assert that the round is no more 
 round than it is straight, and that the straight is no more straight than it is round?  
 MENO: Certainly not, Socrates.  
 SOCRATES: Yet you say that the round is no more a shape than the straight is, 
 nor the one more than the other. 
 MENO: That is true. 54 
 
These are certainly not equivalent to the sceptical utterances That Pyrrho recommends; 
yet the similarity is striking.  The aporetic effect is meant to be the same, and Meno 
expresses this shortly thereafter. 
 
 Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of 
 perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are 
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 bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite 
 perplexed.  Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every 
 other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes 
 close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect 
 on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give 
 you.55 
 
Meno both expresses his view of what Socrates seems to do, namely create doubt and 
sow aporia in others, but also describes the effect that this aporia has on his soul as one 
of numbness.  Though not precisely the same as the speechlessness of aphasia, Meno’s 
numbness once again resounds of Pyrrho’s novice sceptic developing into an aporetic 
sage.  Meno’s inactivity in the face of finally experiencing aporia at the hand of Socrates’ 
doubtful questioning is the sign of his readiness to move forward in Plato’s paideia.  I 
spoke earlier of the novice sceptic’s experience of aphasia as a stepping-stone towards 
ataraxia.  Both Plato and Pyrrho begin with aporia, and both have aims that continue 
after this is attained, neither resting in any sort of naïve realism.  Focusing on Pyrrho, we 
find that he turns his sceptical disposition upon his own views, notably his intial first 
negatively dogmatic doubt regarding the nature of reality as unknowable, which he 
overturns and extends his suspension of judgement to include.  Plato does not assume the 
aporetic state the same way as Pyrrho.  Plato takes it as a position one must attain to 
move forward in his continued argument for the existence of the soul, knowledge despite 
flux, and hypotheses regarding the Forms, none of which have anything to do with a 
continued maintenance of suspending judgement.  Only Pyrrho made suspended 
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judgement the priority, finding that maintaining an aporetic disposition, and not making 
claims about the nature of things, whether as hypotheses, theories, or otherwise, aided 
one in finding the happy life.  This was because as much as Plato may strive to only 
hypothesize his Forms, once one begins to speak of things being such-and-such a way, 
and not ‘no more this way than that way’, utterances build upon utterances, views and 
beliefs develop from these compound utterances, and soon enough the fundamental 
epistemological and metaphysical uncertainties about the nature of things which first 
caste the philosopher into aporia are forgotten.  This is precisely what develops 
disturbances within one’s soul – opinions and convictions developed out of falsity as 
much as truth – and are exactly what Pyrrho wished to avoid by maintaining epoche and 
aporia.  The aporia becomes something the philosopher may still say she maintains, but 
just like the theories that she begins to espouse and uphold were theories she once 
maintained as only theories, the aporia she once maintained also only becomes 
theoretical, and not actually practiced.  Thus the would-be sceptic succumbs to allowing 
the mere speaking of things being such-and-such a way - be it the participation of Forms, 
the first principles of being, or what have you – to shape what she actually thinks. 
 
1.6 Appearances, Customs, and The Soul of the Sceptic 
 The soul has come up several times already, and demands addressing in light of 
Pyrrho’s scepticism, and the central role that the soul played in Greek philosophy and 
daily life.  As much as the soul was commonplace in Greek speech and the understanding 
of the self, Socrates’ development of the soul would be too much for Pyrrho to give 
assent to.  We have gone over a great deal about the soul insofar as Plato and Socrates 
 52 
may have spoken about it, and the sceptics were as prone to speaking about the soul as 
any other.  Pyrrho would assent to the suggestion of the soul insofar as a recipient of 
pathe or a customary thing to speak of, much in the same way it is common custom today 
to speak of the mind, but anything about the nurturing of the soul would ‘no more be than 
not be’.  Even regarding pathe, as impressions on part of or all of the soul, Pyrrho would 
have no more agreed than disagreed and have given way to nothing more than what is 
conventional.  To go by appearances, customs, and conventions was not to assent to the 
truth or reality of a thing, like the soul, but to allow it so as to continue to make sense and 
relate to others, so long as it was always maintained as no more being than not being in 
proper aporetic linguistic practice. 
 As a customary or conventional thing to speak of, Pyrrho certainly would have 
spoken of the soul, as later sceptics such as Sextus continued to, especially as something 
defined in contrast to the body but a part of one’s self, and which survives after death.  
Tarrant indicates that the idea that the soul experiences “good or bad fortune in another 
world [after death] was deeply implanted in the Greek consciousness.”56  I do not wish to 
engage in the Platonic debate about the soul, but show that the soul was a thing spoken of 
by philosophers and ordinary people alike, and that there are several interesting 
similarities and differences between Pyrrho, Socrates, and Plato with regard to the soul 
and aporia.  Much like debates rage today about mind and consciousness in everyday 
conversations as well as academic circles, it was not completely agreed upon as to what 
the soul was precisely, though many sophisticated accounts were made.  The debate as to 
the nature and existence of the soul continued even within the Platonic tradition itself 
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between figures such as Plotinus and Iamblichus.57  Even keeping within Plato’s own 
writings on the soul it is hard to attribute a single view on the soul to him (compare 
Apology, Republic book IV, Meno, and Phaedo).  A strong line of comparison between 
Pyrrho and Plato can be found in the Apology (81c-e), where Plato seemed to be 
delineating a certain understanding of what the sage, as opposed to the ordinary person, 
would find in the afterlife.  The philosopher’s soul, having grasped the Ideas and realized 
the realm of doxa and pragmata for what it is (in Plato’s understanding) only after 
achieving aporia, will stand out “among the living as Homer said Tiresias was among the 
dead, namely, that “he alone retained his wits while the others flitted about like 
shadows.””58  
The ordinary soul, not having travelled Plato’s path of paideia, neither achieving 
aporia nor realizing the Ideas, is essentially caught in the realm of doxa and particular 
pragmata, and will presumably not enjoy the same good existence as the philosopher’s 
soul in the afterlife.  Pyrrho would not have assented to the Ideas as lending to grasping 
the truth of the nature of things any more than opinions would; rather, customs and 
appearances, which are perhaps more like opinion than Idea in Platonic terms, are all 
either the philosopher or the ordinary person function within anyways.  It is the ordinary, 
everyday, and customary use of a word that is key with Pyrrho.  He may only epoche on 
the existence of the soul, but he still speaks of it as a customary or conventional thing, as 
he seemed to think, “that men do everything on the basis of convention and custom; for 
each thing is no more this than that.”59  It may well be that the soul no more is than is not 
– but practically speaking, the ‘soul’ is a customary way to convey certain ideas, 
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especially regarding our ontological situation, and therefore Pyrrho will have it in his 
discussions and inquiries.  His philosophy ideals with the everyday, and can only 
function within the customs and conventions – ranging from speaking about the soul to 
the operation of language itself – of those it wishes to help.  Pyrrho’s aporetic disposition 
operates within customs, especially linguistic ones, so as to: make sense to those whom it 
is intended to aid; and second, to alter how sense itself is made.  This ‘altered sense’ is 
precisely what an aporetic disposition creates; it alters the assumptions that a person 
makes, reducing the number and the reinforcement of them by forcing a person implicitly 
to question or qualify everything that he says through the explicit utterance of the kind 
‘no more is than is not’.  The soul is a good example for this, as Pyrrho did most likely 
epoche on its actual existence, but equally as likely continued to speak of it as something 
that existed at least according to custom.  
 Thus for Pyrrho, the soul ‘no more is than is not’, and the soul of the Platonic 
sage would ‘no more’ enjoy a potential afterlife than the soul of the ordinary person.  
Plato left behind the state of aporia to lay claim to knowledge about the nature of things, 
such as the soul, and the afterlife, both of which Pyrrho would engage in discussion 
about, but without leaving his suspension of judgement, and never departing from his 
practice of maintaining aporetic language towards those things he speaks of.  To do so 
would be to begin habitually developing belief and opinions in things for which no belief 
or opinion is necessary.  Furthermore, to speak of knowing about the soul or mind would 
be to go against his very purpose of maintaining aporia and avoiding discursive 
statements that are epistemologically or metaphysically non-evident and which may in 
turn give rise to troubling beliefs or assumptions about those statements.  That being said, 
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the similarities between Socrates, Plato’s Socrates, and Pyrrho, are striking.  Pyrrho 
simply did not wish to go further – that is, to speak of a hypothesis as true, and not 
always qualify it as aporetic – as Plato did, and found the aporetic disposition lent itself 
to a more contented life than striving for and assuming truth. 
 
 
1.7 Pyrrho and Plato’s Theaetetus 
 The final Platonic dialogue I wish to look at is the Theaetetus, and it is perhaps 
the most relevant dialogue in both content as well as its execution regarding Socratic 
aporia and the question of human knowledge.  As Timothy Chappell notes, Plato’s 
dialogues have been taken to go through distinct stages; the early ‘Socratic Dialogues’ 
(Laches, Charmides, Alcibiades I, Euthyphro, Lysis, Meno, and Hippias Major) are 
distinguished largely by their aporetic nature.60  Later, after several ‘transitional’ 
dialogues such as Protagoras and Gorgias, Plato begins to move away from both the 
aporetic disposition as well as the strict question-answer style most associated with 
Socrates.  The Theaetetus, being one of the last dialogues written, returns to the aporetic 
style of the early dialogues, and in inquiring into the nature of knowledge, determines 
three things that knowledge is not, without ever conclusively pointing to what knowledge 
in fact is.61 
 The first theory of knowledge posited is that ‘knowledge is perception’, which is 
tantalizingly close to what later sceptics, and even Pyrrho, were willing to act or assent to 
without belief or assumptions regarding any presence of some ‘absolute’ truth.  As it is 
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meant here, however, the idea that knowledge is perception is precisely what sceptics 
would not assent to, and becomes of great importance in Sextus’ discussions on 
‘apprehension’ in the final chapter.  Just as with the soul, the sceptics would go with the 
appearance, custom, or convention of knowledge, but never assent to it being anything 
more than appearance or custom.  It is important only to note that Socrates refutes this 
Protagorian conception of knowledge in several ways, notably by relativizing arguments 
and differentiating between ‘perception’ and ‘appearance’, and encourages Theaetetus to 
try again. 
 Theaetetus’ second attempt begins as follows: “well, Socrates, one can’t say that 
it is judgment in general, because there is also false judgment—but true judgment may 
well be knowledge.  So let that be my answer.  If the same thing happens again, and we 
find, as we go on, that it turns out not to be so, we’ll try something else.”62  Echoing 
Plato’s language for hypothesizing the Forms in Phaedo, it seems that here Socrates is 
leading Theaetetus to give birth to his own views by way of first realizing his own 
ignorance, that is, by first bringing him to aporia, and then having him posit his theories 
as things that may stand, or may stand in need of replacing.  Aporia is the birthing ground 
for hypotheses as it is unbiased and preserves an open disposition, which is mostly 
Pyrrho’s aim with his aporetic disposition; that is, never to cease an inquiry and remain 
open to the possibilities that other hypotheses may fit, or that no answer may solidify.  
This is once again a place of contrast and comparison between Pyrrho’s sage and Plato’s 
Socrates: Socrates appears to be recommending aporia to Theaetetus solely as a place to 
begin an inquiry into knowledge; Pyrrho, on the other hand, has aporia and epoche as the 
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preferred state of mind to be maintained despite any hypothesizing.  Socrates himself 
appears to espouse Pyrrho’s take on aporia, though without the accompanying 
suspension of judgement.  Perhaps this is Plato moving forward himself from Socrates’ 
position, acknowledging Socrates’ influence and the importance of aporia, but following 
Nausiphanes’ advice, “that while one should acquire the disposition of Pyrrho, one 
should follow [one’s] own theories.”63 
 Plato presents five angles from which Socrates refutes Theaetetus’ second 
definition of knowledge, revolving around accidental or untrue opinions and ultimately 
ending in the example of Athenian court.  In this example it is shown that a lawyer cannot 
possibly give all the facts to the court and give them knowledge regarding the case, but 
he can persuade them despite the lack of knowledge, thus showing that an opinion not 
touching on knowledge can convince people all the same.64  This reflects Diogenes’ 
account of Pyrrho maintaining that, “one ought not to suppose that that which persuades 
us is true,” and again shows a similarity in thinking and aporia between Pyrrho and Plato 
in that falsehoods can become the basis for beliefs and convictions as readily as can 
truths.65 
 Theaetetus gives his third and last attempt at defining knowledge, and gives it as a 
modification of his previous hypothesis: knowledge is true opinion with an account, or 
logos.66  The account, initially put forward and refuted by Socrates in his dream analogy, 
is then divided into three possible alternative explanations.  The first is logos as speech, 
or statement; the second is logos as the enumeration of the base elements of a thing; and 
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thirdly logos is proposed as a sign or diaphora of a thing.67  Once again the arguments 
utilized by Plato through Socrates refute these attempts to knowledge as not amounting 
anything more than opinion.  This criticism follows throughout the attempt at pinning 
down a conception of logos, whether it is opinion of the thing at hand, the elements of the 
thing at hand, or opinions differentiating the thing at hand from what it is not.  The 
Theaetetus ends in aporia, though not without Theaetetus having been drawn to a 
fundamentally virtuous aporetic disposition from which he is already seen to be positing 
a hypothesis and correcting it under criticism.   
 The midwifery of Socrates elicited this change, as Theaetetus states, “I am sure, 
Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me.”68  
Midwifery is, I believe, analogous to the ongoing process of maintaining an aporetic state 
via linguistic practice.  This is expounded in the following dialogue, where Theaetetus 
admits that he has not heard that Socrates practices the art of midwifery: 
 
 SOCRATES: But I do, believe me.  Only don’t give me away to the rest of the 
 world, will you?  You see, my friend, it is a secret that I have this art.  That is not 
 one of the things you hear people saying about me, because they don’t know; but 
 they do say that I am a very odd sort of person, always causing people to get into 
 difficulties.  You must have heard that, surely?  
 THEAETETUS: Yes, I have. 
 SOCRATES: And shall I tell you what is the explanation of that? 
                                                
67 Ibid., 201-210. 
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 THEAETETUS: Yes, please do. 
 SOCRATES: Well, if you will just think of the general facts about the  
 business of midwifery, you will see more easily what I mean. You know, I 
 suppose, that women never practice as midwives while they are still conceiving 
 and bearing children themselves.  It is only those who are past child-bearing who 
 take this up.69 
 
Socrates describes the art of midwifery as being observed by others as ‘causing people to 
get into difficulties,’ which is quite often how scepticism is described.  Further, he states 
that one who already holds to opinions or theories cannot help others to genuinely 
develop their own.  Only by being unburdened, or ‘past bearing’, can a midwife of 
theories bring a theory out on another without adding his or her own tincture of theory to 
it, thus spoiling the original and genuine theory of the person giving birth.  One who has 
achieved aporia, and is able to maintain it in dialogue, is able to elicit the views and 
thoughts of one’s interlocutor.  The Pyrrhonian sage is more focused on his or her own 
views and thoughts, rather than achieving an objective idealism, but the comparison is 
still a strong one.  Theodorus attests to Socrates’ ability to elicit the views of his 
companions numerous times.  This ability is further reflected in several places in the 
Meno: where Socrates is said to ‘numb’ his interlocutors; where he is said to bring 
Theaetetus to his wit’s end; and where Socrates evokes anxiety in him.  In line with 
maintaining an aporetic stance, Socrates does not seem to recommend holding onto the 
theories or conclusions that one may come to in speaking with him, as his ability to move 
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Theaetetus through the motions of labour seem quite objective and less interested in 
Theaetetus’ findings than in the art of midwifery itself. 
  Perhaps maintaining an aporetic stance was the extent of Socrates’ teachings, and 
Plato did indeed view this position as a vantage point from which to leap and posit the 
Forms, and it is in the aporetic dialogues such as the Theaetetus, Meno, and Phaedo that 
this difference between Socrates and Plato becomes most evident.  This supposition, true 
or not, makes a comparison between Pyrrho, Socrates, and Plato much easier and clearer; 
Pyrrho and Socrates, both philosophers who wrote nothing and had their views carried 
forth by their star pupil, both sought after a way of life that was defined by a practice of 
being aware of one’s own ignorance.  It is hard to say where Socrates ends and Plato 
begins, just as it is even harder, with the increase in obscurity, to say where Pyrrho ends 
and Timon begins.  It may be possible that one can maintain aporia regarding one’s 
theories regarding the nature of things, though I think this greatly limits what, precisely, 
those theories regard.  That being said, the conclusion of Nausiphanes that one ought to 
have one’s own views but maintain the disposition of Pyrrho, suggests that this is 
precisely what Plato tried to do: maintain an aporetic disposition, yet still make 
fundamental metaphysical and epistemological claims from such a position.  Unlike 
Pyrrho’s sage, who, with his honed suspension of judgement, turned upon his own first 
assumptions and purged them, Plato looked outward, seeing the aporetic disposition as a 
vantage point only from which to start, not end.  While not necessarily contradictory, so 
far as Socrates is concerned, if one claims to be always in a state of aporia, but also 
strives to uphold some hypothesis that assumes the nature of things to be a certain way, 
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whatever theory is being upheld will only be “simply and artlessly and perhaps 
foolishly”70 carried out.  Pyrrho would agree. 
 Pyrrho does not think that certainty in knowledge about the nature of things is 
something we know we have, even if we have it.  Like Democritus, Parmenides, 
Metrodorus, Xenophanes, and Socrates before him, Pyrrho thought that philosophically 
striving for such truth lead one away from the eudaimonic life that the philosopher 
originally set out to find.  Rather than struggle for such a lofty goal, Pyrrho found that 
giving up the struggle and maintaining an aporetic disposition towards such philosophical 
claims to the nature of reality resulted in the disappearance of a great deal of perturbation 
which otherwise hindered a happy life.  He did this by constantly maintaining these 
epistemological and metaphysical uncertainties in the forefront of his use of language.  
By never allowing himself to be caught up in the dogmatic reality that language 
customarily assumes, Pyrrho never is caught up in struggles for the truth of things either 
in ordinary language or in philosophical discussion.   
 Consider this.  A law firm advertizes that if you are injured at work, it will always 
fight for justice and get you a big monetary settlement.  The implicit assumption in this 
statement is that money can stand in for justice, that justice for a workplace injury can be 
found in an exchange of money.  Perhaps this is widely agreed upon by enough people 
that it becomes customary for a society to endorse such a practice, even if little to no 
thought is laid out by anyone as to what justice itself may or may not in fact be.  Soon 
enough, even the question of what justice is becomes lost in the radio and television 
advertisements that already espouse the assumed reality that enough of a monetary 
exchange can get you justice.  No one questions it as it has gone from a mix of implicit 
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linguistic and doxastic belief to just a plain societal custom.  A simple criticism of this is 
that Pyrrho might be seen to recommend, to an extent, accepting customs and 
conventions as one must to participate in society or language (and indeed Pyrrho did 
participate in both) and that Pyrrho would accept this as any other convention.  However, 
he would do so without belief; he washed pigs and did things that custom would normally 
frown upon according to Diogenes.  Taking Pyrrho’s attitude toward conventions to his 
use of language, he would still not assent to the belief, opinion, or custom that money has 
anything to do with justice, “For he said that nothing was either honourable or shameful, 
just or unjust; similarly for all cases he said that nothing exists in truth but that men do 
everything on the basis of convention and custom; for each thing is no more this than 
that.”71  Pyrrho would immediately recognize the assumption in such a statement, and 
though he would not deny its potential for being true, he would argue for the uncertainty 
of such a proposition, and the question of what justice is would never be lost, nor would 
the answer ever be assumed to be found.  
 
1.8 Chapter One Conclusion 
 The discrete, habituated, and aporetic use of language has the effect of never 
losing the uncertainty of knowing precisely what something like ‘justice’ is in itself.  In 
doing so, the ongoing state of aporia reduces the number of beliefs and convictions one 
has.  The reduction of beliefs and convictions regarding what is real or true in exchange 
for aporia and suspension of judgment is the path that Pyrrho recommends as bringing 
about a happier life that is less disturbed by beliefs and convictions by the very fact that 
one who follows the sceptical way has fewer beliefs.   
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 The discussion of Pyrrho in this chapter has centered upon several key passages 
that indicate a specific attitude towards the human condition, towards the way in which 
beliefs are generated, and towards the way that language can be utilized to refine the 
generation of beliefs.  The specific attitude is one of maintaining an aporetic stance in the 
use of language and the way one makes propositions, such that dogmatic statements do 
not give rise to dogmatic beliefs and convictions.  Further, comparisons have been made 
between Pyrrho and Plato regarding aporia and how central uncertainty and wisdom 
through awareness of ignorance were to both of these thinkers.  Pyrrho’s ascetic, aporetic 
disposition, echoed in Socrates’ language in several Platonic dialogues, is made and 
maintained within language via sceptical utterances so as to address language use itself, 
and more importantly, to address the troubling effects language has upon our conscious 
and unconscious ontological beliefs and opinions.   
 If the teachings of Pyrrho are to be summed up in as few words as possible, it 
would be as follows: if one wishes to try to live a less easily disturbed life, one should try 
to speak in such a way that emphasizes the uncertainty that one feels about the things one 
encounters in life.  For with the recognition of the uncertainty of knowledge comes 















2.1  Introduction: Academic Scepticism 
 Where the first chapter focused on Pyrrho and the origins of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism and aporetic language, the second chapter follows chronologically the next 
major development in scepticism, Academic scepticism.  The overall aim of the chapter 
is to contrast and compare Pyrrho’s brand of scepticism with that of the Academic 
sceptics, with the goal of furthering our understanding of aporetic linguistic praxis.  
Comparisons are first drawn from what has been discussed in the last chapter about 
Pyrrho and Plato to Arcesilaus, the first sceptical head of the Academy.  The differences 
and similarities between Pyrrho’s scepticism and that of the early Academy are 
highlighted with particular focus given to the argumentative nature of Academic 
scepticism, as well as the greatly altered change in goals that followed this new-found 
focus in argumentation.  Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism are even at first flush 
obviously very different, but by focusing on the language practice as being central to the 
Pyrrhonian way, the differences become more apparent. 
 The head of the Academy many years after Arcesilaus, Carneades is introduced as 
an example of the widening gap between Pyrrho’s scepticism and that of the Academy.  
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Such concepts as ataraxia and even eudaimonia take a definitive back seat to dialectical 
or even sophistical argumentation under his headship.  His to pithanon (‘to the 
probable’), as well as Arcesilaus’ to eulogon (‘to the reasonable’) arguments are found to 
be unworkable in any way but as dialectical argument; that is, arguments offered up as 
mere responses or refutations to positions held by other schools, the Stoic school in 
particular.  The language practice of Pyrrho is completely absent from the philosophy of 
these Academic sceptics, as evidenced by their argumentative focus, as well as the 
adaption of the phrase ‘no more’ – so central to Pyrrho’s sceptical language – to being a 
dialectical ploy. 
 Pyrrho’s focus on the practice of language for the reduction of beliefs and 
disturbances in a person’s life – whereby beliefs are thought to lend to the development 
of disturbances regarding the convictions surrounding those very beliefs – is emphatically 
wiped from the drawing board during the years in which Academic scepticism is the 
foremost form of scepticism.  As will be made clear, the Academics were concerned 
about arguing and about being right more than they were concerned with a way of life, 
and if one thing is clear about Pyrrhonian scepticism, it is that Pyrrhonism is mainly 
concerned with a linguistic praxis solely related to a way of life. 
 
2.2 Scepticism up to this Point 
 Sextus Empiricus was shown earlier to draw distinctions in attitude between three   
general philosophical modes in the opening sections of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism.  
These divisions include: the dogmatists, who ceased philosophical inquiries as they 
thought they had found the answers to their inquiries; the Academic sceptics, who settled 
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their inquiries as they thought the inquiries could not be answered; and the Pyrrhonian 
sceptics, who did not settle their inquiry as they thought the inquiries neither solved nor 
unsolvable.  I interpreted Pyrrho as falling somewhere between what Sextus would have 
labeled as Academic negative dogmatism, and Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement.  
That is, Pyrrho began in negative dogmatism, claiming to know that the nature of reality 
was such that it was inherently unknowable, or that our inability to apprehend reality lead 
to it being inapprehensible, from which Pyrrho moved to suspend judgement on all things 
including the initial claim.  Pyrrho maintains a disposition of aporia by always practicing 
language in such a way that epoche is forefront – never stating that things are any one 
way more than another, or that a thing is any more than not – avoids much of the troubles 
that arise from persistently claiming to know things.  The troubles arise largely from the 
connection between belief and knowledge that language foists upon its users, namely, 
that one believes to have justified one’s underlying beliefs regarding the propositions that 
one makes. 
 Take for example, a renowned physicist talking about quantum theory.  He states 
that “we know this because of quantum theory,” and goes on to explain what he thinks 
we know about the world.  Rather than explain the nature of the theory, or even delimit 
the knowledge claim to “we may know,” he assumes the knowledge as given, and we 
take him at his word – that is, we hear his claim.  This has repercussions in at least two 
directions: first, his language as it is spoken to himself no longer admits to the possibility 
of being wrong and speaks to a certainty that Pyrrho dismissed; second, his language as it 
is spoken to others does not admit to fallibility either.   
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 The theorist’s assumption of knowledge is troubling in that he is essentially being 
dishonest to himself, and dishonest to others who happen to hear him.  As we might recall 
from the Socratic dialogues discussed in the previous chapter, theories and hypotheses do 
not and should not be taken for incontestable knowledge, and should always remain open 
to being replaced by a more fitting hypothesis.  As an expert on the topic of his 
propositions, our quantum theorist should be openly aware of the potential shortcomings 
of his theories, and therefore more aware of the limits of his knowledge.  This awareness 
of the limits of knowledge should not be mere lip service to theoretical epistemology.  As 
the Pyrrhonians would have it, the awareness of the limits of knowledge should be a 
practice that permeates the very propositions that describe attempts to know.   Becoming 
blind to the possibility that one’s theories, opinions, and beliefs might not be the 
infallible truth that one assumes them to be, is the root of all the strong convictions and 
beliefs that remove one from living a happier and less disturbed life. 
 More to the point, while the quantum theorist may (hopefully) in fact be aware 
that ‘to know’ in the absolute sense that language suggests in the use of that verb is not 
the ‘know’ that he intends; both he and the others who hear him only hear his language as 
operating with that absolute sort of ‘to know’.  It was found that fallible language is 
precisely what Pyrrho aimed for in his language practice.  By fallible language I simply 
mean language that does not make absolute claims to knowledge, but rather focuses on 
aporia.  However, an explicitly fallible ‘to know’ of which Pyrrho would approve 
(whereby uncertainty of knowledge is more important than certainty of knowledge) is 
less powerful in developing beliefs and convictions in another person than a dogmatic or 
infallibly uttered ‘to know’ would.  A person who is trying to sell you a car will get much 
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further in convincing you of his beliefs by saying he definitely knows X about the 
qualities of the car than if he uncertainly claimed X  about the car.  The same stands for 
the quantum theorist; he and almost any person making a proposition is in some way 
trying to sell you what he or she is saying.  Any theorizing or discussion developed from 
what someome has ‘infallibly’ stated (that we know something because of a theory, or 
that the salesman knows you will love the heated seats) will continue to carry that tone of 
absolute knowing for no better reason than that the custom of language forces its users to 
speak and hear in absolutes.   This custom or habit of language, where infallibly stated 
propositions are assumed as true or more true than uncertain ones, will develop further 
theories and hypotheses that continue to build a chain of assumed ‘infallible’ theories and 
hypotheses into a body of assumed knowledge. In this way, ‘knowledge’ is built ever 
higher but no mind is given to the unstable foundation that has become obscured.  Pyrrho 
started with the claim that denies absolute knowledge, and then from the achieved state of 
aporia that followed from this, he expanded his aporetic stance and epoche to include 
that first claim, thereby no longer denying human knowledge or that things can be 
known, but suspending judgement. 
 Thus, we can see that this sort of language, operating only with infallibility, does 
not belong in any sort of genuine inquiry, and the belief that develops from this sort of 
disingenuous inquiry can be founded as much on falsehood as on truth.  Hence Pyrrho 
wanted our language, especially that of inquiry, to reflect the potential fallibility of our 
thinking and avoid the promulgation of beliefs and theories based on falsehoods and 
deception.   
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2.3 Arcesilaus And the Early Academic Sceptics 
 Lines of comparison were also drawn between Pyrrho, Plato, and Socrates, 
concerning aporia and the customary discussion of the soul in both everyday and 
philosophical contexts.  The connections between these three are reinforced in the 
thought of the founder of the Academic brand of scepticism, Arcesilaus.  A heavily 
sceptical thinker, he became head of what is now considered the Middle Academy around 
273 BCE, left no writings, and consequently little is directly known about him save what 
has passed through exchanges of interpretation.  His scepticism was directly drawn from 
Socrates, and to a lesser extent Plato, and developed in opposition to Stoic 
epistemology.72 Arcesilaus took up Socrates’ maxim for achieving wisdom through the 
recognition of aporia (that is, recognition of one’s own ignorance), and championed the 
dialectical method of Socrates to reduce one’s interlocutors to aporia and never 
espousing a view of one’s own.  That Pyrrho also influenced Arcesilaus is attested to by 
Numenius, who further stated that Arcesilaus seemed to endorse an absolute form of 
epoche, or suspension of judgement, much like Pyrrho was said to have pioneered.73  It 
would seem that contemporaries of Arcesilaus even had a hard time telling which 
philosophical camp Arcesilaus gave his allegiance to, as Numenius reports 
 
 Being equipped from one source and another, Arcesilaus persisted in refuting 
 everything, just like a Pyrrhonian except for the name […] The Sceptics called 
 him a sceptic, just like themselves, since he abolished truth, falsity, and 
 plausibility.  Thus, because of his Pyrrhonian arguments, he was called a 
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 Pyrrhonian, but out of deference to his lover [Crantor] he let himself continue to 
 be called an  Academic.74  
 
Cicero also gives a clear example of Arcesilaus bringing about a sceptical direction to the 
Academy, though without mentioning Pyrrho.  Cicero claims that Arcesilaus followed 
Democritus - whom we have already shown to have had great sway over Pyrrho’s 
thought - in that Arcesilaus “denied that there was anything that could be known, not 
even that very thing that Socrates thought was left for him to know [namely, that he knew 
nothing].”75  And furthermore, in the same vein of showing the sceptical roots of Socrates 
and Plato, Cicero writes, “They call it the New Academy, but it seems to me to be Old, at 
least if we count Plato as belonging to the Old, for in his books nothing is affirmed and 
there are many arguments on both sides of an issue, everything is open to question, and 
nothing is said with certainty.”76  Thus, Arcesilaus is a strong link to Pyrrho and Plato, 
connecting Pyrrho’s central tenet of epoche to Plato’s Academy after his death. 
 While the connections between Arcesilaus, Pyrrho, and Socrates, particularly on 
the importance of aporia, seem clear enough, Diogenes Laertius claims that Arcesilaus 
was the first to suspend judgement on account of the equal strength of contradictions 
among arguments.  Further, he credits Arcesilaus with moving the doctrine of Plato 
towards a more eristic method, presumably away from or at least modifying Socratic 
elenchus.77  This suggests that Arcesilaus was familiar with Pyrrho’s suspension of 
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judgement, but moved away from the aporetic praxis of language that Pyrrho espoused 
(though not aporia itself) by having the utterance ‘no more this than that’ metamorphose 
into an eristic weapon used to show the contradictions among arguments. By this 
Arcesilaus clearly distances himself from the language practice of Pyrrho, as the 
utterance is no longer functioning as a practiced phrase for maintaining epistemological 
and metaphysical uncertainty in daily life.  Arcesilaus leapt into the fray of language not 
to find the truth, and certainly not in the same ascetic spirit that Pyrrho did, but to attack 
those who thought they had found it, and to reduce them to aporia with equal 
argumentation (isostheneia).  Pyrrho only aimed to develop a way to the good life 
following an almost ascetic path and living the sagacious life of his philosophy. 
Arcesilaus openly attacked any position, including any that he may have been seen to 
hold, carrying forward Pyrrho’s method of suspending judgement on everything, as well 
as the aporetic stance shared by Pyrrho and Socrates, speaking of the ‘wise man’ only as 
a dialectical or rhetorical trope.  The language and intention of epoche remained largely 
unchanged, but the practice of language had become an outward weapon against others 
rather than praxis for expressing and maintaining one’s own aporia.  Where Pyrrho 
focused on practicing a specific language to improve his life that in itself was 
incompatible with holding an infallible position, Arcesilaus aimed to use language to 
argue at every opportunity as if his position were, for the moment at least, infallible. 
 The move away from Socratic dialogue that Diogenes reports seems somewhat 
off the mark, as Arcesilaus did seem to conduct his arguments using much the same 
‘question and answer’ method of Socrates.  The difference is that where Socrates wished 
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to birth theories, Arcesilaus wanted to refute them immediately.78  This difference may be 
mostly attributed to the presence of such schools of thought as Epicureanism and 
Stoicism, the latter of which the sceptics were entangled in debate with for many years, 
which was largely begun by Arcesilaus.  While Arcesilaus upheld universal epoche and 
did not assent or dissent to any argument or conclusion being true or false, much of his 
dialectical argumentation was targeted at Stoic epistemology. The animosity toward Stoic 
theory appears to be the most defining feature of Arcesilaus’ thought, along with the fact 
that he argued on either side of any argument, and did not espouse any view himself.  
Cicero points to Aristotle as being one of the first to argue both sides of an argument, but 
with the intention of setting everything down that could be said, rather than to reduce the 
whole effort to aporia.79  As Numenius puts it,   
 
 No one knew about Arcesilaus’ stand any more than they knew about which side 
 the son of Tydaeus was on […] He did not have it in him ever to express one and 
 the same position nor, for that matter, did he think such a thing at all worthy of a 
 shrewd man […] Like a hydra, he decapitated himself and was decapitated by 
 himself […]” 80 
 
 The hydra-like atttributes of Arcesilaus had the effect of him appearing to his opponents 
to espouse beliefs that were opposite and contrary to those he argued against, most 
notably those held by the Stoic Xeno of Citium.   
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 The Stoics argued that nature provides humans with faculties enough to form 
kataleptic impressions, or impressions which “given the way they come about, cannot fail 
to be true,” and provide for us a solid foundation for knowledge.81  Recall that 
impressions were regarded as impressions on the soul, and both were generally accepted 
in philosophical and everyday speech.  In Against Colotes, Plutarch outlines how the 
sceptics were willing to speak of the soul, stating, 
 
 there are three movements in the soul, that of presentation, that of impulse, and 
 that of assent.  Presentation cannot be removed even by those who want to, but it 
 is necessary that those who meet with objects should be impressed and affected 
 by them; and impulse is awoken by presentation, and moves man to act with 
 respect to what is appropriate to him, as though a tipping of the scales and an 
 inclination occurred in the leading part [of the soul].  Now, those who suspend 
 judgement on all matters do not abolish this second motion either, but they use 
 impulse, which naturally leads a man towards what is presented as being 
 congenial to him […] For the argument for suspension of judgement does not 
 interfere with sense-perception, nor does it introduce into our irrational 
 experiences and movements some change which disrupts our faculty of 
 presentation.  All it does is remove opinions; the rest it makes use of in 
 accordance with their natures.82  
 
                                                
81 Frede, 265. 
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Though not Arcesilaus’ exact account of the soul, if there is one, the above is an 
acceptable general account of how the sceptics would have utilized customary beliefs to 
dialectically engage their opponents.  The above account of the soul appears to be a 
joining thread in ancient scepticism, having its root in Democritus, flourishing in Pyrrho, 
and coming to maturity in Sextus Empiricus centuries later.83 
 Setting aside the general account of Arcesilaus and returning to his debate with 
Stoic epistemology to further understand his own position, we find that Zeno’s 
epistemological theory building up to kataleptic impressions followed a form similar to 
the following: believing something is to give assent to an impression which gives itself to 
showing a thing in a certain way, whereby some impressions deserve assent and others do 
not.  An impression deserving of assent gives itself to what it arose from in such a way 
that it is exactly as what it arose from.  Thus, “your impression that this book is green 
deserves assent, if your impression has its origin in fact and if it precisely and accurately 
represents this fact.”84 Stoic epistemology used kataleptic or ‘cognitive’ impressions to 
build a theory of knowledge.  As Sextus puts it some time later, a Stoic kataleptic 
impression “arise[s] from what is, and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance 
with what is, of such a kind as could not arise from what is not.”85  This view was 
precisely what Arcesilaus targeted in much of his argumentation that has survived today. 
Cicero outlines a number of Academic arguments used against the validity of kataleptic 
impressions, including the possibility of deceiver gods and hallucinations.   
 One particular argument attributed to Arcesilaus against this line of Stoic thought 
concerns the viability of a kataleptic impression over an equally convincing but false 
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impression.86  Say you have a favourite pen on your desk, and you come into your office, 
recognize it, pick it up and use it, having the impression that it is your favourite pen such 
that you judge it to really be that pen.  I enter the room and hand you what is in fact your 
favourite pen, having switched it out for a pen that looked exactly like it before you came 
in to the room.  You believed yourself to be having a kataleptic impression, and thus 
‘knew’ that this pen was your favourite one, but in fact a pen that looked exactly like 
your favourite pen gave you the same, but false, impression.  This is how Arcesilaus 
argued that there is no such thing as a kataleptic impression.  The point is that the Stoics 
said that kataleptic impressions were the foundation for knowledge, yet Arcesilaus points 
out that there is no way to tell a ‘true’ kataleptic impression from a false one. 
 Put another way, Sextus reports that the Stoics argued “there are three things 
linked to each other: knowledge, opinion, and, placed between these, grasping.”87 
Knowledge is strong and unchanging, opinion is weak, and grasping is the assent to a 
kataleptic impression.  They maintained that knowledge is accessible to the wise, opinion 
to the ordinary person, and grasping available to both.  Arcesilaus argued that grasping is 
no midway point between knowledge and opinion, as grasping onto a kataleptic 
impression is available to both wise and unwise, and there is no difference between the 
grasping of the two.  Thus, recalling Plutarch’s discussion of the soul,  
 
 a [kataleptic impression] is non-existent, first because assent occurs not with 
 respect to a presentation but with respect to a statement, for assents are given to 
 propositions; second, because there is no [kataleptic impression] such that there 
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 could not be a false one just like it […] Since there is no [kataleptic impression], 
 grasping will not occur either, for the assent has to be to a [kataleptic impression].  
 And if there is no grasping, everything will be ungraspable.  Everything being 
 ungraspable, it will follow, even according to the Stoics, that the wise man 
 suspends judgement. 88 
 
The kataleptic impressions that the Stoics wished to show as generating the truth of 
propositions that articulate their content are shown to be ungraspable.  Since Arcesilaus 
“agrees with Zeno and holds that the wise man’s chief strength is that he is careful not to 
be tricked and sees to it that he is not deceived,” he was able to argue that even the Stoic 
sage would by his own argumentation sooner resort to epoche than assent to mere 
opinion.89  Arcesilaus’ argument essentially reduces the Stoic conception of kataleptic 
impressions to something that cannot be proven to be anything more than opinion by the 
wise man any more than by the novice, and the Stoic sage by his own admission should 
rather suspend judgement than assent to mere opinion.   
 Arcesilaus can be said to have had aporia and epoche as central to his mode of 
argument, as the previous argument against the Stoics makes clear.  Yet, because of the 
focus on dialectical argument, there is an apparent gap between the pedagogical teaching 
of Pyrrho and the antagonistic and argumentative nature of Acresilaus’ Academic 
scepticism.  The Academic arguments certainly worked towards reducing opponents to 
epoche, but did so with considerably less practical concern for the way of life that might 
follow the arguments.  That is, the Academics offered the arguments for the sake of 
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arguing a point with little or no underlying praxis for the way in which one might conduct 
one’s life.  Arcesilaus’ argument for reducing the Stoic position to epoche is a definitive 
connection to the aporetic language praxis that Pyrrho taught and espoused.  Pyrrho’s aim 
to inculcate aporia and epoche is most evident in Arcesilaus’ attempt to bring the Stoic 
interlocutor to experience epoche herself.  The striking difference, however, is that 
Arcesilaus is willing to argue with the Stoic so as to bring about the experience of 
epoche, while Pyrrho would never argue, but would only try to teach his sceptical way of 
life.  
 The Stoics criticized Arcesilaus’ position of universal epoche as being impractical 
and unlivable, generally known as the ‘apraxia charge’ (apraxia literally means ‘unable 
to act’).  The charge of apraxia states that action requires belief at some level, and 
universal epoche is therefore impossible.90  The person who claims to suspend judgement 
universally is, according to the charge, unable to act due to her claiming openly to not 
chose any course of action over any other.  If she does act, then she contradicts her claim 
to universal epoche.  Once again turning to the passage of Plutarch on the differences 
between presentation, impulse, and assent, as well as Sextus’ point that assent is not 
simply given to presentation but to statements and propositions, Arcesilaus’ response 
becomes manifest: one does not need to assent to mere opinions, but can react to 
presentations and impressions upon the soul in accord with the natural impulses that he or 
she feels.  The impression or pathe that you are sitting in a chair does not require, nor is 
equivalent to, the proposition ‘you are sitting in a chair.’  
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  Reminiscent of Pyrrho’s fundamental cause for maintaining an aporetic 
disposition via linguistic praxis, one does not need to assent to the linguistic statement 
about the nature of things in order to perceive, or act on, impressions given.   Whereas 
Pyrrho concerned himself with the individual being happy, Arcesilaus focused on 
dialectically engaging dogmatists.  Arcesilaus maintained that impressions are endless 
and scepticism does not deny that we are affected by them.  Scepticism does not avoid 
anything in impressions themselves, but refrains from holding opinion as anything but 
opinion and avoids falsehoods and deception.91   Likened to Xenophanes’ analogy of 
people searching a dark room for gold, by which gold is absolute knowledge, sceptics do 
not deny that we can feel like we have touched upon gold, or even that we do in fact have 
gold in our hands.92  Rather, given the darkness of the room, sceptics suspend judgement 
on whether we can say for certain that what any person might grasp at is without a doubt, 
golden. 
 According to Sextus, Arcesilaus continued, however, and upheld that one who 
holds to universal epoche regulates choices and acts according to eulogon, or 
reasonableness, which leads to morally correct actions and a happy life.93  To eulogon 
(the reasonable) was Arcesilaus’ direct response to the apraxia charge, and combined 
with the argument given earlier against Stoic epistemology, which concluded that there 
are no presentations that can be perceived, these seem to be the reasons that Sextus 
defined Academic scepticism as different from Pyrrhonian.  Namely, Arcesilaus appears 
to be denying our ability to grasp anything at all, which falls to Sextus’ charge of 
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negative dogmatism, and that Arcesilaus claimed to know that living according to 
eulogon brings about the good life, which is a clear claim to knowing something and 
therefore is just plain dogmatism.  Several scholars maintain that this might be a specious 
interpretation of Arcesilaus.94   
 If we read Arcesilaus as engaging with Stoic epistemology dialectically, as we 
have been supposing he does as carrying forward the tradition of Socrates and Plato, he is 
responding to Stoic interlocutors only to respond, refute, and cast them into aporia.  As 
Plutarch noted of the sceptical dialectic, “debates with those philosophers [i.e. sceptics] 
are carried out by the rules of dialectic and ‘Such a word as you spoke, that you will hear 
as your answer.’”95  A dialectical understanding of Arcesilaus seems to be germane to his 
indebtedness to the Socratic method and the Platonic tradition, of which he was, after all, 
the scholarch.  Moreover, a dialectical understanding of Arcesilaus would be germane to 
understanding the influence that Pyrrho’s suspension of judgement had on it, as Pyrrho 
ultimately aimed for aporia and suspended judgement on everything that might perturb 
one’s soul, as did Arcesilaus in most every account of him.  The charge of negative 
dogmatism regarding to eulogon is somewhat harder to shake, unless we assume it is a 
purely dialectical ploy as well, only put forward in response to an initial Stoic dogma. 
 A general account of Arcesilaus’ philosophy can therefore be understood as a 
combination of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement and Socratic dialectic method, but 
with a greatly diminished focus on the individual’s life.  He suspended judgement on 
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everything and argued every side of an argument so as to cast his interlocutor into aporia 
and show that epoche leads to fewer falsehoods and deception.  The majority of these 
arguments were against Stoic epistemology and therefore, though he was arguing 
dialectically, he was taken to be defending the positions he took up against it despite 
holding universal epoche in higher esteem.  As with Pyrrho, Arcesilaus was aware the 
role language played in developing beliefs and opinions, though rather than recommend a 
way of utilizing language to maintain aporia, Arcesilaus aimed to beat opponents with 
language via dialectic expertise.  It was reported that he 
 was enchanting and bewitching with his verbal apparitions, as a result of careful 
 preparation and practice, he would not allow that he or anyone else was in a 
 position to know anything.  He terrified and confused [others], and indeed took 
 first prize for sophistic arguments and argumentative fraud, delighting in the 
 charge, and priding himself marvelously on not knowing whether something is 
 shameful or honourable, good or bad […]”96 
Arcesilaus desired a route to aporia and epoche that was quite the opposite approach of 
Pyrrho’s ascetic, aphasic path of the sage.  In the previous example of the dogmatic 
physicist, Arcesilaus would rather beat the physicist outright in arguing what it is ‘to 
know’ than offer him a mode of speech to correct himself.  This is indicative of the 
change in goals between Pyrrho and Arcesilaus; the former wished to make one’s life 
better via aporia, whereas the latter wanted to argue whatever truth one thought one held 
into aporia.  Pyrrho wanted to teach a way of life, and Arcesilaus wanted to argue.  
Arcesilaus engaged the game of language that dogmatists played themselves, showing 
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that truth was not available to him nor his interlocutors even in their own terms, and that 
the most shrewd course of action was not to accept the conclusions of argumentation as 
anything other than mere opinion or sophistical wriggling, of which he was himself 
adept.  This is what I believe to be the heart of Pyrrho’s teaching; to alleviate poorly 
founded beliefs – beliefs about reality developed out of nothing but conventions and 
customs of language, which have become assumed to be reality and truth.  Arcesilaus 
may have changed tack a great deal from his roots in Pyrrho and Socrates, but the fusion 
of these two influences along with his antagonistic designs against the Stoics did not lose 
this essential thread of alleviating poorly founded beliefs.  However, as will be seen in 
Carneades, there is a fundamental difference between Arcesilaus and Pyrrho already 
touched on in Arcesilaus’ mode of argument – essentially that he would rather argue than 
teach.  Perhaps it is only a pedagogical difference, and Arcesilaus did aim to teach, but 
his method is far different than the ascetic nature of Pyrrho’s teaching, which was about 
recognizing a crucial problem with how we operate language and how language in turn 
shapes our ontological views, and addressing this problem with altered language practice. 
 
 
2.4 Carneades And the ‘New’ Academic Sceptics 
  
 Carneades took over the scholarchate of the Academy four scholarchs after 
Arcesilaus’ headship, and largely took up the arguments of Arcesilaus as well as many of 
his eristic attacks on the Stoics.  He left no writings, and most of what is known of him 
today is handed down from his followers, most notably Philo and Clitomachus.  While 
Arcesilaus largely focused on attacking epistemological accounts such as the Stoic 
conception of kataleptic impressions, Carneades desired to cast into doubt more than just 
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what Stoics might argue, altering the direction of the Academy enough that his headship 
marked for posterity the beginning of the New Academy.  
 This being said, it is the influence of Carneades that appears to have inspired 
Aenesidemus, in the 1st century CE, to criticize the Academy of being little more than 
‘Stoics fighting with Stoics’.97  Whether this was directly a criticism of Carneades or of 
those who followed him, the new direction of Carneades is clearly seen in the differences 
he espoused in his exposition of epoche as well as in his answer of to pithanon (where the 
sceptic’s actions are explained as to be in accord with ‘the probable,’) in regard to the 
charge of apraxia, which will be explained in detail shortly.  However, the dialectic and 
eristic focus started in Arcesilaus remains very much intact, ensuring a greater divide 
between Carneades and Pyrrho than between Carneades and Arcesilaus.  The divide 
becomes increasingly apparent when compared with the aporetic linguistic practice that I 
have argued to be the central tenet of Pyrrho’s teaching, and distinctly absent in the 
Academic tradition.  Carneades represents the sceptical camp furthest removed from that 
of the Pyrrhonians, as his arguments are much harder to reconcile with the teachings of 
epoche, ataraxia, and the utterances, which are the core of Pyrrhonism.  Carneades’ 
rigorous account of to pithanon, claiming that a sceptic’s actions are in accord with what 
is most probable, hardly seems to be a dialectical manoeuvre, and with only a minor 
indication of attention to how beliefs are generated, it is found that Academic scepticism 
under Carneades is about as far from the aims of Pyrrhonism as can be.   
 The discussion of Carneades’ position is taken up for two reasons: first, to have a 
more rigorous report on the development of scepticism from Pyrrho to Sextus, 
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particularly within the Academic tradition itself, and second, to have a variation of 
scepticism against which to compare the Pyrrhonian position as regards aporetic 
linguistic praxis.  To begin, Carneades continued to argue on both sides of an issue, but 
no longer with the intention of isostheneia, or equal force of argumentation.98  As 
Michael Frede indicates, this move away from isostheneia may be a move to avoid the 
dogmatic claim that isostheneia leads to epoche.  To make the definitive claim that 
isostheneia leads to epoche, is to make a dogmatic claim, and this is precisely what 
scepticism avoids.  A more plausible explanation might be found in looking at an 
argument of Arcesilaus’ noted earlier upon which Carneades built.  Noted earlier in 
Sextus (M. 7.150) the argument was a dialectical one against the Stoic conception of 
kataleptic impressions, and concluded that there is no such thing as a kataleptic 
impression as the Stoic wise man could not be proven to grasp a kataleptic impression 
any more convincingly than an ordinary man could be proven to grasp one.99  All that the 
Stoic wise man could be said to grasp was opinion, which was previously reserved as 
what only the ordinary man could grasp, and hence the kataleptic impression, which was 
the basis of Stoic knowledge, was reduced to opinion.  Carneades allegedly offered a 
counterpart to this argument, which Frede summarizes: 
 
 Carneades’ argument, however, in addition to the first premiss, that if the wise 
 man ever gives assent, he will have mere opinions, took as a second premiss the 
 denial of Arcesilaus’ conclusion, to infer the denial of Arcesilaus’ second 
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 premiss, and thus conclude that even the wise man sometimes will have 
 opinions.100  
 
By this argument, Carneades indicates that the Stoic wise person may indeed hold 
opinions, thus arguing both sides of Arcesilaus’ argument itself, yet still only offering the 
Stoic conclusions that were contrary to his own, as the Stoic must either: epoche, as by 
the Stoic’s own admission the wise person never assents to opinion (only to kataleptic 
impressions); or have the wise person assent to mere opinion, as kataleptic impressions 
have been reduced to assenting to the most probable or plausible, i.e., to pithanon.  
Concluding with either epoche or to pithanon, Carneades presents us with a conundrum 
similar to that which Arcesilaus presented; is Carneades espousing epoche and simply 
arguing dialectically, or is he actually arguing that he assents to plausible opinions?  To 
answer this, a more complete understanding of the finer points of what Carneades meant 
by his use of to pithanon needs to be achieved. 
 In his work Academia, which had a moral focus lacking in most other accounts of 
scepticism, Cicero points to the debate as to whether the wise person might hold an 
opinion despite not perceiving anything in truth.  He reprimands Carneades for seeming 
to fall to allowing the sage to hold mere opinion (in Cicero’s thought, though not relevant 
here, this is to make a moral mistake), and he points out that, “this thesis [to pithanon] 
was advanced as a debating point rather than as something of which he really 
approved.”101  In other words, Cicero thought that Carneades’ position of claiming that 
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the sceptic’s actions are in accord with what is ‘most probable’ was simply a rhetorical 
argument, with no connection to what Carneades carried out in his ordinary life. 
 Sextus is often less forgiving of Carneades’ position, saying that Carneades firstly 
maintained that there was absolutely no criterion for truth, and only in being coerced to 
provide a criterion for life and finding happiness did Carneades give in to positing the 
criterion of to pithanon.102  That is, Sextus does not here seem to follow the supposition 
that Carneades was arguing dialectically, and did suppose that Carneades in fact believed 
there to be a plausible presentation, particularly a “presentation which is at the same time 
plausible, uncontroverted, and thoroughly tested.”103  Further to this point, Numenius was 
recorded as indicating that Carneades did not think universal epoche was humanly 
possible.104 
 Sextus continues to delineate his grasp of Carneades’ position, explaining his 
understanding of Carneades’ plausible, uncontroverted, and tested presentations in due 
course.   
 Beginning with plausibility, he states that presentations are of an object to a 
subject, and thus plausibility at root concerns the relation that presentations have with the 
object(s), and with the subject.  In terms of a presentation’s relation to the object, it is true 
or false; “true whenever it is in harmony with the object presented, false whenever it is in 
disagreement with it.”105  A presentation can also be apparently true or apparently false in 
relation to the subject, the former being labeled a representational or plausible 
presentation ‘according to the Academics,’ and the latter an implausible one.  An 
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implausible presentation “does not naturally persuade us,”106 much in the same way, it 
seems, that a Stoic kataleptic impression or presentation is said to be as such in a way 
that it could not be otherwise.  Furthermore, Sextus states that Carneades, in developing 
his criterion of to pithanon, differentiated ‘apparently true presentations’ in the subject 
into ‘obscure’ and ‘clear’ presentations.  Obscure ones are so due to such things as 
“smallness of the object, or its considerable distance, or the weakness of sight,” and do 
not answer the criterion of plausibility.107  Only a presentation that is apparently true and 
sufficiently plausible plays a part in answering the criterion.  Sextus noted this conception 
of what is plausible displayed a great deal of variation, as any true, plausible presentation 
can and may be superseded by another.108  That is, considerable argument has gone into 
finding a presentation that answers the critierion of to pithanon, yet that same 
presentation can be superceded by another ‘more’ plausible presentation at any time.  
Some plausible thing might be assented to as being ‘known,’ but it is open to being 
replaced by something more plausible.  Perhaps you think you see a fly on the wall.  It is 
a plausible presentation that gives you this thought, though upon closer inspection – 
moving closer, or shining a light on it – so as to clarify any obscurity in the presentation, 
you arrive at the now clearer and therefore more plausible presentation that it is in fact a 
thumb tack in the wall.  This is only the beginning of Carneades’ account of to pithanon, 
and it already seems to be making more claims than scepticism hitherto ever attempted.  
Furthermore, he is actively engaging in precisely the same language that claims 
absolutely ‘to know’ that Pyrrho had found to be the root of so many troubles in life. 
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 Pressing on, we gather from Sextus that Carneades had a variety of combinations 
for the composition of presentations, divided in both subject and object by truth and 
falsity, as well obscurity and clarity.  Only objectively true, subjectively apparently true, 
clear presentations are plausible.  It is apparent, as Sextus outlines, that Carneades thus 
spoke of a presentation as being ‘plausible’ in three ways; firstly as being true and 
apparently true; secondly as being false but apparently true; and thirdly as being true but 
appearing false.109  Carneades then had different degrees of plausibility, with the clearest, 
most truthful and apparent presentations,  (presentations being equivalent to ‘impressions 
on the soul’ following Plutarch’s psychology of the soul,) being the most plausible.  The 
psychology of the soul as given by Plutarch is reflected in Sextus’ own explanation of 
presentation, whereby he states that a presentation is a phenomenon of the soul as relating 
to the perception and experience of a given external object.110  That is, a presentation is 
an impression, or alteration, of the soul, due to the sensing of an external object.  Thus 
there is variability in what appears to be plausible, though like Pyrrho, Carneades 
ultimately goes by appearances.  He seems to be suggesting ways to clarify pathe and 
prevent falsehoods from being the basis of beliefs about what we experience, whether the 
deceptions or falsefhoods be of the senses or of propositions.  He is doing this, however, 
by taking up a position and arguing, which cuts short most every line of comparison from 
him to Pyrrho, as Pyrrho’s entire point is to not take up such a position. 
 Sextus marks this discussion of to pithanon as a first general criterion, the second 
being ‘uncontroverted’ presentations.  This second criterion can be summed up as a 
consistency of the first, or of plausibility; a single object may appear to be your favourite 
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pen, and fill out everything plausibly to be your favourite pen, but if you know you never 
take it from home, and presently think you see it in a stranger’s pocket while on vacation 
in Peru, the presentation that it may be your pen appears less thoroughly true.  That is, it 
probably is not your pen.  Presentations of things occur in concert with others, and the 
whole of them together need to be taken into account to plausibly behold a single one of 
them, “for that this man is Socrates we trust from [the presentation] all the customary 
characteristics belonging to him.”111  One of the characteristics of your pen is that that it 
never leaves home, just as one of the characteristics of Socrates was that he was old: 
seeing your pen outside your home, or a young looking Socrates, takes away from the 
plausibility of your impression of it being true. We must be careful here though, as 
Carneades is not simply speaking of external objects; he is also, and I would argue more 
so, referring to testing our opinions.  The pen example is not just about the external object 
of the pen, it is also about the opinions you have about the pen – i.e., that it is your 
favourite one, and that you think it to be your favourite pen because you find it plausible 
(or not) to believe so. 
 The third and final general criterion that Sextus indicates that Carneades held is 
the tested presentation.  Whereas uncontroverted presentation aimed at verifying a single 
presentation as ‘in its correct or plausible place’ amongst other things, a tested 
presentation aims to 
 
 scrutinize diligently each of the presentations in the combination […] at the place 
 of judgement there is the one who judges, the thing judged, the medium in which 
 the judging occurs, [i.e.,] distance, interval, time, manner, disposition, and 
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 activity, and we discern precisely the particular character of each sort of thing.  
 [Thus we discern] whether the one judging has defective vision […] whether the 
 thing judged is not excessively small […and] whether the medium of judgement 
 is an atmosphere that is not too murky […]112 
 
Carneades here means not just that things appear together plausibly, but that every thing 
is plausibly tested; the judger, the judged, and the medium of judgement are all analyzed 
to a satisfying or persuasive degree.  ‘Did you get a long look at you pen, or have a clear 
view of it?’  ‘Was it dark out?’  ‘Could you have brought it with you on vacation and 
dropped it?’  Questions such as these as are asked so as to test the impressions we 
receive.  Sextus offers an example of testing whether a coil of rope might be a snake.113  
In a bright room one might be able to see that the rope is not a snake, but in a dark room, 
and knowing that snakes sometimes tend to lie still, the judger may decide it prudent to 
test the coil of rope, as it plausibly appears to be a snake, and its situation is consistent 
with that appearance.  A viable method of testing is certainly found in perhaps one of 
humanity’s greatest champions of such things – the poking stick! –  which can prod the 
would-be snake into either moving, or push it into the light for better inspection.  Thus 
the plausible, uncontroverted, and tested presentation is something which Carneades and 
his school would assent to, with the importance of the presentation determining the level 
of scrutiny, such that something of little importance may only need to be plausible, 
whereas something as important as knowing whether there is a snake in your room, 
demands attention and testing.   
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 The result of the testing of plausibility is that whatever is found to be plausible is 
assented to.  Carneades has an arduous criterion for assenting to pithanon, with hardly a 
mention of ataraxia.  In terms of being opposed to Pyrrho’s sceptical quietude, this 
makes sense, as anything arduous, specifically arduous arguments, only add to what 
ataraxia avoids.  A sceptic who argues exhaustively first has a determined position from 
which to argue (dialectically or otherwise), and second, clearly lacks the aporetic 
disposition in language that inherently avoids such a definitive position. 
 It was previously discussed that an impression on the soul (pathe) deriving from 
both opinions and external objects, is not a deliberation, it is in fact the opposite.  An 
impression is how something – that is, any given thought or percetion – strikes us: quite 
literally our first impression, to use a common English phrase.  You walk in the room and 
immediately have impressions about what you experience therein; you do not deliberate 
on whether it is dark, or is a big room, or if there is a snake on the floor.  You are 
impressed upon to think that it appears dark, is a small room, and that there appears to be 
a snake at your feet.  The same stands for opinions.  Someone tells you that his house is 
the tallest building in North America, and you are struck by an impression from that 
statement, and perhaps even begin to test the plausibility of it – could this person live in 
the CN Tower?  Thus it is obvious that Carneades was taking up language in a way that 
Pyrrho not only refused to, but also thought was a major part of the problem with 
generating beliefs and convictions from false grounds.  
 Writing in the late 2nd century CE, we can see that Sextus understands Carneades 
as espousing epoche via the negative dogmatic understanding that nothing is graspable, 
until the pressure of requiring a way of living a good life deems it necessary to assent to 
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plausible things as has just been discussed.  Cicero, writing in the 1st century BCE and 
much closer to Carneades’ time, suggests that Carneades does still epoche in much the 
same way as Sextus did, but any answer that Carneades gives as pertaining to living a 
good life, or any view he may have appeared to have taken up in attacking any other 
position, was purely dialectical and was only taken up much in the same spirit of 
Arcesilaus and Pyrrho before him - to alleviate falsehoods and deception.    
 On one hand, Sextus appears to be suggesting what Harold Thorsrud describes as 
a sliding scale for opinions, with less plausible opinions being on one end along with 
stronger epoche, and more plausible opinions being on the other end of the scale with 
reduced or no epoche.114  We can cautiously assent to some opinions, just as the sage in 
the argument was reduced either to assenting to opinions or to universal epoche.  On the 
other hand, we can understand certain texts and interpretations of Carneades in the way 
we understood Arcesilaus, as arguing merely dialectically and suspending judgement 
universally, which is supported by his aforementioned move away from arguing for the 
isostheneia or ‘equal force’ of equal arguments, this being a dogmatic claim itself.   
 
           2.5 Connecting with Pyrrho 
 In terms of what I argued regarding Pyrrho’s aporetic linguistic praxis in the 
previous chapter, Carneades does not see eye to eye with Pyrrho.  This change started 
with Arcesilaus’ move toward a more eristic method of arguing and attacking 
interlocutors, and is carried forward and amplified in Carneades.  Pyrrho wished to alter 
language so as to prevent falsehoods and deception from being the foundations for beliefs 
and opinions and thereby prevent the troubles caused by them.  He wanted to disengage 
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from the dogmatic presumptions of language, the likes of which the physicist in the 
example adopted, so as to cut off the power that language has over how we develop our 
ontological views.  Pyrrho wanted to alter, or at least be more aware of, what it is ‘to 
know’ or to say that one ‘knows’ something – namely, that we do not often know what 
we say we know, in the absolute way that it is assumed when we implicitly or explicitly 
say ‘to know’ a proposition.  
 The Academics, and Carneades moreso than Arcesilaus, did not wish to alter 
language like Pyrrho, but wished to engage in that very language of ‘knowing’ and beat 
the dogmatists at their own game, in their own field.  Arcesilaus delighted in winning 
sophistic competitions and not knowing if something is good or bad, and Carneades was 
noted for continuing this sort of argumentation.115  Pyrrho started his inquiries in the 
same way as did the Academics - or anyone for that matter – in language.  Further, he, 
like the Academics, initially denied the indubitableness of our knowledge and sought 
suspension of judgement and aporia.  Unlike the Academics, he turned upon this first 
dogmatic premise he had, and using his aporetic linguistic practice, suspended judgment 
on it as well.  This has the effect of severing Pyrrho from playing the same ‘to know’ 
game that the dogmatists continue to assume implicitly in their language use.  
Unfortunately for the Academics, having explicitly taken up this sort of battle with the 
dogmatists, they also implicitly and unconsciously continue to uphold the same 
assumptions about what it is ‘to know’.  That is, despite their varying claims to epoche, 
they still tacitly value the same sort of knowing that the dogmatists do, this sort of 
language and knowing being precisely what Pyrrho’s entire teaching warns against.  This 
is something to be picked up at the end of the chapter, and furthered in the discussion of 
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the revival of Pyrrhonism.  Suffice to say, I believe there is a reason that Aenesidemus 
and Sextus criticize the Academics in the way they did. 
 Despite Sextus’ understanding of Carneades as being too dogmatic, his 
interpretation of the position of to pithanon can still be seen in the dialectical light in 
which Cicero prefers to cast him.  Returning to this, Cicero indicates that truth, evidence, 
and plausibility are three separate things for Carneades, and that no assumption should be 
made equating truth with plausibility.116  Carneades seems to share some of the views of 
Pyrrho, recollecting Pyrrho’s ‘going with appearances’ as well as his acceptance (though 
not assent) to customs and conventions. To pithanon is a testing method for appearances, 
and could perhaps be a fleshing out of what humans naturally do when struck by less-
than-plausible stimuli.   
 A strong link to Pyrrho’s disposition is found in a passage in which Cicero 
appears to be criticizing Carneades and the sceptics for not seeming to discover anything 
despite all their inquiring: 
  
 All right, then, I want to see what they have discovered.  He [Carneades] says, “it 
 is not our custom to set forth [our views].”  Well, whatever are those mysteries?  
 Why do you hide your opinion as though it were something to be ashamed of?  He  
 says, “it is in order that our audience should be guided by reason and not by 
 authority […]”117 
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Here it appears that Carneades does in fact have some pedagogical aims outside of 
merely showcasing the shortcomings of dogmatic argumentation via dogmatic 
argumentation, and genuinely wishes ‘his audience’ to learn by something more than, at 
least, mere reliance on authority.  Recalling the example in which the physicist was 
speaking about knowing something about reality because of quantum theory, a 
connection to Pyrrho can be made here at least pedagogically regarding the linguistic 
praxis of Pyrrho.  I spoke of two forms of repercussions occurring from this sort of 
language: repercussions concerning himself and his own beliefs about what he says, and 
repercussions concerning those he speaks with and the beliefs that they draw from what 
he says.  The latter is Carneades’ ‘audience’, whom he wishes not to hear his opinions on 
things for fear of them taking him as an authority on the given subject, much like this 
physicist would be taken as an authority on what he is speaking about.  By withholding 
his opinions, much to Cicero’s chagrin, Carneades displays an awareness of how beliefs 
and opinions can be promulgated, truth and evidence notwithstanding.  Though this is a 
slim passage, it is one of the few that shed a light on Carneades as something other than a 
stalwart and skillful rhetorician, though less concerned with developing an account for 
the happy life than is either Pyrrho or Arcesilaus. 
 This is the most closely related interpretation of Carneades that I can give with 
my linguistic interpretation of Pyrrho in mind.  Carneades did not epoche to the same 
extent as did Arcesilaus, and certainly not as did Pyrrho.  He developed but essentially 
carried on the Academic tradition of scepticism, attacking dogmatists who claimed to 
know something about the nature of reality by arguing the opposite claim that nothing 
can be known.  He did not seem to suspend judgement on the claim that nothing can be 
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known, and was generally thought to deny that universal epoche was possible anyways.  
We may wish to follow the dialectical interpretation of Arcesilaus where we found him 
merely to be arguing with his interlocutors so as to cast them into aporia, and offering his 
criterion of to eulogon as a method of living with universal epoche.  However, this seems 
less likely the case with Carneades, given his move away from universal epoche and how 
much attention he gave to his account of to pithanon.  Moreover, the modification of 
Arcesilaus’ argument against the Stoic sage, allowing the sage to assent to certain 
opinions in accord with to pithanon, makes assent – however careful it may be – more 
central to Carneades’ position than epoche, and shows him to be far more concerned with 










3.1 Introduction: Later Pyrrhonian Scepticism 
 
 “The idea that one is better off, in practical and emotional terms, adopting an 
 attitude of mistrusting or withdrawal than if one persists with a conventional, 
 optimistic attitude towards enquiry belongs to the Pyrrhonists and the Pyrrhonists 
 alone.”118 
 
 In the previous chapters I have been developing an account of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, beginning in the 3rd and 2nd century BCE with Pyrrho and those who closely 
influenced his aporetic teachings, and moved chronologically from him to the Academic 
sceptics.  However influenced by Pyrrho they were, the Academics developed throughout 
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the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE a philosophy rather different from the individual, aporetic 
linguistic practice of Pyrrho, having turned towards a more dialectical and eristic 
approach that focused on attacking, but also participating in, the sort of dogmatic 
language-practice that Pyrrho had aimed to purge.  Pyrrho emphasized epoche for peace 
of mind, pedagogically suggesting that we say of things as being “no more is than is not, 
or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not.”119  This rather long utterance I shorten 
throughout this thesis to ‘no more’, though always it refers back to the passage from 
Eusebius.  I argue that Pyrrho thought that when we start speaking as if we knew things 
in the absolute sense of ‘to know’ rather than in a way that allows for uncertainty 
regarding what knowledge is and is said to be known, we allow customs, conventions, 
and language largely to direct our ontological views.120 Moreover, we implicitly assume 
equally uncertain opinions and beliefs to be true or valid which underlie whatever 
proposition we claim ‘to know’, such that it is a double-edge assumption of sorts; not 
only is the truth of what we say assumed to be true, but the premises or beliefs which 
might support what we say are also assumed to be true.   
 This double-edged assumption appears to be how Pyrrhonians think everyday 
language tends to function with the development of beliefs: that is, Pyrrhonians think that 
dogmatic language tends to assume that beliefs are always founded on true and valid 
premises, but in practice beliefs are just as often founded on previously held, unfounded 
beliefs.  Everyday dogmatic language practice and the knowledge it assumes to describe 
allows for the motion of belief-to-belief to happen under the guise that it is a motion of 
knowledge-to-belief.  Aporetic linguistic practice specifically addresses the double-edged 
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assumption that everyday language carries with it by forcing the speaker to remove the 
dogmatic assumptions from her propositions and utterances. 
 A simple example of this assumption of knowledge may be that I claim to know 
that it is good for every person to study in school so as to be the best citizen possible.  
Underneath this claim are several other claims that are assumed to be true: namely, that I 
know what ‘good’ is in a very universal sense; that I know what the ‘best citizen’ is 
within a certain societal structure; and that I know that there is a connection between 
education, people, and what is ‘good’.  The deconstruction of these secondary underlying 
claims are upheld by further tertiary ones, with each ‘level’ moving away from the 
individual’s beliefs towards beliefs given to that individual through customs of culture, 
religion, etc..  However, the deconstruction is not the focal point here, it is rather the fact 
that the initial claim can be said simpliciter and all the underlying belief structures are 
assumed in everyday speech by the speaker and the listener to be intact simply because if 
they were not intact, then what the speaker said would not make sense.  Moreover, that 
very statement can become the foundation for further beliefs and convictions, which is 
precisely what Pyrrho’s linguistic praxis intended to address, and what Academic 
scepticism was found almost completely to ignore.   
 As already stated, the Academic sceptics did not have the same focus as the 
Pyrrhonians, and consequently they serve as a foil against which to compare Pyrrhonian 
scepticism as similar but having a very different modus operandi.  The Academics had an 
eristic focus in that their scepticism had argumentative objectives, and consequently they 
cared comparatively little about experiencing a less troubled life.  Having presented the 
origins of Pyrrhonism and the utterance ‘no more’ as the germ of his language practice in 
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the chapter on Pyrrho, as well as having shown how through the Academics scepticism 
moved away from the teachings of Pyrrho in chapter two, the aim of this third chapter is 
to highlight the revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism via Aenesidemus and to show that the 
linguistic practice is at the core of what is revived.  Moving from there into the works of 
Sextus Empiricus, the chapter will focus on developing further the linguistic practice as it 
was carried forth by Sextus.  
 
 
     3.2 Aenesidemus and the Revival of Pyrrhonism 
 
 Aenesidemus is believed to have written extensively in the 1st century BCE 
shortly after the death of Cicero, which accounts for Cicero’s silence on his work.121  He 
is also thought to have been an Academic sceptic himself and became disenchanted with 
what he believed to be the tendency of the Academics to dogmatize as much as those 
whom they criticized did.  Both Sextus and Diogenes Laertius gave accounts of 
Aenesidemus, and the most complete record existing on Aenesidemus comes through the 
writing of the Christian scholar Photius in the 9th century.  Photius gives an account of 
Aenesidemus’ eight books Pyrrhonian Arguments, in which he states early on that 
Aenesidemus maintained that the Academics, particularly the newer ones, seem to be 
nothing more than ‘Stoics fighting with Stoics.’122  This seems to be in line with my 
earlier conclusion regarding the difference between Arcesilaus and Carneades; namely, 
the New Academy under Carneades widened the gap between Academic and Pyrrhonian 
scepticism to an extent that Arcesilaus himself did not.  However, the main points that I 
wish to show relating to Aenesidemus’ revival of Pyrrhonism concern: the melding of the 
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Academic eristic method with Pyrrhonism; the refocusing of scepticism on discovering 
eudaimonia despite the sceptic knowing nothing; and most crucially, Aenesidemus’ 
reconstitution of Pyrrho’s locution ‘no more’ in developing epoche and finding ataraxia.  
All of this will be compared to the genesis of Pyrrhonism in Pyrrho, and will make 
connections to the aporetic linguistic praxis that has been found to be fundamental to 
Pyrrho’s philosophy for leading a happy life.  As will be found, Aenesidemus did 
intentionally revive the language practice of Pyrrho, bringing back Pyrrho’s ascetic, 
existential focus on experiencing the least troubled life possible. 
 Though to provide a long exposition of Aenesidemus’ ten tropes, or ‘ways’ to the 
suspension of judgement, is not necessary for my purposes, since emphasis will be given 
to the more succinct five tropes of Agrippa in the discussion on Sextus Empiricus, brief 
mention must be made as it is Aenesidemus who appears to have first fashioned such a 
list.  Furthermore, I wish to draw a distinction between how the tropes are generally 
understood, and the way that they can be comprehended in terms of the linguistic 
approach thus far taken in understanding the efforts of Pyrrhonism.  In other words, the 
focus is on how one might understand the tropes as an extension of Pyrrho’s effort to 
reduce the troubling beliefs developed in language use, via the alteration of language use 
itself.  This is not to deny the general understanding of them, but to supplement them, and 
show the practical use of them in daily life, which is an integral part to Pyrrhonism as a 
philosophy of life.  As was drawn out in the previous chapters, argumentation is not a 
medium in which Pyrrhonism operates.  Pyrrhonists do not design their philosophy 
around arguments aimed at others; rather, they develop a language practice that becomes 
deeply habituated, with the intention of curtailing the development of knowledge from 
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unfounded and ungrounded beliefs and convictions – beliefs and convictions that can 
otherwise be tacitly assumed to be true and valid.  Pyrrhonism is an experiential and 
practice-based philosophy aimed at nothing more than aiding an individual in finding 
ataraxia. 
 Having been an Academic sceptic prior to announcing the Academics to be 
dogmatic despite their own denouncement of dogmatism, it is no small wonder that 
Aenesidemus would have seen the use in compiling arguments that lead to epoche – if the 
Academics have been shown to be one thing, it is to be organized and talented 
dialecticians.  In making the list of tropes Aenesidemus essentially melded Pyrrho’s 
priority of linguistic aporia with Academic eristic method, producing what is generally 
thought to be a categorical approach to disfiguring the foundationalist scientific method 
rooted in Aristotle, notably attacking the existence of truth, principles of reason, and 
meta-empirical inferences.123  Basically, the ten tropes of Aenesidemus (as well as an 
additional set of eight attributed to him) aim to undermine the idea that the postulates of 
science can lead to definitive knowledge about the nature of things by arguing against the 
competence of our reasoning and senses.   
 In terms of the practiced linguistic aporia that Pyrrho’s sage would have found 
agreeable and useful, each trope can be seen as an extended locution, proposition, or 
argument, which develops towards inculcating epoche in the speaker specifically, but 
perhaps the listener, or both.  Recall that Pyrrho’s intention was to control one’s own 
language usage so as to rein in troubling beliefs and opinions that develop from language 
use itself.  In this way the tropes are best understood as extended locutions or phrases for 
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use in specific circumstances to maintain one’s own aporetic disposition and epoche.  To 
understand them as arguments that the Pyrrhonist actually put forth is to enter into the 
realm of dialectical argument and dogmatism.  This is what the Academics were doing by 
arguing for things so as to disprove any theory, including the one they happen to take up 
in argument.  They may not have believed the argument they took up, but by choosing to 
argue on the same grounds with the same implicit assumptions in language intact, they 
missed the ascetic, wariness of language that was germane to Pyrrho.  Aenesidemus 
reworked epoche from the Academics, and with the tropes, “expressed, enriched, and 
determined in a conceptually more precise way the spiritual attitude which was 
previously Pyrrhonian.”124  I am wary of mentioning Pyrrhonism as spiritual or 
comparable to religion, as if to give Pyrrhonism some sort of religious connotation.   That 
being said, if the tropes are simply to be taken as arguments, dialectical or otherwise, 
then the ‘spiritual’ disposition of Pyrrhonism and the ataraxia that so preciously follows 
an aporetic attitude maintained by language practice that reflects epoche would be 
sullied, as argumentation is quite contrary to the ascetic ways of Pyrrhonism. 
 The tropes are generally understood as a web of argumentation that Pyrrhonists 
use in debate, much in the same way that Arcesilaus used the utterance ‘no more’ to 
attack the positions of others.  I wish to make clear that the reading of the tropes as 
phrases for the utterance of the sceptic wishing to maintain an aporetic disposition does 
not disparage the generally accepted reading of them as genuine epistemological 
arguments for the promotion of epoche and against the certainty of human knowledge.  
The tropes are certainly meant to invoke uncertainty and aporia, but not so much in 
debate with interlocutors as with altering the way an individual speaks so as to induce 
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epoche and aporia within him or herself.  In brief, I wish to summarize the ten tropes of 
Aenesidemus as they are generally recorded between Sextus Empiricus125 and Diogenes 
Laertius126 so as to make the discussion of them clearer.   
 The first points to the numerous differences between living beings, particularly 
differences in their faculties of sense, underlining the fact that humanity’s abilities for 
sensing have no higher or preferable place for determining true reality.127  The second 
trope shifts scope and says that even with humans themselves there is great difference 
and variation between faculties and of feelings, and that no single person can be said to 
have a more preferable or true perception of reality than any other.128  The third points to 
variety and difference in the senses of the individual, showing that what looks smooth to 
the eye can be rough to the touch, or pleasant to smell but horrid to taste, and that even 
within the individual no sense or combination of senses can be said to touch certainly 
upon reality.129  The fourth trope indicates that due to differences of the conditions of 
perception, particularly in the perceiver such as age, health, disposition, temperature, that 
no person or condition can be said to be preferable or closer to touching upon the true 
nature of things.130  A singularly good example is made by Diogenes Laertius on this 
point, where he states that not even the state of a madman is contrary to nature, and 
cannot be said to be more so (correct) than anyone else’s.131  The fifth trope underscores 
the differences amongst people regarding opinions and beliefs about moral values, gods, 
philosophies, and education, leading to epoche by showing that no one can be sure which 
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touches on truth and reality more than another.132  The sixth trope states that appearances 
and our perceptions are never purely occurring of themselves, but mixed together with a 
plethora of other appearances and perceptions such that we cannot determine with any 
certainty one appearance and condition with how they affect any other appearance or 
condition.133  The seventh trope outlines that distances, positions, and places affect our 
impressions of things, so that the same thing from different perspectives can appear 
entirely different, hence our impressions from any one or variety of positions can be 
preferred from any other.134  The eighth trope shows how quantitative relations alter our 
impressions and perceptions of things; for instance, single grains of sand appear rough, 
but an entire beach of sand appears smooth.135  The ninth trope states that the relativity of 
things to each other lends to how we know them, such that when we see something out of 
the context in which we find it familar, we do not immediately (or at all) recognize what 
we saw, and thereby cannot say that we know a thing by its true nature.136  The tenth 
mode concerns itself with the frequency by which something occurs. It states that the 
frequency of a things occurrence alters our perception of that thing, such that rare things 
are held in greater esteem than common things; yet not everyone experiences the same 
frequency of things, whereby the same thing is considered rare and marvelous by some 
but common and mundane by others.137 
 Thus, all the tropes lead to suspension of judgment by showing in a variety of 
ways that our impressions, perceptions, and reasonings are fallible at best, and cannot be 
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the basis of a scientific enquiry that can assume to ‘know’ in the strong or infallible 
sense.  These can be taken as arguments actually propounded by the Pyrrhonist, though 
this would show a discontinuity between the Pyrrhonist’s claim to determine nothing, or 
we can view them as locutions and phrases that the Pyrrhonist employs in concert with 
the utterance ‘no more’ so as to express her disposition of aporia (to herself or to others, 
depending on the scope of the utterance) and of determining nothing. 
 In the first chapter it was noted that Pyrrho’s sage developed over time from a 
novice to a full-fledged Pyrrhonist.  The same process stands to reason with the 
development of an aporetic disposition.  The disposition is not a switch that can be 
flipped, but is rather the result of a conscious linguistic practice.  One starts off with 
doubts and arguments and by either learning of Pyrrho’s teachings or perhaps by natural 
disposition (which Sextus suggests in PH I) one finds oneself repeatedly thrown into 
aporia.  The tropes can be seen then as useful arguments for those still developing their 
aporetic disposition and still feel the need to argue, or for those who do not see 
Pyrrhonism as being fundamentally critical of unrestrained language use.  I would adhere 
to the former understanding, as to grasp Pyrrhonism as lacking the linguistic practice of 
avoiding the promulgation of troubling beliefs is to take up Pyrrhonism without full 
acknowledgment of its clear focus on what the Pyrrhonists say of things.  The latter, 
argumentative understanding of Pyrrhonism is to miss the practical, life-oriented aspect 
of this philosophy.  Perhaps, as with Pyrrho’s sceptical sage, the novice sceptic begins 
with this latter understanding of Pyrrhonism as a method of eristic argumentation, but 
once the habit of speaking of things as no more being than not being settles in, and the 
novice Pyrrhonist finds it harder and harder to determine or speak of things (aphasia), the 
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Pyrrhonist moves beyond the argumentative understanding and accidentally falls into the 
ataraxia that follows suspension of judgement from an aporetic disposition.   
 Aenesidemus’ reasons for choosing to revive Pyrrho’s philosophy as a return to 
Pyrrho or to improve Academic scepticism are not entirely clear, though it is clear that he 
held Pyrrho’s teachings in high regard.  It is apparent that he is well acquainted with the 
thought of Pyrrho, as Photius outlines in the beginning of his account of Aenesidemus 
where he states 
  
 The whole purpose of [Pyrrhonian Arguments] is to establish securely that 
 nothing can be securely grasped, neither by means of the senses nor even by 
 means of thought.  Therefore, neither the Pyrrhonists nor the others know the 
 truth in things; and those philosophizing according to another system, besides 
 being ignorant of other things, are also unaware that they weary themselves and 
 spend their time in continual agonies for nothing; they are ignorant of this very 
 fact, that they have actually grasped nothing of what they believed they have 
 grasped.138 
 
Outlining the essence of what Pyrrho felt was at stake, Aenesidemus appears to be on the 
same page; he wishes to address the troubling repercussions of believing something to be 
known, when the certainty and ‘truth in things’ underlying a given belief are not available 
to us.  Though this may seem to be starting in the same thread as the negative dogmatism 
of the Academics (especially that of Carneades), whom unequivocally maintained the 
nonexistence of knowledge, Aenesidemus is quick to indicate that one who follows 
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Pyrrho, “besides being happy in other respects, [is] wise in knowing that nothing has 
been grasped securely… and is clever enough to assent no more to the affirmation [of 
these things] than to their denial.”139  Thus, we find the utterance ‘no more’ no longer 
employed simply eristically as the Academics had, but returned to being fundamental to a 
disposition of epoche as Pyrrho had used it.  Photius records Aenesidemus as nearly 
mirroring the Eusebius passage on Pyrrho, using the utterance ‘no more’ for what appears 
to be the same intention, 
 
 […] no [Pyrrhonist] has at all said that all things are graspable or ungraspable, 
 but rather that they are no more like this than like that, or that they are like this at 
 one time and like that at another, or that they are such for one man and not such 
 for another and totally non-existent for someone else […] Further, nothing is true 
 or false, plausible or implausible, existing or not; rather, the same thing, so to say, 
 is no more true than false, plausible than implausible, is than is not; or, at one 
 time is like this and at another is like that; or is like this to one person and not like 
 this to another.140 
  
By this passage we once again have epoche affirmed as central to the Pyrrhonist 
disposition, distinguishing their view from negative dogmatism of the Academics.  The 
utterance ‘no more’ is used in a very similar fashion to that of Pyrrho through 
Eusebius141, seeming to be an expression of epoche in which the sceptic does not affirm 
                                                
139 Ibid. 
140  Photius, 170a. 
141  Note: “saying of each and every thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is 
nor is not[…]” Eusebius, 758d. 
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or deny things as graspable or ungraspable.  Furthermore, the way Photius phrases the 
thought of Aenesidemus, as regarding ‘what Pyrrhonists say’ is of no small consequence 
in light of my linguistic understanding of Pyrrhonism a la Pyrrho.  Both this and the 
dominance of epoche are bolstered several lines later, where Aenesidemus is said to have 
maintained that, “generally, the Pyrrhonist determines nothing, not even this, namely, that 
he determines nothing.  We speak in this way, [Aenesidemus] says, not having any other 
way to tell what we think.”142  Epoche is undeniably central to Aenesidemus’ scepticism, 
as his sceptic does not settle on determining the ability to determine things; epoche is 
held as a disposition towards the human experience. The way in which Aenesidemus 
consistently refers to the sceptic ‘saying’, ‘determining’, and ‘speaking in this way’, 
indicates that the speech of his sceptic was a cornerstone of his scepticism.  I am not 
being tautological in this, saying what we all know - namely that language is how we 
express ourselves - I am saying that Aenesidemus’ vindication of the Pyrrhonists’ 
peculiar mode of speech suggests that their very mode of speech is integral to their 
disposition.  The Pyrrhonists speak in this way – saying of a thing being no more than not 
being – not because she actually believes or determines one way or the other, no more 
affirming than denying, because short of aphasia (that is, not expressing anything: recall 
Pyrrho’s aporetic sage in chapter one) there is no other way to express herself.   
 
         3.3 Aenesidemus, Relativity, and Language Practice 
 There is a striking difference between Pyrrho’s utterance of ‘no more’ and 
Aenesidemus’ use of ‘no more,’ and an analysis of this difference will better reveal the 
linguistic practice at the core of Pyrrhonism.  This striking difference is the addition by 
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Aenesidemus of numerous relativizing clauses, such as things being ‘like this at one time 
and like that at another time,’ or ‘like this to one person, not like this to another person, 
and non-existent to someone else.’  Scholars such as Richard Bett143, and Jonathan 
Barnes144 tend to set aside Aenesidemus’ relativity as something separate from the body 
of scepticism, and perhaps rightly so.  Relativity is not scepticism, as a relativist 
maintains something definite in saying something is a certain way.  The relativist may 
limit the way an object can be said to appear for a specific subject, but in doing so 
definitely make a statement about the nature of that object.  The epoche of Pyrrhonism, 
particularly that of later scepticism via Sextus Empiricus, shuns such definitive language 
as oppossed to the very practice of aporetic language.  However, I believe that 
Aenesidemus can be seen to have raised relativity in the same spirit in which later 
Pyrrhonism expressed it, thereby making Aenesidemus a strong chronological bridge 
spanning the gap between Pyrrho and later Pyrrhonism.  Aenesidemus was a strong critic 
of the Academic sceptics, and his revival of the linguistic praxis of Pyrrhonism is the root 
of his revival of Pyrrhonism at all. 
 Richard Bett insists that Aenesidemus’ utilization of the locution ‘no more’ is an 
intentional effort in relativity, stating that Aenesidemus is following an ‘invariability 
condition’ maintaining that ‘X is no more F than not-F’ unless it is invariably so.145  The 
sky is no more blue than not-blue unless it invariably appears to be blue in every 
convieable way and to every perceiver.  I believe that this sort of relativity is evident in 
the additional clauses that Aenesidemus posits concerning things appearing differently 
according to time, place, and perceiver, but not in all instantiations of the phrase.  Bett 
                                                
143 Bett, 190. 
144 Jonanthan Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 113. 
145 Bett, 233. 
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seems to posit the invariability condition as Aenesidemus saying that unless X appears 
the same way to different people at different times (rather, all people at any time,) X 
cannot be said to be known in its true nature.  I wonder, however, whether Aenesidemus 
intended the more Pyrrho-inspired version of ‘no more’  (“[…] that all things are 
graspable or ungraspable...they are no more like this than like that […]”146) as also an 
expression of relativity, and not an expression of epoche.  Perhaps these additions of 
Aenesidemus are additions to the lexicon of utterances that he felt aided the Pyrrhonist in 
maintaining an aporetic disposition.  If Aenesidemus were in fact following some sort of 
invariability condition as a criterion for knowledge, it would be much like an Academic’s 
dialectical move: namely, to offer a rhetorical position from which either to refute other 
positions, or to show that very position to be untenable.  Of course, this rhetorical 
position is one in which the sceptic does not vest any belief and is purely rhetorical, or 
dialectical.  However, in the same stroke, holding such a position moves Aenesidemus 
into the same realm as that of the Academics, no longer minding one’s own language so 
as to maintain epoche, ‘saying of every thing that it no more is than is not’ in order to 
avoid the tendency of language to assume and develop troubling beliefs for us, but rather 
having him enter into the fray – the implicit beliefs about and in language intact – of 
language that assumes ‘to know’.  Epoche becomes less the priority and argument takes 
the lead; concern for one’s own eudaimonia and ataraxia take a back seat to proving a 
criterion of knowledge to an interlocutor, or even to oneself.  The sceptic is no longer the 
unfettered nomad that Pyrrho’s sage was described as in the first chapter, but is actually 
arguing for a position that she does not even believe. 
                                                
146 Photius, 170a. 
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 Several scholars weigh in on understanding Aenesidemus as either advocating 
relativity or scepticism.  Harold Thorsrud says that Aenesidemus seems to offer either a 
relativism that affirms the impossibility of knowledge, or a scepticism that holds 
knowledge is not conclusively ruled out.147  The former understanding is negative 
dogmatism akin to that of the Academics; the latter is closer to the sceptical epoche of 
Pyrrho.  If it were not for the relativity that Aenesidemus seems to strive for, he would be 
almost precisely in line with Pyrrho’s teachings.  Both are concerned with changes and 
differences in the predication of things in individual circumstances, and both also 
mistrust the senses as a viable means of knowing true reality.148  Both use the phrase ‘no 
more’ as an utterance meant to express the disposition of epoche that each sceptic finds 
him or herself in.  If we take Richard Bett’s proposed invariability condition as 
something Aenesidemus holds, (such that X is no more F than not-F unless it invariably 
appears so,) then Aenesidemus is clearly dogmatizing and engaging in debate in much the 
same way as the Academics.  Bett states that Aenesidemus’ epoche is compatible with his 
making relative qualifications about appearances, so long as Aenesidemus is understood 
to deny that appearances give access to the true nature of things.149  That is, Anesidemus 
does not determine or believe that true reality is evident in appearances, and any 
statement about the relativity of appearances is already assumed by Aenesidemeus to not 
touch on true reality.  Statements such as ‘that printer is good for people who print 
photographs,’ or ‘Kilarney Provincial Park is beautiful in autumn,’ Aenesidemus, it 
seems, would not have a problem with since they are qualified to certain people, places, 
and times, all of which Aenesidemus would have already maintained as being ‘no more’ 
                                                
147 Thorsrud, 103. 
148 Bett, 214. 
149 Bett, 201. 
 111 
than not-being.  This brings a question to mind: why make relative qualifications of 
appearances against other appearances when one has already denied categorically that 
appearances give access to things in their true nature?  
 I may have an answer: in terms of the linguistic understanding of Pyrrhonism, it 
can be seen that Aenesidemus may have been attempting to expand the vocabulary of the 
sceptic beyond propositions being subjected to the utterance ‘no more’ by making them 
relative to circumstances such as time, place, and perceiver.  This seems to be in line with 
his apology in Photius for the language of the Pyrrhonists, as well as the undeniable 
centrality of epoche at the outset of Photius’ account of Aenesidemus.  Moreover, 
Aenesidemus would qualify appearances against appearances because it was a quick way 
to vocalize and express the absence of any absolute sense of what someone may be 
claiming ‘to know’.  Rather than say that ‘I know this printer is really good,’ using ‘to 
know’ as if it meant knowing something essential and absolute about the nature of the 
printer, qualifying the statement to location, time, persons, or any appearance (so long as 
epoche is clearly held regarding the appearance) serves to diminish any absolute sense of 
how ‘to know’ is used regarding knowledge about the printer.  As outlined in the opening 
Photius passage, Aenesidemus does this to avoid the ‘agonies and weariness’ perpetuated 
by believing to know something in its true nature, when in fact you only know that thing 
relative to specific conditions.  Ataraxia is much the same to Aenesidemus as it was to 
Pyrrho, in that ataraxia follows on the heels of epoche, and falls upon he who ceases to 
dogmatize about what he experiences.  The Pyrrhonian way of bringing this about is to 
cease using language in such a way that troubling beliefs develop out of things we say 
simply to express ourselves.  
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 This understanding of Aenesidemus also shows that he may have dogmatized 
about the nature of appearances; namely, he determined that they do not lend themselves 
to knowing the true nature of things.  This seems to go against the opening statement by 
Photius, that the Pyrrhonist ‘does not determine anything’.  Dogmatizing about 
appearances does not seem to be in line with much of what has been laid down about 
Aenesidemus’ thought.  Aenesidemus was more concerned with what the sceptic says in 
day-to-day life, and found a new and additional way for the sceptic to express it.  He does 
allow more to be said about things, and this seems to draw criticism from Sextus 
Empiricus, who took this to mean that Aenesidemus was prone to dogmatizing about 
things.  This criticism is not entirely unfounded, as will be discussed in the following 
section on Sextus.   
 Nevertheless, Aenesidemus did not revive Pyrrhonism simply through the reuse 
of the name of Pyrrho, nor simply by returning to a focus on epoche and eudaimonia, but 
by also a return to the mode of speech that Pyrrho embodied and taught as the medium 
for his scepticism.  The tropes not only serve as arguments that some Pyrrhonists employ 
in debate to disparage the basis of scientific certainty, but also as at-hand locutions for the 
ascetically minded Pyrrhonist who is striving for a life undisturbed by beliefs and 
opinions foisted upon her by implicit assumptions in using language.  Aenesidemus 
adopted the phrase ‘no more’ and added his own locutions of qualifying appearances to 
perceivers, locations, and particular times, saying that a proposition is no more true now 
than false at another time, or no more true to me than false to you, or no more relevant to 
me than utterly irrelevant to Albert Camus.  As Harold Thorsrud notes, Aenesidemus 
held that we “do not need any special insight into the nature of things in order to live 
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well.”150  He turned to relativity to show that much of what is said in everyday speech can 
be easily removed from the absolute sense of what is assumed in the verb ‘to know’ by 
simple locutions reducing what it is ‘to know’ to mere relative propositions, while still 
adopting the ‘no more’ locution in the way that Pyrrho employed it.  
 
   3.4 Later Pyrrhonism: Sextus Empiricus 
 Both Pyrrhonian and Ancient Scepticism as a whole are indebted for their 
preservation through the ages largely to the work of Sextus Empiricus, considered the last 
major proponent of Pyrrhonian scepticism. He was a medical doctor writing in or around 
the first century CE who belonged to the empirical tradition of Greek medicine.  This 
tradition held that nothing could be affirmed or denied about the hidden causes of 
illnesses, and even held that the causes of illnesses were inconceivable.151  Scepticism 
and the empirical method for medicine developed together a great deal, and many names 
mentioned in ancient accounts of scepticism are believed to be the same individuals 
mentioned in medical annals from the same time.152  This being said, the portrayal of 
Pyrrhonian scepticism that Sextus provides is definitively philosophical in nature, though 
many of his examples are clearly pulled from his role as a medical doctor.  He wrote two 
works, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and Against the Mathematicians, both of which are 
expositions of the Pyrrhonian philosophy.  The former is an outline of the Pyrrhonian 
position which also attacks dogmatic philosophies of logic, physics, and ethics.  The 
latter is an extended antagonistic piece against dogmatic theories in the liberal arts, logic, 
physics, and ethics. Though sources are gathered in this thesis from both, it is Outlines of 
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Pyrrhonism that I refer to the most, as it does double duty: it is both an explication of 
Sextus’ system, but it also showcases his writing as itself strives to perpetuate a 
Pyrrhonian disposition.  Sextus writes with an aporetic linguistic praxis always in mind.  
In this way, he amalgamates the argumentative nature of Academic scepticism with the 
phenomenological, language-based approach to living a happier life to which Pyrrho 
aspired many years prior.  Sextus’ methodical approach to aporetic language brings to 
fruition the sceptical utterances, which function to purge the sceptic’s very speech of 
dogmatic phrases and bolster his state of aporia.  The medicinal quality of scepticism is a 
recurring theme for Sextus, and the purgative nature that he describes it having is most 
evident in the language practice he espouses. 
 It is no small feat, as will be made evident, to write about a system that 
recommends a disposition of determining nothing, while at the same time tries to hold to 
that disposition.  This explicit effort to adopt an aporetic disposition even in writing an 
account of Pyrrhonism, evidenced throughout the text by statements about ‘what we say,’ 
shows Sextus taking it upon himself to speak as a Pyrrhonian, for Pyrrhonians.  His 
active use of aporetic language suggests a linguistic practice and pedagogical approach to 
forwarding the peculiar Pyrrhonian position of finding ataraxia in aporia.  This approach 
to ataraxia through language practice and revealed experience cannot be over 
emphasized in Pyrrhonian scepticism and will be drawn out in this section.  The approach 
to both language and revealed experience are strongly linked to the approach developed 
in the first chapter on Pyrrho, where we saw that he wished use specific phrases, 
particularly the ‘no more’ locution reported by Eusebius, to diminish the disturbing 
opinions and beliefs that careless language use foists upon its users.  These beliefs 
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include explicit ones about external objects and our thoughts about them, but also include 
implicit beliefs such as the function of verbs that express a ‘knowing’ relation between 
subject and object, such as ‘to know’, ‘to see’, and as will be discussed, ‘to apprehend’.  
Pyrrho did not concern himself with or make use of argumentation, and he projected his 
teachings by living them – a sort of pedagogy of the sage, or teaching by example.  The 
attempt by Sextus to write a piece that explains the Pyrrhonian position that includes its 
own language in the scope of what Pyrrhonian sceptics recommend, is an indication that 
Sextus was not simply reporting on scepticism.  Sextus was teaching by example as well, 
and shared in Pyrrho’s awareness of how language contributes to burdensome beliefs and 
opinions as well as the desire to explicate Pyrrhonism as focused on revealing 
experiences.  Sextus’ ultimate goal is realized when the sceptic is able to suspend herself 
from a dogmatic way of thinking and achieve a dispostion of epoche and ataraxia 
through the practice of aporetic language. 
 Aenesidemus revived this approach after it had been largely lost in the 
Academic’s eristically motivated desire to engage in language so as to beat their 
dogmatic opponents at their own game.  By engaging in argumentation, the Academics 
neglected the central Pyrrhonian practice of maintaining aporia in one’s very speech 
patterns.  While they may have argued for epoche, they had lost the ascetic or ‘spiritual’ 
aporetic disposition towards the human experience that characterizes Pyrrhonism.  Along 
with the revival, Aenesidemus’ greatest contribution was to compile tropes, or ‘ways’ 
that lead to epoche.  These are arguments for the promulgation of epoche, whereby the 
supposed sceptic employs the tropes to induce the suspension of judgement as a 
preferable option to the troubles of dogmatism.  These troubles are still the same ones 
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that Pyrrho wished to avoid, namely, troubles concerning the very development of beliefs 
and convictions, that create division and strife themselves (my god versus your god, my 
country versus your country, etc.,) but also the dogmatic disposition that is the result of 
an unconscious, absolutist use of the verb ‘to know.’   Anesidemus’ tropes cannot be 
solely understood as arguments, as this tends to miss the Pyrrhonian focus on human 
experience and the avoidance of argument.  The focus on human experience is 
exemplified in Pyrrho’s wariness of language and the way he took up habitual language 
praxis as a way to address language itself.  Aenesidemus revived Pyrrho’s wariness and 
language praxis in taking up the name ‘Pyrrhonism.’  Furthermore, Aenesidemus’ 
criticisms of the Academic sceptics and their tendency to argue (engage in language to 
determine something) despite not believing the position that they argue, is an indication 
that Aenesidemus himself had intentions contrary to the argumentative way of the 
Academics.  
 Brief description was already given of the ten tropes of Aenesidemus, showing 
their use as practical linguistic phrases rather than as arguments for inducing epoche.  By 
phrases I mean something that a person with (or striving to maintain) an aporetic attitude 
can say to express his attitude of suspended judgement, without determining something.  
To argue is to make a determination about something (that God is omnipresent, or that 
the sky is most certainly blue, for example) and this is not practically reconcilable with 
the central Pyrrhonian tendency of determining nothing.  Both perspectives on the tropes 
however, are closely related to epoche; as arguments they are meant to induce epoche, 
and as practical everyday phrases they are ways of expressing a disposition that suspends 
judgement.  I will carry out this juxtaposition of these two perspectives on the tropes so 
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as to not lose sight of either, as both are necessary to understanding Pyrrhonian 
scepticism.  Aporetic language praxis is better understood, however, by first 
understanding the tropes in their use as ways to epoche, particularly in conjunction with 
the sceptical utterances, which even more clearly highlight apoertic language practice as 
the focus of the Pyrrhonian way.  
 To understand Pyrrhonism, initially it is necessary to have the Pyrrhonian system 
laid out in familiar terms including its principles (epoche, aporia, phantasiai, 
apprehension), arguments (tropes), and goals (ataraxia).  Pyrrhonism is not simply an 
explanatory system or argument however.  Pyrrhonism is experiential, and is more 
concerned with how the individual feels, or is ‘struck’ by the things she apprehends.  
Essentially, the Pyrrhonian sage would not argue, or even use language in the same way 
that a novice Pyrrhonian or non-sceptic would. This position changes what the tropes, as 
well as several other aspects of Pyrrhonism (which will be explained) do for the 
Pyrrhonian sage as opposed to the novice or non-sceptic.   
 The Pyrrhonian sage has settled into the habit of epoche and aporetic linguistic 
praxis, and this inculcates ataraxia through the persistent experience of speaking from an 
aporetic disposition.  The sage is thereby more concerned with how she speaks, and she 
uses language fundamentally differently than a non-Pyrrhonian would.  She certainly 
does not engage in argumentation nor simply view the tropes as arguments.   
 For the novice, the practice of aporetic speech for the continued locution of 
aporia is not yet a habit, and he might perhaps view the tropes in a more argumentative 
light than the Pyrrhonian sage would.  The juxtaposition between understanding the 
tropes as arguments and as sceptical utterances is ultimately to highlight the difficulty in 
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maintaining the difference between them: to understand the tropes purely as arguments is 
to miss the ascetic language practice that Pyrrhonism culminates in, yet to understand 
them solely as utterances would be to miss the formative, pedagogical steps towards 
understanding Pyrrhonism at all. 
 In Outlines of Pyrrhonism we shall investigate the tropes and their use as 
arguments for inducing epoche, while also explicating their roll in maintaining an 
aporetic disposition via linguistic praxis.  Furthermore, the sceptical utterances that 
Sextus outlines will be analyzed, as these seem to be the strongest thread, along with the 
explicit Pyrrhonian disposition of the writing itself, connecting the practical aporetic 
linguistic praxis to Pyrrhonism’s eponymous founder.  Firstly however, an understanding 
of Sextus’ own terms and the general position of Pyrrhonism must be laid out. This will 
be followed by an exposition of the five tropes of Agrippa, in which I develop an 
understanding of them as arguments for epoche.  Lastly, I will turn to the sceptical 
phrases that Sextus outlines, as well as provide an explication of the tropes which focuses 
on understanding Pyrrhonism as espousing a particular approach to using language that 
began with Pyrrho, was ignored by the Academics, and was revived by Aenesidemus. 
 
    3.5 Outline of Sextus 
 In the opening chapter of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus produces the essentials 
of what Pyrrhonism is as a philosophy, beginning with the division of ‘those who inquire’ 
(outlined at the beginning of this thesis) into three groups: the dogmatists, who stop their 
inquiry because they believe that they know something; the Academics, who stop their 
inquiry because they believe that nothing can be known; and the sceptics (for the 
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remainder of the chapter I use ‘sceptic’ and ‘Pyrrhonian’ interchangeably), who do not 
stop their inquiry since they find no suitable answer.  Further, he states that the 
Pyrrhonian sceptic assents to nothing that is uncertain, and that aporia and epoche come 
about for the Pyrrhonian by the equipollence of propositions regarding objects of 
perceptions and objects of thought.153  Thus every proposition, or anything that can be 
said about reasoning or perception, can be met by an opposite proposition of equal 
strength, thereby making everything uncertain and resulting in epoche on the part of the 
sceptic.  As Sextus writes, “In short, he who dogmatizes, assumes as existing in itself that 
about which he dogmatizes, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings in such a 
way that they are understood to be themselves included [in his epoche], and it cannot be 
said that he dogmatizes in saying these things.”154  Thus the role of the tropes as epoche-
inducing arguments and the sceptical phrases as routes to maintaining epoche are both 
underscored, each of which will be addressed in due time.  Prior to this exposition, a 
handful of concepts that Sextus uses to express his position need to be examined, 
including phantasiai, apprehension, epoche, and ataraxia.  The first two of these 
concepts separate Sextus from the sceptics before him, and though the last two concepts 
are familiar to us from previous sceptics, it is through Sextus that they achieve a new 
level of clarity. 
 
            3.6 Phantasiai 
 To begin, laying out several concepts central to Sextus’ development of 
Pyrrhonism is key.  First are phantasiai, generally interpreted as impressions, 
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presentations, or appearances.155  These are the combination of objects of perception and 
objects of thought that compose human experience.  Sextus outlines phantasiai in terms 
of several schools of thought, giving the Stoic position as a tuposis or a shaping of the 
ruling part of the soul by a sensible object, “just as a foot produces a footprint.”156  
Elsewhere, Sextus presents phantasiai as the Peripatetics understood them: a change in 
the soul that he describes as “something – not yet determined – is approaching.”157  This 
feeling, or pathos, is supervened by a logike phantasia, or a ‘discourse-ready’ phantasia 
which unlike pathos or a-logoi phantasiai158 can be expressed rationally, in language.  
Phantasiai have a wide variety of uses in Sextus, as they can refer to: the externally 
existing thing (ta ektos hupokeimena); the things that are (ta onta); what is (to on); and to 
being (to hupokeimenon).159  It is important to note that phantasiai are not thoughts or 
objects themselves, however, as phantasiai are the impressions we get from objects of 
thought and perception.  Benson Mates also suggests a less popular translation of 
phantasiai as ‘fancy’, whereby you might say that you ‘fancy’ something a certain way.  
Something in the distance, perhaps a chair-shaped object, gives you the impression that it 
is a chair; the perception as well as your conscious and unconscious thoughts as to what a 
chair is, combine instantly to give you the fancy or phantasia that you are experiencing a 
chair.  That thing may or may not be a chair, but you suffer the impression, prior to any 
rational thought on it, of it being a chair.   
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 Avoiding dogmatism is always at the forefront of Pyrrhonism, and one may 
wonder how Sextus would advocate epoche on all phantasiai and yet speak of the soul as 
something that he does affirm as existing.  This is the same problem that was assumed in 
Pyrrho’s discussion of the soul, and though the problem was a hypothesized one for 
Pyrrho (his precise position being obscure) it is addressed more clearly in Sextus.  Pyrrho 
was shown to hold that humans do a great deal based on customs and conventions160, and 
Sextus holds a very similar Democritean tenet.  It is one of four everyday observances 
that he maintains that Pyrrhonians assent to without belief: i) guidance by nature, as we 
appear naturally able to think and perceive; ii) necessitation by pathos, as we cannot deny 
our feelings, particularly ones like hunger or thirst; iii) guidance by laws and customs, as 
we must and do follow local points of view regarding these things; and lastly, iv) 
teaching and learning an art or skill, as we must be active in a vocation or hobby.161   
These fourfold observances are held so that the Pyrrhonian does not fall to the apraxia 
(inaction) charge, and so he does not seem to contradict his epoche by appearing to 
determine one choice of action over another.  To speak of the soul, as well as how we as 
humans appear to experience existence falls into two of the above observances; that of 
following customs, and that of necessitation of pathos.  As was argued for Pyrrho, Sextus 
follows the customs and pathos regarding the existence of a soul insofar as it is a way to 
speak about how we experience our lives.  He does not, as should be clear, vest any belief 
in what he says regarding the existence of souls or of the actuality of phantasiai.  
 Furthermore, in Book III of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, where Sextus discusses gods, 
causes, motion, time, and a variety of other things argued about by dogmatists, he shows 
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that sceptics follow “an ordinary life without opinions,”162 with regard to these things.  
For example, concerning the gods, Sextus says that sceptics “say there are gods and we 
are pious towards them,”163 but only because they follow an ordinary life and do not 
opine that gods certainly exist; rather, it is “inapprehensible whether there are gods.”164  
Sextus is merely expressing how things appear to him, and not determining anything 
about the underlying nature of what impressed these appearances on him.  Phantasiai 
play a central role in Sextus, as they can be seen as that which human experience is 
defined by: “those who say that the sceptics eliminate appearances seem to me to not 
have heard what we have said.  For we do not overturn that which, as a result of a state 
produced by a presentation, lead us involuntarily to assent.  But these are just what 
appearances are.”165  Phantasiai, or appearances, are what we are conditioned to view as 
our world, and give rise to our pathos regarding our situation therein, though Sextus 
cautions us that they are nothing more than impressions.  Honey appears sweet, but that it 
is so, Pyrrhonists suspend judgement. 
 Lastly, I would make it clear that epoche is something that the sceptic falls into 
due to the equipollence of phantasiai and the propositions that can be said of phantasiai.  
It is not something the sceptic wills, or can stop or start doing on a whim.  Epoche 
becomes what the sceptic suffers because of the inapprehensibility of phantasiai.  It is a 
pathos, and not something that the sceptic particularly controls.  Equipollence will be 
explained in detail in the section on the tropes; suffice to say here that it is a balancing of 
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phantasiai and propositions such that the sceptic falls to aporia and epoche regarding the 
true nature of phantasiai. 
 
    3.7 Apprehension 
 The second concept that requires clarification, therefore, is apprehension.  
Translated from the Greek ‘katalambano’, it literally means ‘to grasp’ or ‘to catch hold 
of’, and was central in the debate between the Academics and the Stoics over kataleptic 
phantasia, or apprehensive impressions.166  Sextus appears to attack apprehension, 
particularly as the Stoics conjectured about it, as something that humans do not have for 
certain.  Sometimes this is not entirely clear, as he addresses many views on 
apprehension including those of the Stoics and Peripatetics, while his own utilization of 
apprehension remain obscure.  However, what has been said of phantasiai helps to clear 
this up, as the difference between phantasiai and the objects of thought and perception 
mark a fundamental distinction between what Sextus thinks we do and do not apprehend.  
To be sure, it was and is still debated as to what is apprehended: the external objects, as 
Cicero seemed to maintain167, or the perceiver, who is ‘dragged off to assent’ by 
apprehension.168  However, Sextus certainly did not think that the objects of thought and 
perception were grasped directly, as the account of phantasiai makes apparent.   
 To ‘apprehend’ is different than perceptual verbs like ‘to see’ or ‘to hear’ for 
Sextus, as for him ‘to see’ something does not mean to actually ‘apprehend’ it, and ‘to 
see’ is not treated as a direct relation between the perceiver and the object.169  Modern 
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language use does in fact carry this extensionality for perceptual verbs and assumes that 
when a duck sees a swan as a swan (X sees a P as a P,) the duck directly apprehends, 
(and by extension, knows,) it saw a swan. For Sextus, ‘to apprehend’ suggests a direct 
relation between the perceiver and the perceived, and absolute knowledge on the part of 
the perceiver regarding what is perceived.  Apprehension is a direct relation, and carries 
with it the laws of predicate logic, such that a duck who apprehended a swan knows it 
apprehended a swan; that is, to say ‘I saw a swan’, or ‘I apprehended a swan’, both mean 
that the subject in the sentences knows about the swan in the proposition.  This certainty, 
inherent to ‘apprehension’ in ancient Greek (and unfortunately inherent to virtually all 
perceptual verbs in modern language now,) is precisely what Sextus suspends judgement 
on, as objects of perception and thought are only phantasiai, and the objects themselves 
cannot infallibly be said to be ‘apprehended’.    
 Moreover, for the duck to have seen the swan as a swan, such that the duck would 
utter the proposition that ‘I saw a swan’ (X saw a P), means that X already had the 
concept of a P, and applied it to the proposition regarding the impression it had, such that 
‘X apprehended a P as P’.  This means that X must already have known what a P was, 
implying that the truth of P “depends in part on [X’s] attitude toward the proposition or 
thought expressed by P.”170  Thus, when X designates P as P it is purely an extensional 
relation; that is, the designation derived from what X already knows of P, and may not 
relate at all to what was there to apprehend.  This relation of X to P, where X claims to 
apprehend P, may have nothing to do with what P may in reality be, as it is entirely 
dependent on the relation of X to P.   Mates points out that “there will always be a gap in 
any argument that tries to infer […] one of these sentences from premises expressing only 
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an extensional relation between [X] and certain objects external to [X].”171  Mates goes on 
to indicate Sextus’ formulation of the proposition ‘X has a phantasia of P’ as not 
entailing this logical gap.  Sextus’ epoche regarding the absolute certainty assumed in 
what it is ‘to apprehend’, and his position regarding phantasiai as appearing to develop 
pathos (but not certainty) in us, distances him from making claims to knowledge that 
logically confuse or misuse intension and extension.  Phantasiai do not describe a direct 
relation between the perceiver and the perceived object of thought and perception.  A 
phantasia is merely what strikes us as appearing, and by being unable to assent or dissent 
to propositions that claim a direct relation of the perceiver to the perceived, Sextus forces 
upon us the possibility that what we see, hear, think, touch, smell, (or any other 
perceptual verb,) may be given too high an epistemic value in our propositions regarding 
the nature of things. 
 
3.8 What the Sceptics Do 
 By understanding phantasiai and apprehension (katalambano) we come to 
understand how Sextus expresses his thoughts on what we perceive and how we appear to 
perceive.  We cannot say nor assume in our propositions that we have direct relations 
with every object of thought or perception we encounter.  Just because we saw something 
or thought something does not mean we know that thing.  He does not say that we 
certainly do not know objects of thought or perception – that would amount to negative 
dogmatism akin to that held by the Academics or Pyrrho’s novice sceptical sage – but nor 
can we say that we certainly do.  This draws out two crucial points: first, epoche is a 
pathos that the sceptic suffers due to being unable to determine things as being true or 
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false (aporia); second, Pyrrhonism recommends that we adopt language that expresses 
that we cannot determine things true or false, one way or the other.  Sextus does not just 
point to epoche as a logical conclusion and is done with it, but shows that the sceptic 
suffers epoche as an immediate impression on her soul, and that her language is tailored 
to not reflect apprehension of anything but phantasiai, and even then, she does so without 
holding any dogmatic beliefs regarding her phantasiai.  Sextus does not question how 
phantasiai appear but rather, he questions what they correspond to, and whether our 
propositions can relate to how appearances really are.  Clearly, Sextus does not think 
propositions can relate to anything other than appearances, or phantasiai.  So long as 
propositions are made to operate within the scope of phantasiai, and one maintains a 
position of epoche regarding their apprehensibility (katalambano,) then Sextus thinks that 
no dogmas are being proposed, and the sceptic is only reporting a pathos of his 
immediate experiences.172 
 Sextus’ sceptic would not utter the proposition ‘I am cold and hungry,’ as this 
makes a statement about the absolute certainty of the existence of the speaker being cold 
and hungry.  Rather, the sceptic would say that ‘I feel hungry and cold,’ thus making the 
proposition be about the pathos that the sceptic feels forced upon him or her, and not 
about the true nature of the speaker, hunger, or temperature.  Furthermore the utterance 
does not allow the perceiver to posit the truth of his hunger or temperature as dependant 
on what his or her attitude already is regarding ‘hunger’ or ‘cold’, as this has been shown 
to be a logical misuse of extensionality.  Recalling the discussion on the psychology of 
the soul in the chapter on Pyrrho, Sextus’ explanation of phantasiai (objects of thought 
and of perception) is such that an appearance or ‘presentation’ is a phenomenon of the 
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soul as relating to the perception and experience of a given external object.173  
Furthermore, recalling Plutarch’s conception of the soul174, it is evident that phantasiai 
cannot be removed from human experience any more than impulse can be removed, as 
they are inherent to our very nature.  Our faculties of thought and perception present us 
with something, and we immediately suffer (pathos) it (an object of thought or 
perception, i.e., a book, or the thought of a book), as well as an impulse towards the 
phantasiai.  Anything we say of phantasiai, or of the objects of perception and thought 
that impressed the phantasiai upon us, has a quality of assenting to the existence of the 
given thing – either the truth or reality of the presentation itself, or the object itself.  
Sextus wishes to epoche with regard to what can be said with certainty of objects of 
perception and objects of thought, but not the feeling of being imposed upon by one’s 
own phantasiai of said objects.   
 To be sure, Sextus does not lay any claim to the existence of objects, either.  
Opinions and beliefs about phantasiai are to be pared away from the phantasiai 
themselves.  What we can say about the chair you are sitting on deserves epoche, as do 
the colour, sturdiness, and its very existence as a phantasia, since none of these is more 
certain than uncertain, ‘no more’ true than false.  The chair, and anything that can be said 
of the chair, deserves an attitude and language that reflect the uncertainty about the true 
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nature of the chair – yet what the chair is for you immediately, here and now via 
phantasiai, does not and cannot require this same aporetic treatment.  The sceptic does 
not expect you to suspend judgement as to the phantasiai you endure, as this leads to 
inaction (apraxia), but the sceptic does wish you to realize that what you can say with 
certainty regarding your phantasiai is far less evident than the immediate phantasiai in 
themselves.  Sit in the chair, but do not talk as if you know something fundamental about 
the being of the chair as easily as you sat in it, because whatever you say may no more 




    3.9 Ataraxia and Epoche 
 Prior to addressing the tropes, which are instrumental in inducing epoche, I wish 
to address what epoche is in a more precise sense, and in turn reveal more about freedom 
from disturbance (ataraxia), which ‘follows epoche like a shadow’.175  Suspension of 
judgement is akin to a pathos as it appears to be for Sextus something that the sceptic 
suffers due to the apparent inapprehensibility of things in their true nature.  The sceptic 
lives by appearances (phantasiai), but does not opine or believe that appearances 
correspond precisely to how things are or might be in their true nature.  The tropes are 
arguments or ways of thinking about appearances and the propositions that can be made 
about appearances that pit appearances and propositions of contrary meaning and equal 
weight against those appearances and propositions which a dogmatist might take up as 
true.  As Sextus puts it,  
                                                
175 Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.29. 
 129 
 
 [People] of natural ability are disturbed because of the inconsistency in things, 
 and being doubtful which of the alternatives they should assent to, they came to 
 inquire into what is true and what is false in things in order that from a resolution 
 of their doubts they would attain freedom from disturbance.  The main principle 
 of the sceptical system is that for every argument another argument of equal 
 [weight] is opposed.  As a result of this we seem to arrive at a cessation of 
 dogmatism. 176 
 
And again, explicating Pyrrhonian scepticism shortly after, 
 
 For the sceptic, having begun to philosophize in order to judge presentations and 
 to try to grasp certain things as true or false so that he could attain freedom from 
 disturbance, tripped up on the equal weight of incompatible [claims]; thereupon, 
 not being able to make a judgement, suspended judgement.  Finding himself in 
 this suspensive state, the freedom from disturbance with respect to beliefs 
 followed fortuitously. 177 
 
In these passages we find Sextus creating an image of the sceptic as someone who wished 
at one point to know more about the nature of things so as to live a happier life.  To begin 
one’s inquiry by finding the ‘right’ dogma is very much like the development of Pyrrho’s 
sage discussed in chapter one, when the novice sceptic begins with dogmatic intent but 
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only eventually develops an aporetic disposition.  Sextus’ sceptic set out to learn the true 
nature of things, but in her inquiry she could not overcome arguments for one position 
regarding the nature of things with another argument, nor vice versa.  The sceptic, who is 
not a Pyrrhonist until this present realization is made, finds herself unable to assent or 
dissent to any argument presented to her, and rather than dogmatically choose a single 
argument to assent to, knowing full well that it is no more viable than any other 
argument, suspends judgement.  In suspending judgement, the sceptic suddenly finds that 
by no longer striving for knowledge regarding the true nature of things, and no longer 
arguing for one view against the other, the initial goal of living a happier and less 
disturbed life (ataraxia) befalls her.  In a chapter titled ‘On the General Modes Leading 
to Suspension of Judgement’, Sextus states, “generally, suspension of judgement comes 
about through the opposition of things.  We oppose [phantasiai] to [phantasiai], or ideas 
to ideas, or, interchanging them.”178  Thus sceptics oppose objects of perception with 
objects of thought, showing that propositions and arguments regarding them are no more 
reliable than any other phantasiai or idea one may have. Sextus offers several examples, 
such as a tower viewed up close appearing differently from far away, or an argument for 
providence based on the orderliness of the heavenly bodies that is equally opposed by the 
way that good people have bad things occur to them.179  More examples are made in his 
exposition of the tropes, which all essentially carry forward the central mode of opposing 
appearances and propositions with each other to show that none convincingly overcome 
any other. 
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 The precise nature of ataraxia becomes more evident in the following passage, in 
which Sextus shows an example of how troubling beliefs and convictions can develop in 
a person, and how epoche addresses these problems and ataraxia follows. 
  
 For one who believes that something is honourable or bad by nature will be 
 disturbed; whenever the things he believes to be honourable are not before him, 
 he believes he has inflicted upon himself the things that are by nature bad and he 
 goes off after the things which, according to him, are good; and when he 
 possesses them he stumbles into more disturbances because of his irrational 
 immoderate elation, and fearing that things will soon change he will do 
 everything he can so that he might not lose the things he believes to be good.  On 
 the other hand, the man who determines nothing in regard to things honourable or 
 bad by nature does not flee or go after them excessively.  For this reason he has 
 freedom from disturbance.180 
 
The sceptic does not believe that he knows what is good and bad beyond the appearance 
of things, and thereby he does not pursue the good or avoid the bad with the same fervour 
that a dogmatist might.  Beliefs regarding the good and bad of non-evident things give 
rise to actions regarding those beliefs, actions that further engrain the initial beliefs and 
also bring about more beliefs (i.e. ‘I believe that I do not have something good, therefore 
I believe that I must go and get what is good, and once I believe that I have it, I further 
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believe that I should never let it change’). The beliefs ultimately lead one away from a 
less troubled life. 
 Relating back to what was developed in the sections on phantasiai and 
apprehension, we can recall that Sextus was shown to live by phantasiai but without 
belief or opinions regarding them as anything but appearances – that is, anything other 
than what they immediately strike him to be.  Living by appearances for Sextus simply 
means living with how one suffers human experience: eating when you feel hungry, 
avoiding pain and seeking what strikes one as beneficial, but all without belief.  To say 
something is inherently good is to go beyond what is immediately evident in phantasiai.  
Moreover, to make a knowledge claim also is to believe that something has been 
apprehended, that is, grasped with certainty, which Sextus also has shown to be beyond 
what phantasiai give to us.  Humans cannot be said to apprehend conclusively (in the 
strict sense of the term) such things as goodness or badness; we only seem to grasp what 
we suffer via phantasiai, and the pathos we suffer from phantasiai is nothing other than 
immediate feeling, natural to our human condition. 
 From these passages there is also a sense that Sextus does not so much suspend 
judgement on every single minute thing, but focuses on those things that develop beliefs 
and opinions that disrupt our emotions and feelings.  These latter things clearly include 
how we can speak about things, and what we can claim to apprehend about them.  Sextus 
does not think the sceptic to be utterly undisturbed, and makes concessions that the 
sceptic is disturbed by hunger, thirst, and the like, but notes that these are matters of 
compulsion natural to the human experience.181  He goes on to indicate that, “even in 
these cases, whereas ordinary people are distressed by two circumstances – by the states 
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themselves and no less by the belief that the circumstances [under which the states are 
experienced] are bad by nature – the sceptic, by rejecting the additional belief that each of 
these is not only bad but bad by nature, will escape with more moderate states.”182 The 
sceptic then is not thought to shed completely all worries, nor is ataraxia thought to 
induce some sort of mystical apathy.  Ataraxia is like epoche in that it is a pathos that 
befalls the sceptic, it is a feeling that overcomes the sceptic with regard to how phantasiai 
strike him: first he could not find a single argument or proof that any one proposition was 
any better or truer than any other and so epoche overcame him; then, once he ceased to 
strive either to argue for belief for a given proposition or from a position that adopted 
such a belief, ataraxia overcame him.  The sceptic went from trying to find the true 
nature of things to feeling that the true nature was not apprehensible, to feeling less 
troubled because he was no longer searching for such a dogmatic idea of truth.  Whereas 
a political dogmatist will argue for the Liberal party being the best choice, believing that 
the Liberal party makes choices that are good for people, the environment, and the 
country, a Pyrrhonian will back away from such claims.  The Pyrrhonian does not find 
the connection between what the Liberal party, or any other party, does or claims to do as 
being evidently good or bad by nature, since what the party says and does are phantasiai 
and ‘actual’ goodness or badness are not apprehensible in phantasiai.  Not being able to 
grasp anything about the true nature of the Liberal party’s actions or propositions, the 
Pyrrhonist is dragged off to suspension of judgement, and in suspending judgement, is no 
longer fettered by desires or beliefs regarding the actions or propositions of any political 
party.  The sceptic may vote based upon the appearances of things – ‘it appears that the 
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Liberal platform is sound’ – but he vests no belief in the vote nor in the party for which 
he voted.  
 
3.10 – The Five Ways to Epoche 
  Having now given a general account of Sextus’ scepticism and several essential 
terms and concepts central to his system, the tropes or ‘ways’ require some careful 
attention.  These are arguments, or considerations that the sceptics use to induce epoche.  
Benson Mates points out rather aptly that the tropes should not be considered arguments 
in the strict sense, as they do not have definitive conclusions, but are designed to bring 
about the experience of aporia and epoche.183  An example of this is a line from Epictetus 
wherein he states that one should try to “feel or reject the feeling that the stars are even in 
number.  Impossible.”184  The tropes do not aim for a clear conclusion but try to raise 
more questions in the face of an initial question and try to induce the pathos of aporia 
and epoche in those who use the tropes but also in those who hear them.   
 The first set of ten tropes of Aenesidemus is methodically carried out in a latter 
pair of sets, one of two tropes and the other of five tropes.  It is the set of five, attributed 
to an unknown figure, Agrippa, which will be analyzed here, as they are a development 
from the previous ten, and present together a system towards epoche.  I have been 
juxtaposing two approaches to the tropes so far, suggesting they can be viewed as either 
arguments to induce epoche, or as utterances that the sceptics use to express their aporetic 
disposition.  This has been done to underscore the difficulty in maintaining the difference 
between the two considering the Pyrrhonian position of determining nothing, and to also 
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show that the pedagogy of Pyrrhonism requires understanding of both approaches.  It was 
noted earlier that Sextus balances these positions in the very exposition of the Outlines, 
as he both presents the Pyrrhonian position but also expresses it in his writing ‘only as it 
appears to him.’   The two ‘ways’ of Pyrrhonism (argumentative and linguistic) that I am 
indicating seem to be apparent to Sextus as well, as he indicates two ways of treating 
Pyrrhonism; the ‘general way’ and the ‘specific way’.  The general way is “that in which 
we set forth the basic features of scepticism, enunciating its fundamental idea, its 
principles and arguments, its criterion and its goals.”185  That is, the general way is the 
standard account of a philosophical position, giving aims, arguments, and principles.  The 
second way he delineates as “that in which we argue against each part of what is called 
philosophy.”186  This, I believe, is the recognition of the two different approaches and 
attitudes towards language.  First, the general or theoretical approach is the approach in 
which the sceptic’s propositions about phantasiai concern theory and principles, whereby 
they lay out in general terms what Pyrrhonism is and what its goals are.  The general 
approach can be viewed as the Pyrrhonian speaking about things in a non-Pyrrhonian 
sense, in that the Pyrrhonian will say things as if he is determining something. Secondly, 
the specific or practical approach to talking about phantasiai, initiated by Pyrrho’s 
sagacious teachings, revived by Aenesidemus and carried now by Sextus, concerns the 
practice of those who have a Pyrrhonian disposition.  That is, language is understood and 
utilized differently than the way it is utilized in the theoretical laying-out of principles 
and goals by someone who determines nothing.   
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 Essentially, in the general approach, the practice of aporetic language is not in 
fact practiced and is outside the scope of whatever the Pyrrhonian may be speaking 
about, whereas in the practical approach the aporetic language praxis is indeed practiced.  
To explain something as being a certain way is one thing (‘I know I saw a swan’); to 
explain the same thing without saying that you actually believe it to be that way requires 
a specific approach to language (‘I no more did than did not see a swan’).  One cannot 
offer an argument in the plain or ‘general’ sense of doing so if one does not determine 
anything at all.  The exposition of phantasiai, apprehension, epoche, and ataraxia, aimed 
at clarifying this; the sceptic is willing to argue about phantasiai insofar as they appear to 
him.  The colour of a pen or even the nature of the gods is open for discussion in the 
mind of the sceptic because to him, so long as his language is following the aporetic 
practice of Pyrrhonism (the practical approach), he is simply speaking without belief of 
how things strike him.  He is merely going with appearances, and reporting how he feels 
at the moment.  Anything non-evident, such as the goodness of voting for one party over 
another, or the badness of falling off a cliff and dying, he will not engage with in terms of 
the general approach, as he finds himself suspending judgement about such things due to 
the equipollence of opposing arguments regarding them.   
 Therefore, the tropes should be understood as reports of phantasiai from the 
sceptic, without any belief or conviction regarding the reports as anything other than how 
the sceptic feels impressed upon by the phantasiai at the moment regarding the point at 
hand.  The tropes, therefore, also follow a strict sort of use of language akin to that of 
Pyrrho and Aenesidemus, whereby certain locutions are said with a caveat regarding the 
intended meaning of a word.  Perceptual verbs like ‘to see’, and ‘to apprehend’ are 
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distanced from ‘to know’ due to the gap that Sextus feels is present between perceived 
phantasiai and ‘knowing’ or apprehending something in its true nature.  In following 
Sextus’ elucidation of the tropes in Outlines of Pyrrhonism it shall be shown how he 
presents them generally, but also how he espouses them specifically in the language of 
his writing. 
 
3.10.1 The First Trope: Diaphonia 
 The first trope concerns diaphonia, or disagreement, and Sextus begins explaining 
it by stating that “we discover an undecidable dispute occurring for any matter purposed, 
both in ordinary life and among philosophers, as a result of which we are not able to 
choose something or reject it, and so we arrive at suspension of judgement.”187  It seems 
that Sextus is indicating that dogmatic propositions both in everyday situations as well as 
in circles of experts tend to disagree with each other, and that this induces epoche.  
Suppose you are in a room where eight different sociologists are arguing over the social 
ramifications of teachers using red pens to mark students papers.  Some agree with each 
other on some points, but overall there are eight different and contrary opinions being 
proposed.  You, whether a sociologist yourself or just a passerby, have the feeling of not 
being able to choose one view, absolutely, over any other.   
 Adopting epoche in the face of aporia, you develop an aporetic attitude toward 
such disputes, and neither assent nor dissent to there being a single clear answer.  As 
Jonathan Barnes points out, “all disagreements are disagreements in opinion, and all 
disagreements in opinion are also disagreements of attitude; but not the other way 
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around.”188  That is, attitudes, understood in the same vein as pathos in that they are 
unavoidably part of being human, do not in themselves voice propositions and opinions, 
and thereby do not disagree with each other.  A Canadian and an American can walk into 
a bar, and unless something is said, or opined, no disagreement can occur.  Returning to 
the sociologist example, a Pyrrhonian can walk in and not add to the dispute at all, as he 
is overcome by the sense of epoche in the face of diaphonia. 
 It is interesting to note that Jonathan Barnes offers a ‘Principle of Disagreement’ 
to encapsulate the trope of diaphonia.  It essentially states that if there is a dispute then 
one “ought not to accept or reject any proposed answer to [the dispute].”189  While aiding 
in the ‘general’ understanding of Pyrrhonism, offering this sort of strict principle (recall 
that the general account of Pyrrhonism concerns principles) pulls too far away from the 
‘specific’ understanding of Pyrrhonism and the trope at hand; that is, the trope is meant 
to give the experience of aporia and induce epoche.  It is not a principle in and of itself; it 
is a way to aporia, not a knockdown argument. 
 
3.10.2 The Second Trope: Infinite Regression 
 The second trope considers situations of infinite regress, where “what is offered 
as confirmation of the matter proposed is itself in need of confirmation, and so on 
infinitely, so that not having a starting point from which we can establish anything, 
suspension of judgement follows.”190  The way of inducing epoche works hand in hand 
with the trope of diaphonia, in that one can think of one of the sociologists in the 
previous example offering an argument or ‘confirmation’ to end the dispute, which itself 
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needs further argument and further confirmation.  What the sociologist is doing is 
offering up more argument and more propositions about still more phantasiai.  The 
sceptic feels this only adds to the feeling of aporia and epoche, and does nothing to 
assuage the feeling that no single answer to the dispute is any better than any other.  To 
be sure, as Barnes points out, an argument that falls to infinite regress may in fact lead to 
a true conclusion.191  That the argument at hand may somehow be true is not the sceptic’s 
point; rather, the argument itself is not sound, as no person can follow through infinitely 
many regressions to find the argument valid, something that Aristotle explored already.192 
 The important thing for the sceptic is the immediacy of the dispute.  The sceptic’s 
search for the happy life has always been contiguous with the phenomenological and 
existential, by which I mean that whatever dispute is at hand or whatever argument is 
presented, is immediate to the sceptic.  He or she is part of or present to the debate, 
whether it is through a circle of friends, a one on one discussion, or reading a paper, and 
the arguments strike the sceptic there and then.  To the sceptic, to have an infinitely 
regressive argument thrown at you does nothing to justify a belief or opinion, and only 
throws more dirt on the pile and dust in the air.  Moreover, one infinitely regressive 
argument is as strong as another, and the sceptic can provide an equally persuasive 
regressive argument to counter any regressive argument given.  Aporia and epoche 
follow the experience of such arguments. 
 
3.10.3 The Third Trope: Relativity 
                                                
191 Barnes, 42. 
192 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: 
Random House 2001), 72b 8-11. 
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 The third trope concerns relativity and can be regarded as the lasting influence of 
the relativity that Aenesidemus put forth in his attempt to expand the sceptical 
phrasebook.  Sextus essentially summarizes the ten tropes of Aenesidemus (particularly 
the eighth), stating that an “object appears to be of one sort or another in relation to what 
is judging it and to the things observed along with it, but as for its nature, we suspend 
judgement.”193  Sextus is pointing out that any given object may appear to different 
observers differently.  It is interesting to note that Barnes dismisses this trope from his 
analysis of them, since he thinks that “it is a strange beast […and] belongs […] to a 
different species from the other four modes.”194  I made note of this in the section on 
Aenesidemus, as relativity was his focus in his ten tropes.  Here it will be seen that 
relativity is not Sextus’ focus, and that this trope does not do much work in inducing 
epoche itself, but leads to other tropes in order to do so. 
 To begin with an example of what Sextus means with this trope: an obscure, 
small, black disc flying through the air may appear to a hockey player to be a hockey 
puck; to a UFO enthusiast, a small spacecraft; to a ornithologist, a blackbird.  Suppose 
the UFO enthusiast writes on his blog that small black objects flying through the air are 
probably visitors from another planet.  The hockey player might write that what the UFO 
enthusiast says is foolish and that these objects are hockey pucks. The ornithologist may 
write, saying that it is the migratory season for some blackbirds this time of year, and that 
these birds are a more likely explanation than any other.  The point in all this is that 
things appear, both in perception and in thought, relative to the subject. The way 
something appears, even if it is completely new to the subject perceiving it, can only be 
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expressed in terms already familiar to the subject, which was discussed in the section on 
apprehension and the problems that can arise with extension and intension. 
 To make the example less dramatic, perhaps one ornithologist who has spent ten 
years studying the Eastern blackbird is arguing with another ornithologist, who has spent 
nine years studying the Western blackbird, about what species of blackbird they both saw 
last night.  Sextus’ point is that one may be correct, but neither has apprehended anything 
in its true nature, and one perception of phantasiai cannot be preferred over any other.  
Thus we find that this trope relies on the trope of diaphonia in that two or more 
conflicting views have been presented, and neither can be certainly said to touch on the 
nature of the thing at hand.  Diaphonia leads to the aporia and epoche with regard to the 




        3.10.4 The Fourth Trope: Hypothesis 
 The trope based on hypothesis attacks dogmatists who think that certain 
unestablished arguments “deserve to be taken as agreed upon simply and without 
demonstration.”195  The role of hypotheses in Platonic works was discussed in the chapter 
on Pyrrho, where hypotheses were championed as the best possible courses to take from a 
position of aporia.  They were fluid suppositions that were tenuously proposed and open 
to being replaced by better hypotheses.  These are juxtaposed with the more Aristotelian 
sort of hypotheses, which Sextus most certainly has in mind here, whereby a hypothesis 
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is proposed as a first principle and is not open to replacement.196  Both the Platonic and 
Aristotelian methods propose something as given, but the Platonic method is heuristic in 
nature and aims to aid in getting closer to the discovery of some truth, whereas the 
Aristotelian method posits its hypotheses axiomatically, and does not allow for their 
change or replacement.197  The trope of hypothesis targets both of these, but clearly 
attacks the Aristotelian axiomatic hypothesis with more rigour.   
 Essentially, Sextus attacks the hypothesis of the dogmatists by saying that they 
barely assert anything by hypothesis, and that if they can hypothesize X by bare assertion, 
then anyone can hypothesize not-X by bare assertion as well.198  One bare assertion is 
equipollent to any other, and by proposing a contrary hypothesis to the dogmatist’s 
hypothesis; Sextus invokes the trope of diaphonia.  By doing this, the sceptic forces the 
dogmatist into one of two options: either argue for his hypothesis, thus making it no 
longer a hypothesis and susceptible to the trope of infinite regress, or argue that the 
consequence of the hypothesis is proof that the hypothesis is true.199  The latter point 
shows the trope of hypothesis is comparable in form to the trope of reciprocity in that the 
dogmatist’s own argument can be shown to be logically flawed.  That is, if the dogmatic 
hypothesis were axiomatically given as a principle proof upon which consequent 
arguments are built, but the dogmatist states that the proof of the axiomatic hypothesis is 
in its consequence, then “the whole epistemological order of things is overturned [and the 
dogmatist] suffers as epistemological bouleversement,”200 since he attacks the ground of 
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198 Ibid., 99.  See also Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.173. 
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his own dependence on axiomatic hypotheses.  That is, proof and premise cannot come 
from the same source.  
 If someone were to argue by hypothesis that a god wrote a book and as a 
consequence of this that person follows what the book says, one might question how she 
knows a god wrote it.  If she were to say that she knows it was written by a god because 
she follows what the book says, then the initial hypothesis that the book was written by a 
god is no longer the antecedent argument for her following what is written in the book.  
The value of the initial axiomatic hypothesis is thrown out as soon as the dogmatist tries 
to prove its worth by its consequence; the axiom was supposed for its ability to further 
prove things, not for those further things to prove the hypothesis.  Thus, the 
hypothesizing dogmatist either ends in attacking her own position via reciprocity or turns 
away from hypothesizing by being forced to justify via further argument her 
hypothesized proposition.  This latter move, as was said, allows the sceptic to invoke the 
trope of infinite regress. 
 All this argumentation may seem to overshadow the aim of the trope to cause the 
experience of aporia and epoche, and I think that the focus on the argumentative aspect 
of the tropes does have this effect.  However, the trope of hypothesis does not end in 
utterly refuting the position of someone who posits something by hypothesis; it only 
shows that whatever can be posited by hypothesis can be countered by a hypothesis of 
equipollent weight, reduced to infinite regress, reciprocity, diaphonia, or can be 
countered by attacking its own position.  By this, one hypothesis can be said to touch on 
the nature of things no more than any other can, and the feeling of being able to choose 
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absolutely one over any other is lost in the feeling of aporia, which is followed by 
epoche. 
 
         3.10.5 The Fifth Trope: Reciprocity 
 The final trope concerns reciprocity, and is “introduced whenever that which 
ought to provide assurance for the thing investigated itself requires confirmation from the 
thing investigated.  Therefore, we are not able to accept either one as establishing the 
other, and regarding both we suspend judgement.”201  Sextus here points to an oscillation 
between criterion to proof, or from cause to effect, such that what was meant to provide a 
ground for further argument also finds its own ground further in the argument itself.  
Reciprocal argumentation was exemplified in the above discussion of the trope of 
hypothesis, where the value of the initial claim is disregarded as soon as the dogmatist 
tries to prove its worth by its consequence. The first claim was supposed for its ability to 
prove further things, and to have the further things need to provide proof for the first 
claim is to fall to reciprocity.   
  Much like an argument from infinite regress, there is no ‘first’ element, or 
epistemic priority, to a reciprocal argument. The lack of epistemic priority is most 
evident in examples of definition, where one person asks ‘what does tall mean?’ to which 
someone responds ‘big.’  The first person, not being clear what ‘big’ is asks for 
clarification, to which he gets the response ‘big means tall.’  Having come full circle, the 
initial questioner has learned nothing about what is meant by ‘tall’.  As Sextus notes, to 
try to prove something by a reciprocal argument is to try to ‘prove the unknown by the 
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unknown’.202 As with the trope of hypothesis, the trope of reciprocal argument forces a 
dogmatist to argue for a ‘first’ element or proposition, which would invoke either the 
mode of hypothesis, or infinite regress, which in turn would invoke the mode of 
diaphonia.  The trope does not disprove or refute the possibility that the argument may be 
true, but it does show that the argument or opinion at hand is no more sound than another 
argument of equal and opposite weight, and thereby induces aporia. 
 
3.10.6 The Tropes in Action 
 Sextus maintained that any inquiry can fall to these tropes, and that they strip 
arguments of their ability to cause us to apprehend absolutely one argument above all 
others in a given inquiry as unequivocally correct and true by nature.203  Concerning what 
can be said of things, or the opinions that can be had of them, he felt that nothing could 
be posited with absolute certainty, as aporia is a more prevalent feeling than is certainty 
when trying to determine the validity one position over any other.  Through the tropes all 
inquiry is shown to dissolve by way of infinite regression, hypothesis, reciprocity, 
relativity, and diaphonia, to aporia and suspension of judgement.   It should be cautioned 
though, that by invoking the tropes in argumentative ways, or with a focus on the 
argument, the aim of the tropes as ways to epoche is often lost.  The Pyrrhonist is not 
arguing dialectically by giving opposite and equipollent propositions, and he is certainly 
not trying to argue for the opposite positions themselves; he is trying to implant the 
feeling of uncertainty and aporia that Epictetus accomplishes so well by asking us to 
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‘feel whether the stars in the sky are even or odd in number.’204  The sceptic does nothing 
but try to instill aporia and epoche by pointing out the human inability to say anything 
with absolute certainty regarding the true nature of things, or regarding things like 
goodness or badness, which are not evident in phantasiai.  We cannot say that we are 
directly related to the true nature of things by perception and rationality, and the 
phantasiai we do grasp in perception and thought cannot be said with absolute certainty 
to aid in discovering anything about the true nature of things.  We only have phantasiai 
and we need to limit how we speak of phantasiai as related to any absolute truth.  
 An example that Sextus uses to express this grasping-without-certain-success 
(hyphenated to try and keep the sense of it being a verb or action humans do) can be 
found in Against the Mathematicians where he equates the search for absolute truth and 
‘knowing’ to searching for gold in a dark room.205  There are plenty of things on the 
ground, including gold, and the people in the room grope around in the dark, with 
someone announcing every so often that he or she has found gold.  With complete 
darkness however, no one has a way of conclusively proving that what he has is in fact 
gold, despite the fact that he may indeed have found gold.  A similar analogy is drawn 
later whereby archers are shooting targets in a dark room, and though an archer can say 
that she is certain she has hit a target, there is no way to show conclusively that she 
has.206  We can say that these archers who make claims to hitting targets are shooting 
propositions at the truth.  They dogmatically claim to have ‘true apprehension’ and draw 
a direct relation from subject to object.  That is, they claim ‘to know’ that they have hit 
the target, or found gold.  Yet, because of the equipollence of propositions made apparent 
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by applying the tropes to their claims, it appears that aporia and uncertainty are more 
evident than any single proposition supporting a claim to apprehending something in 
truth, and the sceptic has the feeling, or pathe, of suspending judgement over any feeling 
of assenting or dissenting to the dogmatic proposition.  We can grasp the phantasiai of 
things in the dark room, and say that we behold something, but of non-evident things 
such as the goodness or badness of them, we only conjecture and grasp nothing. 
 The division between the use of the tropes as arguments or as utterances has been 
cleared up.  They may at first flush be viewed as arguments, but in practice they are not 
arguments in the sense of having a logical, argued conclusion.  They aim at raising more 
questions, and they essentially do this to reduce the false feeling of certainty and to 
induce the feeling or pathe of aporia, and in turn epoche.  The tropes work together to 
induce epoche in the speaker, but also in people with whom a Pyrrhonist may speak.  
Much of the confusion regarding the tropes as purely argumentative efforts arises from 
the thought that a Pyrrhonist would argue with someone rather than simply speak with 
her, as Sextus suggests by saying “it is not fitting for a sceptic to quarrel over 
utterances.”207  Though Sextus there speaks of utterances, the overall disposition of the 
Pyrrhonist – being aporetic, undetermining, and undogmatic – should certainly show that 
argument is not their nature.   The Academic sceptics might argue for epoche, eristically 
and dialectically manoeuvering to have you logically conclude in their favour. Recalling 
Pyrrho, he did not argue but taught his position through anecdote and living his 
philosophy as closely as he could, recommending it for those who might follow and 
experience the untroubled life as he did.  Pyrrho constantly maintained fundamental 
epistemological and metaphysical uncertainties in the forefront of his use of language.  
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By never allowing himself to be caught up in the dogmatic reality that language 
customarily assumes to be true, Pyrrho never became caught up in struggles for the truth 
of things either in ordinary language or in philosophical discussion.  The following 
section on the sceptical phrases and utterances should underscore this practical, linguistic 
disposition Sextus draws from Pyrrho, and further show that Pyrrhonism is less 
concerned with arguing than it is with suggesting a way to use language that leads to a 
happier, less troubled life. 
 
   3.11 The Sceptical Practice of Language 
 Sextus wishes to suspend judgement with regard to what can be said with 
certainty of objects of perception and objects of thought – that is, what we can say with 
certainty about what we perceive and what we think.  He does not extend this same 
suspensive attitude toward the pathe of being imposed upon by one’s own impressions of 
appearances, that is, phantasiai.  Appearances, or phantasiai, are what they are, and the 
sceptic abides by them in daily life.  Non-evident, non-apparent things, most notably the 
goodness or badness of phantasiai, are the precise targets of epoche.  By removing the 
conventional, infallible way of speaking about non-evident things, Sextus and Pyrrho 
before him aimed at removing the ‘troubling beliefs and opinions’ that develop from the 
implicit way that language assumes that we absolutely ‘know’ whatever it is we see, hear, 
touch, taste, or speak about.208  This certainty, inherent in virtually all perceptual verbs in 
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modern language (see chapter on phantasiai) is precisely what Sextus suspends 
judgement on, as he felt that objects of perception and thought are only phantasiai and 
cannot infallibly be said to lend to a direct relation between the speaker and non-evident 
things such as goodness or badness.  Any belief regarding the goodness of an action or a 
thing is over and beyond anything a sceptic would feel she is able to determine. 
 An example drawn from Sextus in Against the Mathematicians serves to clarify 
how the sceptic acts without belief via her aporetic disposition or attitude.  I will use this 
example shortly to clarify further the language practice that the Pyrrhonists employ.  In it 
Sextus offers the position of someone criticizing a sceptic for inconsistency, as the 
sceptic is said neither to choose nor avoid anything, yet 
 
 […] if [the sceptic] is ever in a tyrant’s power and is compelled to do something 
 unspeakable, either he will not submit to the command but will rather choose 
 voluntary death, or he will avoid the torture chamber by doing what he is ordered 
 to do.   And so he will no longer be, in Timon’s words, “free of choice and 
 avoidance”, but will choose some things and steer clear of others – and that is the 
 act of people who grasp with conviction that there is something which is worth 
 choosing and something which is worth avoiding.209 
  
Sextus’ hypothetical critic supposes a situation in which anyone would be forced to make 
a choice and thinks that he has caught the sceptic in a situation where the sceptic’s so-
called claim neither to choose nor avoid anything is made to be inconsistent, as the 
sceptic clearly must make a choice in the situation.  Sextus shows that this attempted 
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entrapment is mistaken in a number of ways.  The first of which is the thought that the 
sceptic lives according to a philosophical theory, akin to the scepticism delineated by the 
‘general’ (versus ‘specific’) understanding of scepticism as having principles and 
arguments, given at the outset of this chapter.  The sceptic can and does make choices via 
“unphilosophical observations”, which are in accord with living by appearances, upheld 
by Sextus’ fourfold observances, as well as by Pyrrho.210  The sceptic, coerced by the 
tyrant, will choose a course of action.  He will not fall to apraxia – the other option that 
the critic thinks the sceptic would fall to - as he does not in fact determine a ‘sceptical’ 
theory, or any other any philosophical theory, as a guide to correct action.  As Sextus 
states, “he will perhaps choose one thing and avoid another by [following] the basic grasp 
which accords with his ancestral customs and habits.”211 
 The ‘perhaps’ in the above quote is of interest as it seems to allow for the aphasia 
of Pyrrho, such that the sceptic may in fact say or do nothing, being overcome with the 
sense of aporia, and thereby he may be seen to in fact fall to apraxia.  I shall return to 
this.  The point here is that the sceptic does not follow anything but the phantasiai, or 
appearances, and vests no belief or opinion in the following of these phantasiai as being 
anything but how things appear.  Thus, Sextus concludes, the sceptic will bear hardship 
more easily than will a dogmatist, as the sceptic “has no additional opinions beyond [the 
hardship itself].”212 The sceptic endures whatever befalls him, be it torture, death, or 
‘unspeakable acts’.  The dogmatist would endure these, as well as the self-inflicted 
trauma of believing her choices and the ensuing effects of them to be good or bad. 
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 It is important now to recall that the Pyrrhonian sceptic does not argue for her 
aporetic position in the sense of determining it to be ‘logically’ correct and concluded.  
The discussion of the tropes should have made this clear, as they aim only to raise more 
questions and induce the feeling of aporia, like how Socrates argued with people on the 
streets of Athens not to prove them wrong, but to show that no one present seems to 
know anything about the topic at hand.  Sceptics are trying to reveal the experience of not 
knowing and also maintain that aporia, that presence of not knowing, in their own 
language.  The sceptical utterances that Sextus sketches toward the end of the first 
chapter of the Outlines espouse this revelatory character of Pyrrhonian scepticism as well 
as the non-argumentative nature of having the Pyrrhonian, or aporetic, disposition of 
determining nothing in everyday language.  These utterances, of which Sextus gives five, 
accentuate the roots that Sextus’ thought has in Pyrrho’s recommendation of being 
“undogmatic and uncommitted and unswayed, saying of each and every thing that it no 
more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not […] The result for those 
who are in this disposition will first be speechless and then freedom from disturbance.”213 
This is the germ of all Pyrrhonian utterances.  Each one of Sextus’ utterances is said 
without commitment, without intending to take a side on whatever is being stated, and 
without making any claim beyond a report of what appears at the moment to the person 
making the locution.  The sceptical utterances certainly aid in the promulgation of aporia 
and epoche, but that burden is largely laid upon the tropes.  The utterances definitively 
underscore the individualistic, non-argumentative nature of Pyrrhonian scepticism, as 
they, more so than the tropes, concern the maintenance of the sceptic’s own disposition 
over and above any thought of convincing another person of the ways of scepticism. 
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           3.12 The Sceptical Utterances 
 The first utterance is ‘I suspend judgement’, and is uttered to show that the sceptic 
cannot say which of the objects or choices before her can be given her trust or belief, and 
which should not.  It is an expression of the aporia and epoche induced by the tropes, and 
can be understood in terms of the tyrant example as the sceptic expressing her inability to 
choose between the options that the tyrant forces upon her.  No option strikes her as 
better or worse by nature than any other; death is not certainly known to be bad, nor is 
whatever ‘unspeakable act’ that the tyrant demands of her.  In terms of appearances, 
customs, or personal preference, she will choose accordingly, but will never leave the 
aporetic disposition that she has towards her choice and action being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ by 
nature, since such things are not evident. 
 The second utterance is the locution ‘I determine nothing’, wherein ‘determining’ 
is meant as  “making an utterance about a non-apparent thing with assent.”214  This 
utterance merely  “reveals our state [of mind],” and encompasses itself in its own scope 
in that the sceptic does not determine anything in stating that he determines nothing.215  It 
is again an expression of the pathe of uncertainty that the sceptic feels regarding 
whatever is under investigation, much like the third utterance ‘all things are 
undetermined’ is a report of how the sceptic feels that whatever is under investigation – 
the ‘correct’ choice of action in the face of the tyrant, perhaps – is not determined.  One 
choice is no more determined than a contrary choice; hence the sceptic, struck by epoche 
induced by equipollence, cannot and will not say that anything is determined.  
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Furthermore, Sextus indicates that any locution is necessarily relative to a subject, and 
that the sceptic’s utterance ‘all things are undetermined’ is necessarily limited to and 
relative to the sceptic.  Any utterance therefore can always be taken, as Aenesidemus 
pointed out, as only speaking to a relative, and not to an absolute, point of view.  This 
suggests that the sceptic, in making her choice between the options given to her by the 
tyrant, does not determine what could be good by nature for her at the moment of 
deciding by thinking if her choice might be good for someone else.  The focus on the 
moment is either because existentially and phenomenologically speaking there is only 
this moment and no one else could be in it, or that, in purely relative terms, what is good 
for one is not always good for another or for all.  Sextus does not care for relativism save 
for where it aids in revealing the experience of aporia, or where it is part of expressing 
the experience of aporia itself.  It does both here. 
 ‘I fail to grasp’ is the fourth sceptical utterance, and it further accentuates the 
revelation of the sceptic’s experience of aporia through showing that “the sceptic avoids, 
for the present, positing or abolishing any of the non-evident matters being 
investigated.”216  I group into this fourth category of utterances Sextus’ ‘all things are 
ungraspable,’ as both of these utterances report an individual’s pathe, with the word ‘all’ 
in both instances limited to what is relative to the present investigations of the sceptic.  
The sceptic is not determining that things are certainly not graspable, as the Academics 
tended to conclude, but is saying that the goodness of one choice of action over another is 
not presently evident or determinable.   
 The final utterance is a familiar one by now: ‘to every argument an equal 
argument is opposed.’  As with the previous utterances, it is said only in terms of relating 
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the sceptic to whatever investigation she is undertaking at the moment.  Hence, ‘every 
argument’ does not mean every single one in existence, but merely every one that has 
been presented thus far in the present investigation.  The meaning of the utterance is once 
again not a dogmatic statement, as might be understood by one who thinks that 
Pyrrhonian scepticism holds itself to general principles or to a philosophical theory, but 
should be understood in light of the specific understanding of Pyrrhonism as a revelatory, 
experiential approach to using language in an aporetic way, such that it reflects the 
aporia that the sceptic feels.  
 Sextus indicates that ‘some sceptics’ urge that this utterance be employed only in 
the imperative, such that it is stated as ‘let us oppose to every argument an equal and 
opposite argument’.  They urge this so that the sceptic  
 
 will not be lead astray by the dogmatist and give up his sceptical mode of 
 investigation, and so, because of his rashness, lose that freedom from disturbance 
 which is apparent to them and which they believe is dependent on suspension of 
 judgement about everything, as we said above.217 
 
 The sceptics who urged this almost certainly included Pyrrho, as it is he who began the 
linguistic approach to maintaining aporia, and who was most concerned with how 
unchecked language use can lead to rash beliefs and opinions.  We might understand the 
imperative-approach to utterances as something a novice sceptic might do in earnest, not 
yet having fallen into ataraxia nor found his stride in aporetic praxis.  Pyrrho himself 
embodied this approach to life; he himself never said that anything was more being than 
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not being, and remained undogmatic, uncommitted, and unpersuaded in his own everyday 
statements about the nature of reality.  His scepticism was no armchair philosophy, and it 
was not concerned with general accounts of principles or conclusive arguments, but with 
specific language and how, in practice, people generate beliefs about non-evident things 
based on false assumptions as much as true ones.  Sextus shares this concern about the 
beliefs generated by and through everyday language use, as expressed in the numerous 
ways already discussed, the strongest of which being the nature of the tropes, the 
fundamental practical nature of the utterances, and the way that Sextus incorporates the 
aporetic language of the utterances throughout the writing of the Outline of Pyrrhonism. 
 The ‘perhaps’ mentioned earlier in the passage from Sextus218 seems to allow for 
the aphasia that was thought to be part of Pyrrho’s development of the sceptical sage.  
The novice sceptic may in fact say or do nothing, being overcome with the sense of 
aporia, and may be seen to fall to apraxia by those ignorant of the mature Pyrrhonian 
way and the fact that the sceptic is merely choosing to say nothing.  Sextus supports this 
in suggesting that aphasia is a state of mind, though “we [Pyrrhonians] do not understand 
by aphasia something that inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that 
we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it in regards to the things 
that are under investigation.”219  Thus, not speaking or offering any statement about 
whatever is under investigation is not necessarily inaction – that one can act without 
speaking is beyond question – but aphasia is by virtue of the silence itself, an expression 
of the aporia that the sceptic feels, and the epoche held because of this feeling. 
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 These are the sceptical utterances as Sextus treats them in the Outlines.  I have 
spoken of Pyrrho as offering the initial utterance of ‘no more’, which Sextus treats 
separately from the utterances mentioned above, though very much in the same way.  As 
was discussed in the section on Aenesidemus, it was thought that his utilization of ‘no 
more’ was an exercise in relativity, which appears to have pervaded the utterances that 
Sextus describes in the sense that all utterances “do not have any unqualified significance 
but are in fact relative to the sceptic and the sceptics [themselves].”220  The utterance ‘no 
more’ is for Sextus an expression of the state of mind that the sceptic finds herself 
experiencing by applying the tropes to a given investigation.  Any option given to the 
sceptic by the tyrant appears to the sceptic to be ‘no more’ good than not good in that 
goodness is neither apprehended, nor, due to the equipollence of arguments, any more 
present in one option than in another.  If the sceptic feels the desire to express herself 
with regard to the choices she has or how things appear to her, the utterances provide 
ways that express her aporia but also ways to ‘thwart every sophistical trick’221 that a 
dogmatist may throw at the sceptic in trying to incite her to slip from her suspensive 
attitude.   
  
3.13 Shielding, Suspending, and Purging 
 The sceptics do not use the utterances as anything but a shield from sophistical 
wrangling, though a more apt analogy might be found in calling the utterances a web of 
articulation which suspends the sceptic above the mire of troubling beliefs that they 
perceive dogmatic language inevitably creates.  Like the characterization of Pyrrho’s 
                                                
220 Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.207. 
221 Ibid., PH 1.208. 
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sceptical sage in the first chapter, showing him to be a linguistic nomad unfettered by 
troubling ontological beliefs due to the suppression of dogmatic utterances, the sceptic of 
the Outlines induces aporia and maintains it through the utterances for the perceived 
benefit, stumbled upon in suspending judgment, of no longer being troubled by so many 
beliefs about her ontological situation.  Both sceptics, to the point that we might speak of 
them as one since they share the fundamental sceptical attitude towards what can be said 
with certainty in language, wish to use the very medium that controls our ability to make 
meaning and sense, to suppress just how much we let language speak itself.    
 The Pyrrhonists do not venture into the realm of argument like many imagine a 
person labeled a ‘sceptic’ would or should.  This is the prerogative of an Academic 
sceptic, to be sure, as he delights in refuting and dialectically attacking every position, 
including his own.  A Pyrrhonian does not share in this argumentative approach for no 
other reason than that she practices aporia, and practices epoche, and to do these things 
is fundamentally to use language differently.  If one feels that a given position or 
argument on a topic is no more trustworthy than another, or any other, then to engage in 
argument is viewed as equally unscrupulous.  The feeling of aporia and epoche drops the 
Pyrrhonian into a different use (or ‘way,’ to follow the meaning of ‘trope’, as well as 
Benson Mates’ book title, The Skeptic Way) of language than that which an Academic 
uses, evidenced by the Academic’s misappropriation of Pyrrho’s ‘no more’ utterance into 
an eristic weapon that, rather than expressing or lending to epoche, was only used as a 
dialectical chess piece for argumentation.  Pyrrhonians step back from the entire 
chessboard, viewing the game as a whole as not appearing to help one to achieve 
eudaimonia.  
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 Sextus speaks of the sceptical phrases as “purgative drugs, which not only 
eliminate the [unhealthy] bodily humours but also drive themselves out along with the 
humours.”222  He says this to describe the way that the sceptical phrases are used to 
express the pathe of a sceptic, and the way that the phrases are not committed to or 
assented to in any way.  The phrases or utterances aid the sceptic in expressing and 
maintaining epoche and an aporetic disposition, but any dogma that the utterance may 
have conveyed or belief that the sceptic may have had in the utterance is purged by the 
very epoche it expresses.  In terms of this purgative relation that the sceptic has with the 
utterances, we might view language itself as having a purgative function as well.  In 
exploring this, I wish to draw in the aphasia that has been mentioned in connection with 
Pyrrho’s sage as well as in Sextus’ account of the sceptic’s state of mind, and show how 
sceptical aphasia can be understood as something other than simply being dumbstruck. 
 Language itself is like a purgative.  Before even becoming a sceptic, the sceptic 
implicitly took language first as a mode of inquiry, assuming it to be an accurate medium 
for relating subject to object and for describing the human situation.  Becoming more 
sceptical and finding only aporia and equipollence in arguments regarding the nature of 
things, the sceptic steps back from the initial assumption that language can accurately 
relate what he perceives, knows, or feels, to the external word, and vice versa.  That is, he 
suspends judgement on all arguments and takes up the Pyrrhonian practice of maintaining 
that disposition of suspended judgement through the tropes and sceptical utterances.  The 
practice of epoche through the utterances is that very stepping away from language; it is 
the stepping away from the implicit assent to the assumption that language describes or 
relates the human condition to the external world in a way that is in itself dogmatic.  Only 
                                                
222 Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.206. 
 159 
in using language with the initial hope of finding truths about reality to make his life 
better does the sceptic come to this end, this end being the conclusion of the sceptic’s use 
of implicitly dogmatic language.  Having altered his disposition from unconsciously 
dogmatic to consciously aporetic, he finds that language must be altered to suit the 
altered disposition.  This is the function of the practice of sceptical utterances: to purge 
language of the implicit dogmatic disposition it foists upon its users.   
 The switch to consciously aporetic language marks the beginning of sceptical 
aphasia.  By this I do not mean that the sceptic does not speak, but that she finds herself 
unable to speak the tacitly dogmatic language that assumes to relate infallibly things in 
their true nature to the objects of thought and perception held by an individual.  No 
longer can the sceptic simply say ‘I see the chair’ or ‘the Green Party has a good 
platform’ as she actively qualifies everything to accommodate the aporia she feels 
towards what can be said.  ‘Seeing’ is no longer an infallible perception, but more 
importantly, the verb ‘to see’ is consciously held at arm’s length and not held to be 
synonymous with knowledge.   
 Dogmatism and the language it fosters are viewed by the Pyrrhonians as most 
commonly found in everyday language. We might think of when Adam stood in the 
garden of Eden and accused the animals and everything of their being, accusing them of 
their names as he pointed at them, dogmatically making up the truth of it as he went.  To 
not accuse things of their being, to not act as if perception were beyond questionable, and 
to not act as if the perceptual verbs that we use to articulate our views lent to an infallible 
relation between human to true nature, is to try and ‘speak’ against the grain of language.  
Aporetic language tends to speak against the grain of language – the necessity for 
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Anesidemus’ apology for such language speaks to the difficulty he probably encountered 
both in expressing himself but also in finding someone to listen to his aporetic 
disposition. 
 The sceptic is struck dumb because of his altered disposition and the way that 
language is not geared for someone to articulate oneself fallibly.  Speaking from an 
aporetic disposition, having disavowed the dogmatic one, the sceptic not only has the 
pathe of aporia but the further feeling of aphasia.223  To proclaim, to make a statement, 
to declare, to argue, to speak: these are all inherently dogmatic in their function.  
Language assumes certainty, and to try to be uncertain in making propositions requires 
additional work.  The realization of this extra work – carried forth by the practice of the 
utterances – is the end of language as the sceptic had hitherto used it and the start of what 
I call aphasic language.  This can largely be viewed as being synonymous with aporetic 
language as practiced by the sceptical utterances, but singles out the linguistic nature of 
it.  It is aphasic because from a dogmatic disposition, the aphasic speaker is not saying, 
or claiming, anything.  It is language operated from an aporetic disposition in accord with 
the Pyrrhonian practice of the tropes and utterances. 
 To be sure, the sceptics can and do qualify statements with phrases and utterances 
that diminish the ‘determining’ power that statements inherently have.  Aphasic language 
is precisely the habit on the part of the Pyrrhonist that maintains the aporetic state within 
the sceptic, allowing ataraxia fortuitously to follow him everywhere.  As has been said 
numerous times, he does not epoche on what appears to him to be; rather, he suspends 
judgement on whether what appears to be can be said to relate to things at all.  The 
Pyrrhonian sceptics therefore: use the tropes and utterances to shield themselves from 
                                                
223 Note: Sextus calls aphasia a state of mind or a state of the soul.  See PH 1.206. 
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slipping into dogmatism; use language to purge themselves of dogmatic language; and 
use the utterances to suspend themselves above the tumult of assumptions and beliefs that 
dogmatism and a dogmatic disposition bring about. 
 An example of the sort of troubling belief that the Pyrrhonist would avoid 
altogether can be found in the old debate about the existence of gods.  There is an influx 
of atheists who attack theists with the same virility with which many theists attack non-
believers.  Often, it has become as impossible to talk to an atheist about the possibility 
that gods might exist, as it is to talk to a theist about gods not existing.  Both sides of the 
argument have developed devout believers, and more often than not, devout, militant 
believers are those who think any who believe anything contrary to his or her own beliefs 
are wrong and in need of correcting.  Moreover, these militant believers are so caught up 
in their arguments and beliefs that they themselves often do not know where argument 
begins and belief starts, or vice versa; but to be sure, they are indubitably sure, 
particularly the atheist, that her beliefs are founded entirely on rational argument.   The 
aim here is not to dip into the god debate, but to expose enough of it to show that beliefs 
– strong beliefs, at that – develop out of incoherent, false, and fundamentally uncertain 
arguments just as quickly as beliefs develop out of coherent arguments.   
 Still further, beliefs develop out of previously held beliefs, such that the validity 
of the foundation of the antecedent belief is not even questioned in the development of 
the consequent belief.  The Pyrrhonian concern for how we develop beliefs becomes 
increasingly apparent, especially considering the way beliefs often develop unconsciously 
and embed themselves into an individual’s language, but also a society’s language.  This 
leads to many reciprocal, circular, and hypothetically based beliefs, which are the bread 
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and butter of what the tropes expose.  For example, many people, atheists and theists 
included, believe something initially and find arguments to fit the belief, and refuse to 
acknowledge or are not even aware of such things going on in their psyche, thereby 
having a belief as the ‘bare assertion’ or hypothesis for another belief, or even an 
argument.  They speak as if their beliefs are grounded by solid argument and logic on all 
four corners, and lose themselves in letting language speak for them.  That is, language is 
allowed to operate with the dogmatic disposition spoken of earlier, where most 
everything that is or can be said, is ‘known’ in the strong and absolute sense of the verb.  
Little is said of a thing that is not an accusation of the true nature of the thing; that is, 
there is no space for uncertainty.  ‘I see the chair’ is a proclamation about the nature of 
the object before the subject, and is heard only as such (as hearing is as much a part of 
speaking as is listening) and is understood as a direct ‘knowing’ (Sextus’ criticism of 
apprehension) of the object by the subject.  ‘Gods do not exist’ follows the same form: it 
is a statement about the nature of the gods and is heard only as a claim to knowledge.  To 
speak such a statement or to hear such a statement uttered in such a way that it was not a 
claim to knowledge goes against the grain of language – so much so, that a ‘non-
statement’ does not seem to make sense.  The Pyrrhonian may suspend judgement on 
knowing the true nature of the chair as much as knowing the true nature of the gods; the 
fact remains that fewer people develop hatreds or political parties over differing views on 
the nature of chairs. 
 As mentioned at the outset of this thesis, linguistic determinism – the 20th century 
concept that one’s language determines one’s thought – appears to have deep roots in the 
Pyrrhonian approach to aporetic language use in that Pyrrhonians seemed to presuppose 
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some version of linguistic determinism in their approach to language praxis.  Linguistic 
determinism was and still is a greatly debated subject, and a discussion in this thesis 
regarding aporetic linguistic praxis and its relation to a 20th century thinker such as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein would be interesting and, I think, very fruitful.  I did not touch upon 
this topic as the focus of this thesis has been on the historical development of Scepticism, 
with the cynosure being Pyrrhonism and its approach to living a happier life.  
 Pyrrhonism wades into the mire of beliefs and language, and through its practice 
forces the sceptic to operate language with an aporetic rather than a dogmatic disposition.  
Epistemological, metaphysical, and ontological uncertainties are kept at the forefront of 
how the Pyrrhonist speaks, thereby allowing him to speak about things that he may 
suspend judgement on without succumbing to beliefs about those things.  More to the 
point, he avoids the emergence of unfounded beliefs upon previous unfounded beliefs, 
and finds himself unexposed to strong beliefs and strong emotions regarding them.  He is 
not apathetic, inactive, or silent, since the tropes and utterances provide for ways of 
expressing how he feels about things.  Strong beliefs regarding those things, however, are 






















     Conclusion 
4. The Linguistic Praxis of Pyrrhonism 
and the Sceptic Way 
 The root teachings of Pyrrho have been shown to focus on a way to speak that 
inculcates uncertainty and suspended judgement.  He recommended an attitude towards 
reality via language practice that reduces the power and number of beliefs one may have, 
and he went about teaching this view by a pedagogy of revealed experience and living the 
practice himself by maintaining things to be no more being than not being.  Introducing 
epoche, his philosophy was always aimed at helping the individual to achieve a less 
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troubled life, exemplified by the questions and answers that he posited for those who 
wished to live a happier life.   
 By comparing his philosophy with that of Plato and Socrates, many similarities 
are brought out, most notably the importance of the experience of aporia and the lack of 
desire for eristic argument.  Much like Socrates, Pyrrho did not argue for a particular 
position and wished to underscore the experience of aporia as essential to living a 
happier life.  This was outlined by examining passages from Plato’s Meno, Theaetetus, 
and Phaedo whereby: similarities between Plato’s use of hypotheses and Pyrrho’s 
language praxis were drawn out, and Socrates’ own state of aporia, or awareness of his 
own ignorance, was shown to be integral to his ability to act as a midwife for the ideas of 
others.  Overall, Socrates and Pyrrho appeared to have similar pedagogical goals in that 
both wished to enjoy a happier life through the recognition of the limitations of 
knowledge. 
 The Academic sceptics serve as a foil against which the peculiar linguistic 
practice of Pyrrhonism is highlighted.  Pyrrho focused on suspending judgement and a 
pedagogy of altering language so as to maintain aporia and reduce troubling beliefs; on 
the other hand, the Academics wished to use eristic argument over and above any 
pedagogy they may have had for improving the life of the individual.  The Academics, 
Carneades specifically, lacked the revelatory experience of aporia and most importantly 
lacked the aporetic language praxis, though they did aim to cast their opponents into 
uncertainty.  In the end, the Academic sceptics and the Pyrrhonian sceptics have very 
different goals and very different ways of going about achieving them. 
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 Aenesidemus was found to have criticized the Academics heavily and explicitly 
revived the language practice of Pyrrho.  He systematized a set of ten tropes or ways to 
epoche which, along with his relativizing focus on Pyrrho’s ‘no more’ locution, set back 
in motion the aporetic disposition maintained in language that Pyrrho started.   
 Sextus Empiricus embodied the practice of aporetic language in the very writing 
of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and his use and discussion of the tropes as well as the 
sceptical utterances therein were geared towards ‘what can be said’ of things such that he 
unmistakably supported the linguistic approach to maintaining aporia and epoche to 
stumble upon ataraxia.  With the aporetic language practice in hand, Sextus’ in-depth 
discussion of phantasiai, apprehension, epoche, and ataraxia come together to show the 
shielding, purging, and suspending ways of Pyrrhonism: shielding from falling to 
speaking dogmatically; the purging effect that utterances have on dogmatism as well as 
themselves; and the suspending function that the aporetic attitude and sceptical utterance 
have in holding the sceptic away from language that develops beliefs. 
 The way of the sceptic is not a path that is quickly grasped nor easily understood.  
The life of the sceptical sage, which I have alluded to repeatedly in the hopes of 
clarifying the sceptic’s way of life, is perhaps the best way to show once again the 
complete path of the sceptic now that we have traced aporetic language praxis from its 
birth with Pyrrho to its flowering in Sextus.  In this final examination of the way of the 
Pyrrhonian sage, I wish to make it clear that the sceptical life insofar as I have developed 
it in concert with aporetic language praxis, is a progression from a pre-sceptical or novice 
period to the level of a fully sceptical sage. The point at which the novice becomes the 
sage involves the implementation of aporetic language into regular practice. 
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 The novice strives to achieve something – namely happiness – and this is carried 
out with a dogmatic disposition as well as dogmatic language.  Like a dogmatist, or more 
likely, an Academic, the novice sceptic begins his inquiry with the belief that either his 
inquiry into happiness has or will find some truth (dogmatist), or that his inquiry cannot 
or will not find any truth (Academic).  As the sceptic learns and applies an aporetic 
language to his everyday life, suspending judgement on everything and developing an 
aporetic disposition via aporetic language practice, he no longer believes ‘dogmatically’ 
or ‘Academically’ that he will or will not find truths in his inquiry.  Rather, ataraixa 
befalls him, having suspended judgement on everything and adopted aphasic or aporetic 
language so completely that he does not think dogmatic thoughts nor speak dogmatic 
statements.  No longer troubled by the desire to prove anything, nor troubled by the 
beliefs that follow and build upon dogmatic statements and thoughts, the sceptic becomes 
a Pyrrhonian sage.  The evolution from novice to sage is a subtle one, and I do not think 
that the sceptic is necessarily conscious of the manifestation of tranquility that she has 
brought about.  The story that Sextus tells about the painter Apelles is somewhat 
misleading in this way.224   By the story it would seem that the occurrence of ataraxia is 
as sudden and obvious as an unexpected yet expertly accomplished brush stroke.  
Freedom from disturbance does not, however, follow from the accomplished strokes of 
the painter, but from the suspensive state into which he had fallen.  What Apelles 
accomplishes in the appearances of the painting, whether by intended effort or accidental 
                                                
224 “They say that when Apelles was painting a horse and wished to depict the horse’s froth, he was so 
unsuccessful that he gave up and flung the sponge that he used to wipe off the brushes.  The mark made by 
the sponge produced a representation of the horse’s froth.  The sceptics hoped to attain a freedom from 
disturbances by judging the inconsistency of appearances and ideas, and not being able to this, they 
suspended judgement.  Being in this suspensive state, freedom from disturbance followed fortuitously, as a 
shadow follows a body”  (Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.28-29). 
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happenstance, is symbolic of the sceptic’s inability to apprehend the inconsistency of 
appearances and ideas in everyday life.  Epoche follows from the inability to choose one 
appearance as true over any other; the practice of aphasic or aporetic language follows 
naturally from this, in that one who cannot choose also cannot make locutions of the type 
which claim definitive choice. 
 The occurrence of ataraxia may seem to be the root of the change from novice to 
sage, but ataraxia itself is a consequence of practiced linguistic aporia.  Therefore, 
ataraxia cannot befall the sceptic until aporetic language has pervaded her way of speech 
and way of thinking. 
 By all of this the Pyrrhonian practices the avoidance of strong beliefs and strong 
emotions concerning those beliefs.  She does not in fact, ‘doubt’ anything, yet neither 
does she assent to things either, as suspension of judgement is the inability to choose 
either.  The Pyrrhonian lives by appearances and customs, as, it might be said most 
people do already anyways, yet the Pyrrhonian does so without the added convictions or 
beliefs about the reality of the external world.  By reducing beliefs, and reducing the 
value or weight that beliefs have in one’s daily life, the Pyrrhonians seem to have found a 
disposition with which to face the world by which many people could benefit – a 







     Glossary 
 Several key terms are defined as they are utilized throughout this thesis. 
 
Aporia: The state of mind of being puzzled or uncertain, best described by Epictetus in 
 his dictum: “feel or reject the feeling that the stars are even in number.  
 Impossible.”225 
Ataraxia:  The state of mind of being at peace, undisturbed, unperturbed, or free of 
 anxiety, particularly pertaining to the happenings of everyday life. 
Epoche:  Described by most Pyrrhonian sceptics as the act of ‘suspending of judgement’ 
 whereby a decision or judgement regarding something (whether it be an 
 ontological or epistemological judgement) is not decided upon.  Closely linked to 
 aporia. 
Eristic:  Having to do with debate or dabating, particularly with winning a debate rather 
 than reaching some sort of truth.  It is contrasted with elenchus, or Socratic 
method. 
Phantasiai:  A difficult term to pin a single definition to, especially given the seemingly 
 shifting position that a sceptic such as Sextus Empiricus has regarding phantasiai.  
 A good rule of thumb definition is that phantasiai are what human experience is 
 comprises; all sense impressions and thought impressions.  
Trope:  Literally from Greek, trope means ‘way’ or ‘turn’ and is used throughout this 
 thesis to describe the ways in which sceptical phrases and arguments are 
 employed, similar to the way in which ancient sceptics employed the term. 
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